Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, uttering a threat, and pointing a firearm against his intimate partner, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and using evidence of discreditable conduct, and in finding a pellet gun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as narrative and the pellet gun met the definition of a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court noting that under s. 732(3) of the Criminal Code, the imposition of a conditional sentence alongside an intermittent sentence causes the intermittent sentence to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

Following a successful appeal where a new trial was ordered, the parties agreed that the costs of the original trial should be reserved to the judge conducting the new trial.

The Court of Appeal endorsed this agreement.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for business interruption losses following a fire at their towing and collision repair facility.

They argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and misapprehended the evidence regarding the impact of the fire and subsequent arson rumours on their business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons standing alone made appellate review difficult, the basis for her rejection of the appellants' evidence and expert report was patent on the record.

The respondent obtained Letters Rogatory from a U.S. District Court to examine a former in-house counsel of a corporation in Ontario.

The application judge ordered the witness to attend for examination by U.S. counsel pursuant to U.S. rules.

The witness appealed, arguing the application judge failed to apply the proper legal test and that permitting U.S. counsel to conduct the examination infringed Canadian sovereignty and the provincial legislation governing the legal profession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the criteria for enforcing Letters Rogatory and that allowing U.S. counsel to conduct the examination for a foreign action did not constitute practising law in Ontario or infringe sovereignty.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim, arguing he was misled during a workplace investigation interview.

The trial judge found the appellant lied about the content of emails with a subordinate and his personal use of company equipment, and agreed to be a party to his subordinate's falsehood.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the McKinley proportionality test, finding the dishonesty was work-related and breached the trust required of managers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Sentence appeal from a global penitentiary term imposed after guilty pleas to multiple historic and more recent sexual offences against three child complainants, together with child pornography and breach offences.

The court held that a sentencing judge may reject a joint submission only where the proposed sentence is contrary to the public interest and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, but found the judge erred in applying that standard by failing to give sufficient weight to the guilty plea, remorse, and the avoidance of trial for the complainants.

The court also held that prior appellate authority on sentencing ranges for repeated abuse of children in a position of trust did not mandate a sentence above ten years regardless of a guilty plea.

The seven-year floor of the joint submission was too low, but the ten-year ceiling, though lenient, was not so low as to require rejection.

Appeal allowed and global sentence reduced to ten years less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant employment agency placed an employee with the respondent without checking her references.

The employee subsequently defrauded the respondent.

The respondent obtained a civil judgment against the employee and then sued the appellant for negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the appellant liable but reduced damages by 50 percent due to the respondent's contributory negligence in failing to supervise the employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation, apportionment of liability, or the prevention of double recovery.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision including his pension in the equalization of net family property and dismissing his claims for spousal support and the inclusion of a pre-separation debt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's disability pension had effectively become a retirement pension since he was over sixty years of age, and was therefore subject to equalization.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the spousal support claim due to a lack of medical evidence and a finding of purposeful unemployment, nor in the dismissal of the debt claim due to lack of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that struck a jury notice and ordered security for costs.

The respondents brought motions to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that while the right to a jury trial is a substantive right, an order striking a jury notice is collateral and does not determine the substantive issues in dispute.

The security for costs order was also held to be procedural and interlocutory.

The motions to quash the appeals were granted, with the Court noting that the delay caused by appealing to the wrong court should not be held against the appellant if he seeks leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that their faulty construction of a fireplace caused a fire in the respondent's home.

The appellants argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider that the fire's cause was undetermined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's expert evidence that the fire was caused by pyrolysis due to the chimney's proximity to a trimmer joist.

The parties made written submissions on costs following an appeal decision that yielded divided success.

The Court of Appeal held that neither party should pay costs to the other under the usual loser-pays rule.

However, because both parties acted to protect or advance the interests of the pension plan fund on their respective successful issues, the court awarded each party $15,000 in costs per court level, payable from the fund.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment.

He argued that his delay in responding to the statement of claim was adequately explained and that he had a triable defence of economic duress regarding a collection agreement, claiming the respondent barricaded his moving equipment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's rejection of the delay explanation and concluding that the facts did not establish a triable defence of economic duress, as the appellant had other practical alternatives and waited over a year to raise concerns.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary spousal support payments owed under a separation agreement incorporated into a consent order.

He argued the motions judge should only have decided the procedural issue of whether to order a trial by viva voce or affidavit evidence, not the substantive merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had a complete record, including financial disclosure, and was entitled to exercise his discretion to dismiss the requested relief on the merits.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing their personal guarantees of a corporate debt.

They argued that the respondent creditor failed to disclose a material fact: an alleged arrangement limiting the liability of a third co-guarantor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the respondent intended to deceive or knew the appellants were signing under false premises.

Furthermore, the appellants failed to provide evidence that they relied on the co-guarantor's guarantee or that they would not have signed had they known of the alleged arrangement.

The appellant, a plasterer, was bitten by a mosquito carrying the West Nile virus while working outside and was rendered a paraplegic.

His initial action against the respondent insurer was dismissed on the basis that his injury was not caused by an 'accident' under his group accident insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the illness was an unforeseen, unexpected event caused by an external source, and therefore fell within the ordinary definition of an accident.

The respondent was convicted of sexual assault against a child and received a conditional sentence.

The trial judge refused the Crown's request for a DNA databank order and a sex offender registry order, reasoning that the respondent did not present an ongoing risk to the community.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the 'grossly disproportionate' test required by the Criminal Code and by minimizing the public interest in registration.

The Court set aside the trial judge's refusal and made the requested orders.

Canada Post Corporation brought an application for an injunction to restrain the appellant from violating its exclusive privilege to collect and deliver international mail under section 14(1) of the Canada Post Corporation Act.

The appellant argued that the Act provided a complete code with specific penalties, precluding civil proceedings, and raised equitable defences of laches, delay, and estoppel.

The Court of Appeal held that Canada Post has the right to seek an injunction to enforce its statutory privilege, as the penalty provisions alone are insufficient to protect its mandate.

The Court further held that equitable defences cannot be raised against a Crown agent to prevent the operation of a public policy statute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite alleged errors in the trial judge's reasons, the core of the decision was clear and there was no basis to interfere.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge found the appellant had feigned compliance, which is tantamount to a refusal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's findings amounted to a feigned attempt to blow and denied leave to appeal.