Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed his convictions on the sole issue of whether the 2013 self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code have retrospective application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that it had previously determined in R. v. Bengy that the provisions do not have retrospective effect.

The parties, two dentists operating through professional corporations, entered into a joint venture agreement that provided for termination on 90 days' notice but was silent on the consequences of termination.

The respondent gave notice of termination and sought to exclude the appellant from the practice and buy out his interest.

The application judge declared the joint venture terminated, excluded the appellant from the practice, and directed that the appellant's interest be sold to the respondent, with financial issues to be resolved separately.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction and that terminating the appellant's ownership interest was necessary to give business efficacy to the termination provision and the parties' common intention.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge presumed guilt while glossing over inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly addressed the issues and assessed the evidence, and that the appellant was merely attempting to retry the case.

Following a judgment allowing appeals and cross-appeals in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, ordering Charles Sr. to pay Diana $50,000, Charles Jr. to pay Diana $15,000, Lisa to pay Charles Jr. $15,000, and Ford to pay Lisa $15,000.

All additional requests for costs were dismissed.

Two appeals were heard together regarding whether the equitable doctrine of laches can defeat a first party insurer's loss-transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

In both cases, the first party insurers delayed several years before requesting indemnification from the second party insurers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defence of laches cannot be invoked against a statutory loss-transfer claim, as it is a claim for legal relief subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, which no longer contains a laches-saving provision.

Furthermore, even if laches were available, the second party insurers failed to demonstrate acquiescence or actual prejudice.

Lombard's appeal was dismissed and TD's appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

The plaintiff expert witness sued the defendant law firm for unpaid fees and subsequently served a Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000 plus HST 'in full and complete satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim'.

The defendant accepted the offer days before trial and argued the settlement amount was inclusive of costs.

The motion judge agreed, finding the offer unambiguous.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by adopting a literal interpretation and failing to consider the factual matrix, including the Rule 49 context and the timing of the offer.

The Court concluded the offer did not dispose of costs, entitling the plaintiff to costs under Rule 49.07(5)(b).

The appellant sought to set aside a negotiated family law settlement agreement reached during mediation, alleging duress and failure to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment to enforce the agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court applied the Miglin framework and concluded that the circumstances of the negotiation were satisfactory and the appellant failed to show the agreement departed significantly from the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent investment dealer terminated the contracts of four sales agents when it closed its Thunder Bay office.

The respondent sued for repayment of transition loans that became due upon termination.

The appellants defended the action, claiming misrepresentation by omission regarding the office closure and equitable set-off.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against two of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in fact and law, and that a fair and just determination required a trial of all claims and counterclaims together to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal of their personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2007 due to the inaction of their former counsel, and a motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought until 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the significant delay, and that actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to defend the action had been established.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued an employment agency after paying a fee for a promised job that never materialized.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents credible.

After the initial appeal was dismissed, a television program broadcast an undercover investigation exposing the respondents' deceptive practices.

The appellant moved to re-open the trial to adduce this fresh evidence, but the motion judge dismissed the request.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's reasons inadequate and holding that the fresh evidence met the test for re-opening the trial as it was cogent, previously unavailable, and could have affected the trial's outcome.

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of Blair J.A., which denied his request for the province to pay for appeal transcripts and refused a stay of child support pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the motion.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The tenant appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment obtained by the landlord respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision because the appellants failed to provide affidavit evidence explaining their delay in responding to the Statement of Claim or establishing a plausible defence.

The court noted the respondent's undertaking to credit the appellants for any re-rental amounts received and directed that the final judgment be adjusted accordingly.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds held in court related to an estate.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, alleging the real litigant was a declared vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the underlying application had not been advanced for over 10 years, the beneficiaries were elderly, and the appellant's agent could not justify retaining the funds in court.

The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.

The self-represented appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting sole custody of the two teenaged children to the respondent mother, with access at the children's discretion.

The father argued the motion judge erred in hearing the summary judgment motion after the matter was set for trial, in applying the evidentiary burden, and in assessing the children's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment framework and properly considered the children's best interests, including their expressed wishes not to have court-ordered access with the father.