David Parry

The defendant brought a s. 8 Charter motion to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, arguing procedural flaws related to the use of the telewarrant process and substantive flaws regarding the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the telewarrant procedure was justified due to impracticability, not necessarily urgency, and that the ITO, when read holistically, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance despite minor imperfections.

Consequently, the seized evidence was admissible.

The defendant, Tekle Tamzean Ogbamichael, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue was the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator from poor-quality video evidence and recognition testimony from his probation officer.

The court found the identification evidence, including the probation officer's testimony, to be unreliable due to concerns about overstatement, confirmation bias, and the poor quality of the visual evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove identification beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all charges.

The Crown brought two applications: a Leaney application to admit lay opinion recognition evidence from the accused's probation officer, and a Similar Fact application to introduce evidence from two other complainants (N.T. and A.B.) to prove identity and propensity.

The court granted the Leaney application, finding the probation officer's long-standing familiarity with the accused put her in a better position to identify him on video, and that concerns about tainting went to weight, not admissibility.

However, the court denied the Similar Fact application for N.T. due to issue estoppel, as the accused had been acquitted of sexual assault (though convicted of assault) in that case, precluding relitigation of the sexual nature of the touching.

The application for A.B. was also denied, as its probative value was outweighed by the prejudice of forcing the accused to testify on untried charges, raising the spectre of inconsistent verdicts and compromising his right to silence in an upcoming trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a young girl aged 14-15 years at the time of the offence, contrary to section 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to follow his directive that the trial proceed in French and that the interpretation provided was inadequate, thereby violating his language rights under section 530 of the Criminal Code and his right to interpreter assistance under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, finding that the appellant had full knowledge of his language rights, freely chose to proceed in English, and raised no objections at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of attempting to possess a firearm and transferring ammunition, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

The court found the offender was a mid-level marijuana dealer and was actively engaged in a business enterprise of supplying illegal firearms and ammunition for profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and 9 months, less 5 months credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, leaving 4 years and 4 months to serve.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts of fraud over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000, as well as seeking leave to appeal his custodial sentence of two years less a day.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's s. 11(b) Charter application regarding delay.

The trial judge found that the delay, which exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials, was justified by exceptional circumstances including the appellant's inability to represent himself and the complexity of the case.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction appeal dismissal and granted leave to appeal sentence only to set aside the mandatory victim fine surcharge order.

Kevin Hanse was charged with firearm and ammunition offenses, with the Crown's case relying heavily on wiretap interceptions using alleged code words like "car," "whip," "gas," and "snub." The defence sought to introduce internet search results from "weedmaps.com" and "wikileaf.com" through an articling student to suggest that "snub" and "gas" were slang terms for marijuana, thereby challenging the Crown's interpretation.

The court conducted a voir dire and ruled the internet evidence inadmissible.

The judge found that the evidence did not meet the strict criteria for judicial notice of adjudicative facts, as the sources lacked indisputable accuracy and the facts were not notorious or generally accepted slang for marijuana.

The court emphasized the need for accuracy and reliability in evidence presented to a jury, rejecting the argument that trial fairness or cost considerations should relax the evidentiary standards for adjudicative facts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder of a drug dealer who was found dead with blunt force trauma to the head and multiple stab wounds.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the appellant's connection to the deceased, knowledge of his residence, financial motive, threatening text messages, cell phone evidence, and possession of the deceased's stolen belongings.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: exclusion of alternate suspect evidence, admission of threatening text messages, and failure to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The defendant, Dale Lapps, brought an application to resile from an admission made by his counsel regarding the admissibility of his trucking logs in his third trial for importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the admission was binding under section 655 of the Criminal Code and professional conduct rules.

The court found that an application was necessary to withdraw an admission and that such withdrawal is only permitted in narrow circumstances, such as mistake or misunderstanding, which were not demonstrated by the applicant.

The application was dismissed, and the admission stood.

The applicant, Givan Iusein, sought to stay extradition proceedings to Romania, where he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, from which he fled.

He argued abuse of process based on alleged police violence, torture, sexual assault, an unfair trial, delay in the extradition process, and deliberate attempts by Romanian authorities to mislead Canadian authorities.

The court found that while there was likely some limited police violence immediately after his arrest, the claims of extensive torture, sexual abuse, and unfair trial were largely fabricated and uncorroborated by medical evidence.

The court also found that the applicant's exculpatory statements were not coercively obtained and that he had legal representation and the opportunity to testify at his trial.

The delays in the extradition process were largely attributable to the applicant.

The court dismissed the application to stay, concluding that the high threshold for abuse of process was not met and that alternative remedies were available through the Minister of Justice or civil action.

The applicant was committed for extradition.

The applicant, sought for extradition to Romania for a manslaughter conviction arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident, applied under s. 32(1)(c) of the Extradition Act to adduce expert accident reconstruction evidence.

The applicant sought to challenge the reliability of the requesting state's expert report regarding his speed at the time of the collision.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence did not establish that the requesting state's evidence was manifestly unreliable, as the applicant's expert lacked access to the complete evidentiary record.

The court further held there was sufficient evidence of dangerous driving and manslaughter to justify committal, and ordered the applicant committed into custody to await surrender.

Andre Evans, an adult offender, sought orders of prohibition and certiorari to prevent the Crown from using his youth records as an aggravating factor in his sentencing hearing.

The Crown had previously obtained an order from a youth court justice under s. 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to access these records after the prescribed access period expired.

Evans argued that the youth court justice exceeded jurisdiction by granting access and that using the records would compromise his right to a fair trial due to principles of privacy and rehabilitation for young persons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the youth court justice acted within jurisdiction and that society's interest in truth-seeking and public safety outweighed Evans' privacy interest, which could be protected by a publication ban.

The defendant, Andre Evans, was charged with 15 counts including procurement, human trafficking, assault, criminal harassment, drug trafficking, and various firearms offences involving two complainants, KJ and AB.

The court acquitted Evans on the procurement charges (counts 1 and 13) for both complainants, finding insufficient evidence of inducement.

However, Evans was found guilty of human trafficking (counts 2 and 12) for both complainants, as the court determined he exercised control and influence over their movements for exploitation, creating a culture of dependence and fear.

He was also found guilty of assault (counts 3 and 14) against both complainants, criminal harassment (count 4) against KJ, breach of a non-communication order (count 15), possession of marijuana and cocaine for trafficking (counts 5 and 6), and all five firearms offences (counts 7-11).

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of nine and a half years imprisonment for armed robbery convictions.

He abandoned his conviction appeal and argued two errors: first, that the trial judge failed to impose a sentence as short as necessary for a youthful offender's first penitentiary sentence, and second, that the trial judge granted insufficient enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting the conceded reduction of 7½ months for pre-sentence custody credit but dismissing the argument regarding the length of the sentence itself.

The final net sentence was reduced to 7 years and 4½ months.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after fatally shooting the victim in the chest during a dispute.

The court inferred the shooting was intentional for intimidation purposes but assumed the offender did not intend to hit the victim.

The court declined to revisit the constitutionality of the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong family support, the court imposed a sentence of six years, reduced to three years less 15 days after credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown sought an order under section 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code to introduce a videotaped statement of a child complainant in a sexual assault trial.

The defendant opposed, arguing the statement was not made within a reasonable time and should be excluded under the court's residual discretion.

The court found the delay in reporting was reasonable given the child's age, the accused's position of authority, and the child's belief she would be arrested if she told the secret.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statement and granted the order, subject to the complainant adopting the statement at trial.