Jill M. Copeland

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a defamation action brought by the respondent.

They also appealed the motion judge's award of costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the impugned Facebook post did not relate to a matter of public interest, concluding it was a private business dispute despite references to masks and a potential class action.

The court also affirmed the costs award, finding no error in the motion judge's discretion to award costs given the perceived misuse of the anti-SLAPP provision.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its claims against two corporate and individual respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for lack of contractual privity and other deficiencies.

The motion judge had denied leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondents were not parties to the alleged contract (Mandate) and that other claims were unsustainable.

The court affirmed that reviewing a document expressly pleaded and incorporated into the statement of claim does not constitute considering evidence on a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion and upheld the discretionary refusal to grant further leave to amend.

The appellants sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to dismiss their action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The underlying action concerned a mortgage whose validity had been previously decided.

The Court of Appeal found the action, which included 40 causes of action in a 300-page statement of claim, to be plainly vexatious and an abuse of process, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, Adam Kaup, appealed his convictions for drug possession and trafficking, arguing two main points: that the search warrant for his home was invalid due to insufficient grounds and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that the trial judge erred in finding he had constructive possession of drugs found in the basement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the ITO, concluding that it provided sufficient grounds for the warrant when viewed holistically.

Regarding constructive possession, the court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law, considering all circumstantial evidence beyond mere occupancy, and reasonably concluded that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The appellant brought a second application for adverse possession of a smaller portion of land after a previous application for the same parcel was dismissed on summary judgment and the appeal was dismissed.

The second application was dismissed on the basis of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The appellant appealed, claiming the subject matter of the current application was not the same.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the earlier action included the smaller portion and that a claimant cannot modify the parameters of their claim within the same boundaries to obtain a different result, as this is contrary to the objective of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The appellant, Hafeez Fazl, sought a panel review of a single judge's decision to dismiss his appeal for delay.

He also requested an adjournment, initially for a religious pilgrimage, and subsequently on the grounds of being a party under a disability requiring a litigation guardian, citing a 2019 doctor's note.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the adjournment request due to a lack of proper medical or psychiatric evidence and the absence of any application under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The panel found no error in the original dismissal of the appeal for delay, noting the underlying action had been dismissed on summary judgment as being "without a scintilla of merit" due to previous litigation on the same issues.

The motion for review was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The appellant, Armando Scarlato Jr., appealed the dismissal of his breach of contract action on a motion for summary judgment.

He alleged the respondents, Richard Buzbuzian and Jason Monaco, breached an agreement to pay him a commission or finder’s fee for introducing them to a third-party corporation for a proposed IPO.

The motion judge found that emails exchanged did not constitute a contract, lacking essential terms, and alternatively, that the appellant was estopped by a settlement with the third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that no contract was formed, emphasizing deference to findings of contractual interpretation as mixed fact and law, and concluding that the term sheet did not remedy the contractual deficiencies.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their application challenging outdoor gathering restrictions imposed as public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was initially dismissed for lack of public interest standing.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying application was moot because the challenged regulations were no longer in force.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal regarding Mr. Baber's private interest standing, finding that this issue was also moot and that a decision would not resolve any live controversy or bind future hypothetical challenges.

The appellant, a professional accountant and second-time bankrupt, appealed a conditional discharge order requiring him to pay $325,000 to the Trustee.

The application judge found the appellant untruthful, evasive, and in breach of disclosure obligations under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, including failing to disclose businesses, records, property, vehicle sales, and loans/inheritance from his mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional discharge was based on the appellant's conduct and disclosure breaches, not surplus income under s. 68.

The court also addressed improper ex parte communications by the Trustee, finding no miscarriage of justice.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Michael MacKinnon was found guilty of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a knife, the victims being unarmed, the severe loss to the deceased's family, and the life-threatening injuries to the aggravated assault victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's pro-social life for 20 years, strong family support, and a diagnosis of PTSD stemming from childhood trauma and a past shooting incident.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the dated criminal record was an aggravating factor and that the mental health issues should be given limited weight.

A total sentence of 9 years imprisonment was imposed, with 3 years concurrent for aggravated assault, after accounting for 69 months (5 years and 9 months) credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months (3 years and 3 months) remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of two pre-trial motions brought by the accused, Barrington Brooks: one alleging abuse of process under the Charter and the other alleging infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court, exercising its case management powers, summarily dismissed both motions.

For the abuse of process motion, the court found no reasonable prospect of success as the allegations were not capable of constituting abuse in the current proceeding and lacked evidentiary support.

For the s. 11(b) motion, the court calculated the net delay, attributing significant periods to defence delay (due to discharging counsel) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), concluding that the total delay fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling and was not otherwise unreasonable.

The defendant, John Cochrane, was charged with one count of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The prosecution's case was primarily circumstantial, focusing on whether Cochrane possessed the heroin (either solely or jointly) and if the purpose of possession was trafficking.

The court applied legal principles regarding the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, proof of possession (including constructive and joint possession), and the assessment of circumstantial evidence.

The court found that while Cochrane had legal control over the apartment where the drugs were found, the evidence did not rule out the reasonable possibility that a co-occupant, Ms. Petersen, was in sole possession of the heroin.

As the prosecution failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was found not guilty.

Damion Stewart, charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking, brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his car and person.

He argued infringements of ss. 8 and 9, asserting lack of grounds for investigative detention, a de facto arrest without reasonable and probable grounds, and an unreasonable search.

The court found reasonable suspicion for investigative detention, and that the manner of detention and search were justified by officer safety concerns, particularly due to non-compliance and observed reaching under the seat.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, E.A., on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by effectively applying a defence of automatism without proper analysis and by conceptualizing the offences as specific intent.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not rely on automatism but rather concluded that the Crown failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt due to vagueness in the complainant's evidence and the possibility that the touching was accidental while the respondent was asleep or half-asleep.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's understanding of the offences as general intent.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on one count of sexual assault.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in not finding sexual assault on the couch, whether the reasons were inadequate regarding conflicting evidence about pinning, and whether the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings on consent were reasonable, his reasons were adequate, and he did not rely on impermissible stereotypes in his credibility assessment, having properly cautioned himself.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of making child pornography, arguing that the Crown lacked sufficient evidence for the actus reus without direct documentary proof of the alleged video.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the complainant's testimony, if believed, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to infer that a video depicting explicit sexual activity by a person under 18 was made.

The decision clarified that direct documentary evidence is not an absolute requirement for conviction, as circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.

The defendant was charged with assault, choking with intent, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The central issue was identification, with the Crown relying on the complainant's identification and DNA evidence, while the defence presented an alternative explanation for the DNA findings through witness testimony.

The court found the complainant's identification evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and uncertainty.

Although the DNA evidence was compelling, the defence witnesses' accounts, despite minor flaws, raised a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the alleged assault at the Liberty Village apartment.

The court also addressed, for completeness, the elements of sexual assault and unlawful confinement, finding the sexual assault elements met but not the unlawful confinement elements due to uncertainty regarding intent.

The defendant was found not guilty on all counts.

J.S. brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on reverse onus charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and firearm offences.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including new sureties (father and godfather) addressing previous concerns about the mother's health, and the elevated risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in detention facilities.

Considering the proposed strict house arrest plan, the applicant's lack of criminal record, and the overall circumstances, the court determined that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground.

The bail review was granted, and J.S. was released on a $15,000 surety recognizance with strict conditions.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) analysis and providing insufficient reasons.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her credibility findings were entitled to deference, and she properly applied the W.(D.) principles and provided adequate reasons.