John I. Laskin

The appellant farmer appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay the respondent for soybean seed, chemicals, and spraying services, and dismissing his counterclaim for crop losses.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he authorized a herbicide substitution, in enforcing an allegedly illegal contract for an unregistered pesticide combination, and in calculating the quantity of soybeans ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that enforcing the contract for the unregistered pesticide combination was not contrary to public policy.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a review of a decision denying him bail pending trial under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal confirmed the detention order, finding that the applicant failed to show his detention was not justified on the primary ground.

The court noted his significant criminal record, history of breaching court orders, recent misconduct in jail, and an inadequate release plan.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment denying her request to relocate with the child to British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the principles from Gordon v. Goertz and made factual findings supported by the evidence.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's assessment of the child's best interests in mobility cases.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved substantial success in reducing the damages award, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondents were still entitled to their party and party costs of the trial because the principal findings of liability were not altered and they largely succeeded in their claim.

The court declined to alter the costs of the appeal, confirming the appellants were entitled to them due to their substantial success.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend the respondent insured, a contractor, in actions arising from an oil spill.

The insured was retained to remediate the spill but was sued for allegedly failing to clean it up in a timely and proper manner.

The insurer argued that the claims did not fall within the insuring agreement and were excluded by a pollution exclusion clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claims fell within the insuring agreement and that the pollution exclusion clause did not apply because the insured's alleged negligence constituted an independent cause of the loss occurring after the original discharge.

Following the dismissal of their appeal, the appellants made written submissions regarding costs.

They argued that costs should not be awarded on a joint and several basis, and that four appellants whose judgments were satisfied while the case was under reserve should not bear any costs.

The Court of Appeal agreed, ordering costs against the remaining appellants on a several, pro rata basis rather than jointly and severally, noting that a joint and several order would be unusually onerous.

The appellant father appealed an order varying a joint custody arrangement to grant sole custody to the respondent mother and significantly reducing his access.

The father argued the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction by granting relief not explicitly requested in the pleadings.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to rely on a consent order directing a custody assessment as defining the issues between the parties.

The Court upheld the sole custody order due to worsening conflict between the parents but found the substantial reduction in the father's access was not justified by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part to restore the father's access to four overnight visits in alternating weeks.

The appellants, a corporation and its undisclosed principal, breached an agreement to purchase land after the real estate market collapsed.

The trial judge assessed damages at the date of closing and held a third-party corporation and its principals liable on an undertaking as to damages given during an interlocutory injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the damages assessment against the appellants, finding the sealed contract rule inapplicable.

However, the Court allowed the third parties' appeal, concluding that the injunction did not cause the appellants' damages, which resulted instead from the market collapse and their deliberate refusal to close.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and improperly used his after-the-fact conduct as positive evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) principles, gave cogent reasons for disbelieving the appellant, and permissibly used the after-the-fact conduct as a factor in assessing overall credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel failed to call evidence that could have explained inaccuracies in the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge had used the statement to undermine the appellant's credibility.

The Court found that the ineffective assistance occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff commenced a negligence action for property damage caused by a fire shortly before the expiry of the limitation period.

During discoveries, it was revealed that the proper plaintiff was the plaintiff's corporation, not the plaintiff personally.

The plaintiff successfully moved to amend the statement of claim to substitute the corporation as the plaintiff.

The defendant appealed, arguing the amendment should not be permitted after the limitation period expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 5.04(2) grants the court discretion to substitute a party after a limitation period expires, provided there is no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant and special circumstances exist.

The court considered written submissions from the parties regarding costs following an appeal.

The court decided to vary its previous reasons to provide that the appellant is entitled to one third of the costs of the appeal, rather than full costs.

The University Health Network (UHN) was formed through the amalgamation of several hospitals, each of which previously held an express statutory exemption from retail sales tax.

The amalgamation statutes repealed the individual hospital acts, including their tax exemptions, but contained 'continuation of rights' clauses.

UHN sought a declaration that these clauses preserved its tax-exempt status.

The Court of Appeal held that even if a tax exemption is a 'right' under the continuation clauses, it did not survive the repeal of the specific statutes granting the exemptions.

The court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including implied exclusion, to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to continue the tax exemptions for UHN.

In supplementary reasons regarding costs, the Court of Appeal considered offers to settle made by both parties.

Despite the appellant's success on the appeal, the court ordered no costs of the appeal because the respondent's offer to settle was almost identical to the appeal result.

For the application, considering the appellant's misconduct and the various offers, the court ordered no costs to either party up to November 1, 1999, and party-and-party costs to the respondent thereafter.

The appellants, family members of a deceased cyclist, appealed an order striking their negligent investigation claim against a municipal police officer and his employer.

They alleged the officer's post-accident investigative failures caused the collapse of criminal proceedings against the driver and prolonged their emotional distress through subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

Applying the motion to strike standard and the Kamloops duty of care framework, the court held the investigating officer owed no private law duty of care to the appellants because they had no legal interest in the criminal investigation, prosecution, or discipline process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The father was ordered to pay child support in 1992.

In 2001, a motions judge reduced his ongoing child support obligations based on an imputed income of $9,000 due to his alcoholism and lack of earning capacity, and rescinded all outstanding arrears.

The mother appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reduction in ongoing support but set aside the rescission of arrears, finding that a present inability to pay does not foreclose future capacity to pay.

The Court also held that the dismissal of a prior application to rescind arrears does not constitute an absolute bar to future rescission if there is a change in circumstances.

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a bus making a left turn while she was crossing the street with the light.

At trial, the jury found the respondent driver was not negligent and found the appellant contributorily negligent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the jury's finding regarding the driver's lack of negligence was perverse, as he had a duty to yield.

However, the majority found there was some basis for the jury's finding of contributory negligence.

A new trial was ordered on the issues of contributory negligence and damages, as the damage assessment was tainted by the perverse liability finding and improper evidence regarding collateral benefits.

The plaintiff, an Ontario Provincial Police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a police cruiser.

The driver of the other vehicle was underinsured.

The plaintiff claimed under the OPCF 44 endorsement of both her personal automobile insurance policy and the police force's fleet policy.

The issue on appeal was which insurer was required to respond first.

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was an 'insured person' under the fleet policy because the cruiser was provided for her 'regular use'.

The Court found that 'regular use' does not require a personal use component.

Therefore, the fleet policy was the first loss insurance.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding the plaintiff one year's salary for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge had found the plaintiff's employment contract, which limited notice to three months, unenforceable due to misrepresentations by the defendants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of wrongful dismissal but overturned the finding that the contract was unenforceable, concluding there was no evidence to support the claims of misrepresentation regarding the plaintiff's job description or a failure to invest by the defendants.

The Court varied the judgment, limiting the plaintiff's damages to the three months' salary stipulated in the employment contract.