Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed her 9-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and failed to give meaningful effect to her Aboriginal status under Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered and distinguished relevant case law, and appropriately balanced rehabilitative and Gladue objectives with the paramount need for public safety given the appellant's substance abuse and risk to the community.

The appellant, a non-citizen, pleaded guilty to obstruction of a peace officer after repeatedly lying to police about her involvement in a fatal hit-and-run committed by her boyfriend.

She received a suspended sentence.

Upon learning that the conviction rendered her inadmissible to Canada, she appealed her sentence, seeking a conditional discharge to avoid deportation.

The summary conviction appeal judge conducted a de novo hearing but dismissed the appeal, finding a discharge contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge properly applied the Supreme Court's framework in Pham regarding collateral immigration consequences and correctly concluded that a discharge would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death against a Crown Attorney.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the legal test for a threat.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no error of law of general significance and no merit to the appeal, as the determination that the words constituted a threat was a factual finding fully open to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court that had dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the concession, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-car accident.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 839 of the Criminal Code, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge failed to properly review the evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were largely factual, raised no question of law, and did not involve issues of significance to the general administration of criminal justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and put to bed by friends, who shortly after discovered the appellant having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial judge found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and rejected the appellant's claim of consensual sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed two orders: one striking his pleadings for non-compliance with court orders, and another imputing income for support purposes and vesting his half-interest in the matrimonial home in the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The court found no error in the motion judge's decision to strike the pleadings given the appellant's history of non-disclosure and default.

Furthermore, the trial judge's imputation of income and the vesting order were well-supported by the evidence and established jurisprudence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying her an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued there was no evidence she would stop taking her medication if discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's missed psychiatric appointments, lack of insight, and past omissions to take medication.

The parties entered into a marriage contract during an attempted reconciliation.

Due to a drafting error, the written agreement provided the appellant husband with the entire value of the matrimonial home, contrary to the respondent wife's intention of an equal division.

The trial judge set aside the contract, finding no meeting of the minds and unconscionability.

On appeal, the appellant sought rectification, which he had resisted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not seek rectification after insisting on enforcing the erroneous written terms at trial, and found no error in the trial judge's findings on the meeting of the minds, property valuation, support, or costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to grant leave to amend their statement of claim to allege malice and substitute a named defendant.

The underlying action against the police defendants had previously been dismissed by another judge, and that dismissal was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that it was now too late to challenge the validity of the original order dismissing the action.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants successfully appealed a motion judge's decision limiting the scope of their class proceedings based on the Limitations Act.

The Divisional Court, however, refused to award the appellants their costs of the appeal, finding success was divided, and remitted the costs issue to the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on costs, holding that the Divisional Court erred in principle by mischaracterizing the appellants' success and by failing to apply the general rule that the costs of a successful appeal should be awarded to the appellant and not depend on the outcome of a rehearing.

The appellants, a nurse and her employer, appealed a trial judge's finding that they were 50 per cent liable in negligence on a crossclaim by a hospital.

The trial judge found that the nurse's delay in diagnosing and treating a patient's vasospasm exacerbated his brain injuries.

The appellants conceded the nurse fell below the standard of care but argued the trial judge's finding on causation was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence, viewed as a whole, supported the trial judge's conclusion that the continuing negligence exacerbated the harm.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an action as statute barred under the notice provisions of the Municipal Act.

The court held there was no dispute that written notice had not been given within 10 days as required by s. 44(10), and the appellant therefore bore the onus under s. 44(12) to establish a reasonable excuse and absence of prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge's reasons were found to be careful and considered, and the appellate court found no error in the analysis or in the application of the governing principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000, and the certificate of stay was set aside.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding the deduction of a hypothetical tax on deferred compensation received after his retirement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the hypothetical tax applied to income earned during employment and received in retirement.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant insurer appealed an order determining insurance priorities in a tort action involving a rental car.

The Court of Appeal held that under the Ontario Insurance Act, as amended by Bill 118, the appellant's policy was required to respond first, regardless of whether the policies were limited to Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and indecent assault charges arising from historical child abuse allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating mere opportunity for indirect contact as giving rise to an air of reality to collusion, and by misanalyzing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed similar fact evidence.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held the judge adopted an impermissibly formulaic comparison of similarities and dissimilarities and overstated reasoning prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The errors materially affected the acquittal, and a new trial was ordered.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from an order dismissing her motion to set aside the dismissal of her wrongful dismissal action.

The action had been dismissed due to her failure to comply with a pre-trial order.

Applying the Kefeli factors, the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for her delay and lacked evidence of an arguable case on the merits.

The appellant sold his minority interest in two businesses and entered into agreements containing non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality covenants.

The duration of the non-competition and non-solicitation covenants was tied to the period he held an indirect interest in the businesses, which could only be disposed of with the consent of third-party lenders and the board.

The Court of Appeal held that the duration of these covenants was unreasonable and unenforceable because it depended on the unpredictable consents of unascertainable third parties, creating an indeterminate period with no fixed outside limit.

The confidentiality provision, however, was upheld as reasonable.

The moving party sought an extension of time and leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the responding party damages for breach of warranty regarding swimming pool equipment.

The moving party argued the Divisional Court applied a lesser standard of review to the adequacy of the Small Claims Court judge's reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the Divisional Court correctly applied the functional approach to the adequacy of reasons and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.