COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-90000344-00MO
DATE: 20180525
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA
– and –
LASZLO SOPRONI
Person sought/Applicant
Adrienne Rice, for the Attorney General
David Parry, for the Person sought/Applicant
HEARD: March 29, 2018
B.A. ALLEN J.
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Application to Adduce Evidence under Extradition, s 32(1)(c))
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[1] Laszlo Soproni (“Mr. Soproni”) brings this application under s. 32(1)(c) of the Extradition Act to adduce evidence at the extradition hearing. The Attorney General for Canada (“the A.G. (Can.) challenges the application on behalf of the Republic of Romania.
[2] Mr. Soproni was convicted in Romania of killing a 12 year old girl in a motor vehicle accident on May 20, 2008. He was driving along a county road in Romania in the afternoon on when he struck and killed the girl who was walking on the shoulder of the road. The child was projected into the air. Mr. Soproni left the scene of the accident. A truck driver stopped him about 10 km away.
[3] The police reported that the speed limit on the road at the site of the accident was 50 km/hr. An accident reconstruction expert, Florian Urdea, an engineer, was retained. He prepared a report in which he made findings about the accident. Among his findings he estimated Mr. Soproni was travelling at about 90 km/hr. at the time of impact. Eyewitnesses estimated the speed to be 75 to 100 km/hr.
[4] Mr. Soproni was arrested. After the expiry of a travel restriction Mr. Soproni left Romania for Canada where he is a citizen. He did not attend his trial in Romania but was represented by a lawyer in absentia. He was convicted in December 2009 of manslaughter and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Mr. Soproni appealed only his sentence and in September 2010 his appeal was denied.
[5] Romania, the “requesting state”, sought extradition of Mr. Soproni to enforce the sentence. In August 2016 the Minister of Justice of Canada issued an Authority to Proceed under s. 15 of the Extradition Act which allows the A.G. (Can.) to seek his committal for the corresponding offence of manslaughter as set out under s. 234 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Soproni was arrested in Canada in October 2016. An extradition hearing was scheduled for March 23, 2017.
[6] Mr. Soproni filed a Notice of Application seeking a stay of the extradition proceedings. Mr. Soproni alleged he was subjected to physical violence and threats by Romanian police when he was arrested. I dismissed the Application.
[7] The extradition process involves requests for disclosure from the foreign state. The Local Court of Marghita and the Bihor County Police in Romania disclosed to the A.G. (Can.) documents related to Mr. Soproni’s case. This included a Record of the Case dated June 26, 2014 and an additional Record of the Case dated December 29, 2015 with annexes (appendices), each record written in Romanian and translated into English (collectively, “the ROC”). On record is a certification by Romania of the contents of the ROC.
[8] The ROC consists of records of court proceedings, police statements by Mr. Soproni, statements from the police, the report from the accident reconstruction expert, photos of the accident scene and vehicle, summaries of statements from eyewitnesses to the accident, medical and forensic reports, and a statement from a lawyer who represented Mr. Soproni before trial.
CANADIAN LAW OF MANSLAUGHTER AND DANGEROUS DRIVING
Manslaughter
[9] Section 234 of the Criminal Code provides that: “Culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide is manslaughter”. There are two requirements to make out manslaughter (a) conduct causing the death of another person; and (b) fault short of intention to kill: [R. v. Creighton, [1993] 3. S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)].
[10] On culpable homicide s. 222(5)(a) of the Criminal Code states:
222.
(5) A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of a human being,
(a) by means of an unlawful act.
[11] Proof of the unlawful act of manslaughter requires the Crown to establish the actus reus and mens rea of the underlying unlawful act or “predicate offence”. The Crown must also prove the mens rea for the unlawful act of manslaughter which is reasonable foreseeability of risk of bodily harm which is not trivial or transitory in the context of a dangerous act. Foreseeable risk of harm not foreseeable risk of death is required to establish manslaughter: [R. v. Creighton, at pp 371-381]. The question to be asked is whether the unlawful acts of the accused were a significant contributing cause of the victim’s death: [R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 30, at para. 14 – 15, (S.C.C.)].
Dangerous Driving
[12] The predicate offence in this case, the underlying offence of dangerous driving, is the unlawful act that was found to have led to the death of the young girl. The actus reus is set out in s. 249 (1) of the Criminal Code:
249 (1) Every one commits an offence who operates:
(a) A motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public , having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place
[13] The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Roy provided important developments to understanding the actus reus of dangerous driving. To determine whether the actus reus has been established requires an inquiry into “whether the driving viewed objectively, was dangerous to the public in all the circumstances”. The focus is on the manner of driving not on the consequences of the accident: [R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 33, (S.C.C.)].
[14] The definition of the fault factor in the offence seeks to distinguish simple carelessness from a “marked departure” from the standard of care. The test is whether the dangerous manner of driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances:
The first [question] is whether, in light of all the relevant evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible. If so, the second question is whether the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances.
[R. v. Roy, at paras 33-34 and 36]
The inquiry is “whether the manner of driving, which is a marked departure from the norm, viewed in all the circumstances, supports an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the circumstances would have exhibited”. The mens rea of deliberate dangerous driving would support a conviction for dangerous driving, but is not required: [R. v. Roy, paras. 40-41].
APPLICATION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
The Law
[15] On this Application Mr. Soproni opposes the findings in the accident reconstruction report prepared in Romania by Mr. Urdea. He seeks to adduce, under s. 32(1)(c) of the Extradition Act, for the extradition hearing, a report by a Canadian accident expert, Barry Raftery, an engineer.
[16] There is not a limitless entitlement to adduce evidence in an extradition proceeding under s. 32(1)(c). A person sought, that is, the person subject to extradition, must establish that the evidence they seek to adduce is: (a) relevant to the test for committal and; (b) considered by the judge to be reliable. The relevancy requirement is linked to the test for committal as set out under s. 29 of the Extradition Act.
[17] Under s. 29(1) the extradition judge’s statutory task is defined as determining whether there is evidence “of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada.” The test at a preliminary inquiry in Canada to determine committal for trial is set out under s. 548 of the Criminal Code as whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty. In the extradition context the judge decides whether there is any evidence on which the extradition judge could reasonably commit the person to custody in Canada to await surrender to the requesting state.
[18] The Supreme Court of Canada in M.M. v. United States explains the relevance requirement in the following passage:
…this is the key point – the relevance requirement is linked directly to the test for committal under s. 29 of the Extradition Act. In other words, the evidence must be relevant to the task of the extradition judge, that is, whether the test for committal under s. 29(1) of the Extradition Act has been met. (This relevance requirement is the same whether the evidence is otherwise admissible under Canadian law or not). To decide whether the proffered evidence is relevant in this sense, the extradition judge must consider the proposed evidence in light of the limited weighing of evidence which he or she must undertake on applying the test for committal.
[M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62, at para. 76, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.)]
[19] The following principles govern the extradition judge’s assessment of the evidence from the requesting state:
• The extradition judge must find the evidence from the requesting state to be “manifestly unreliable” to exclude it: [United States v. Ferras, at paras. 53 and 54].
• The extradition judge may engage in a “limited weighing” of the evidence to exclude evidence that is “manifestly unreliable”: [United States v. Ferras, [2006] 2 S.C.R., at paras. 53-54].
• An extradition hearing is not a trial and the extradition judge’s role in assessing the reliability of the evidence presented by the requesting state is a restrained one: [M.M. v. United States, at paras. 64 and 70].
• The extradition judge’s starting point is a presumption in law that the certified evidence from the requesting state is presumptively reliable: [United States v. Anderson (2007), 2007 ONCA 84, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at paras. 52-56, (Ont. C.A.)].
• Challenges to the reliability of the evidence must meet an onerous standard. Concern about the evidence becomes germane to the s. 29(1) inquiry if the concerns about the evidence are sufficiently powerful to justify the complete rejection of the evidence; [M.M. v. United States, at para. 72].
• An extradition judge’s consideration of the evidence sought to be adduced must be conducted in light of the entire record: [M.M. v. United States, at para. 78].
• Satisfaction of the high standard is likely only in very rare situation: [M.M. v. United States, at para. 85].
[20] M.M. v. United States circumscribes the boundaries of the “limited weighing” by the extradition judge as not including:
• weighing competing inferences that may arise from the evidence, other than in the limited sense noted in Arcuri of considering that the inferences sought to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are reasonable;
• deciding whether a witness is credible or his or her evidence is reliable, beyond determining that the evidence is not “so defective” or “so unreliable”, it should not be given any weight;
• evaluating the relative strength of the case put forward. There is no power to deny extradition simply because the case appears to the extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to succeed at trial.
[21] This means that evidence directed to contradicting or providing a defence to the evidence adduced by the requesting state, or evidence aimed at establishing an exculpatory account of events, is inadmissible as irrelevant. An extradition judge has no authority to weigh the evidence presented to decide issues of credibility or to draw competing inferences: [M.M. v. United States, at paras. 83 and 84].
[22] The ultimate issue for the extradition hearing is whether the evidence establishes a prima facie case for the unlawful act of manslaughter, that is, whether there is sufficient evidence to justify Mr. Soproni’s committal for the unlawful act of manslaughter.
Application of the Law and Analysis
[23] Mr. Soproni does not dispute the facts as set out in the ROC. Mr. Soproni concedes his identity as the person prosecuted in Romania. He also concedes, if there is sufficient evidence to establish the offence of dangerous driving, there is sufficient evidence of manslaughter.
[24] Mr. Raftery prepared a report dated March 16, 2017 and a supplementary letter dated March 22, 2017. In his report he challenges Mr. Urdea’s report from a number of perspectives. He takes the view that Mr. Urdea’s report:
• contains conflicting observations;
• uses unrealistic assumptions;
• contains the mistaken belief that the speed of the vehicle can be evaluated from knowledge of the location of debris;
• contains the mistaken belief that the speed of the vehicle can be precisely calculated by making unrealistic assumptions regarding the shape of the damage profile to the vehicle;
• is based on two calculations that are purported to be scientific but yield very different results with respect to the calculation of the speed of the vehicle.
[25] Mr. Raftery concedes he had insufficient information to calculate speed. He points to the insufficiency in the number of photographs to evaluate the accident. He states in the supplementary letter that he believed he had the complete record of evidence but realized from conversations with Mr. Soproni’s counsel that he did not have all the documents collected in the investigation. That is, he did not have access to all the information relied upon by Mr. Urdea to arrive at his conclusions.
[26] Mr. Raftery had some black and white photos when he prepared his initial report but among those photos he did not have photos of the damaged vehicle. Also not available to Mr. Raftery were:
• reports of the police officers’ on-site observations;
• the statements of the five eyewitnesses who witnessed the accident;
• minutes of the reconstruction; and
• the forensic and medical reports.
[27] I accept the A.G. (Can)’s argument that the unavailability of evidence at Mr. Urdea’s disposal when he prepared his report is by itself fatal to Mr. Soproni’s ability to satisfy the weighty burden to show Mr. Urdea’s findings were manifestly unreliable.
[28] Mr. Urdea had the benefit of seeing the site of the accident himself and of making notes of his observations. He had photos of the accident site. He had available the accounts of police officers’ investigations and eyewitnesses’ statements about the position of the victim and her circumstances before the accident, the dynamics of the accident, the point of impact, and their estimations of the speed of the vehicle. To form the conclusions in his report Mr. Urdea had the entirety of the photos taken of the site, photos of the vehicle at the site and photos of the vehicle taken after it was transported to be impounded.
[29] Mr. Urdea estimated that, at the time of the accident, the vehicle could have been travelling between 88 to 104 km/hr. and, at the time of impact with the victim, the speed was estimated at 90 km/hr.
[30] Whether the disputed Romanian report is manifestly unreliable must be assessed in light of the entire record. Mr. Raftery did not have available the entire record to form his conclusions. Even without Mr. Urdea’s report, the other evidence on the record is sufficient to obviate a finding of manifest unreliability. The record is such that the balance of the evidence, Mr. Urdea’s report aside, supports his conclusions, for instance:
• the evidence of the eyewitness, Gheorge Lazar, who observed the high speed of Mr. Soproni’s vehicle, its deviation from the road’s service, the impact with the victim, her resting place after impact and the departure of the vehicle from the scene;
• the evidence of eyewitness, Omut Aurel, who also observed the high speed of Mr. Soproni’s vehicle, its proximity to the location where the children were walking at the road’s shoulder and its departure from the scene without stopping;
• the evidence of Cristian Angel Dimbrau whose observations regarding the high speed of Mr. Soproni’s vehicle are in accord with two other eyewitnesses. He observed the impact with the victim and her resting place after impact; he was available at the reconstruction and described the position of Mr. Soproni’s vehicle and the children at the time of the accident;
• the evidence of the police officers who attended the accident scene and secured it; they interviewed the eyewitnesses; they took photos of the scene on the day of the accident; they observed that the road surface was dry asphalt with no visible traces of braking; the officers located and collected fragments from Mr. Soproni’s vehicle and observed the speed limit where the victim was struck was 50 km;
• the evidence of the police officers who arrested Mr. Soproni after the accident who observed damage to the front right side of the vehicle; Mr. Soproni told the officers he might have hit a child who was on the shoulder of the road;
• the evidence of the officers who examined the vehicle on the day of the accident and a day later at the impound site; they took photos of the vehicle which showed the damage caused by the impact with the victim; it was found that fragments found at the scene came from the vehicle;
• the police officers who attended the reconstruction of the accident took photos and spoke to eyewitnesses from which they concluded that, before the accident, children were in the grass near a park wall and that on impact the right side wheels of Mr. Soproni’s vehicle were off the roadway near the park wall;
• the statements to the police from Mr. Soproni which state that: he saw children on the right in the direction he was moving; he did not slow down to prevent danger; and in the area of the crossroads he hit something on the right but he did not know what; the radio was on so when he heard “some hit, as of stone”, he kept driving.
• the forensic and medical evidence.
[31] Operating from a substantial evidentiary handicap Mr. Raftery focuses his critique on Mr. Urdea’s calculations of the speed of the vehicle before and on impact. He critiques the methodology Mr. Urdea employs to calculate the speed of the vehicle which Mr. Urdea estimated based on the projection of fragments of debris from the vehicle on impact and on a profile of the damage to the vehicle.
[32] Mr. Raftery opines that the methodologies used and conclusions made on Mr. Urdea’s theories of speed are based on unrealistic assumptions and conflicting observations.
[33] Mr. Urdea bases his conclusion of the point of impact by the location of the victim’s slippers after impact. Mr. Raftery points out that the victim’s slippers landed in two different locations. The right slipper landed 7.75 metres west of where the left slipper landed. Mr. Raftery calls Mr. Urdea’s conclusion on the point of impact based on the location of the slippers unrealistic because there were not two points of impact.
[34] Mr. Raftery proposes there is good reason to believe the point of impact was further west of where Mr. Urdea estimated, further west of where the left slipper was found. In his critique Mr. Raftery employs what I find amounts to another methodology to show the flaws in Mr. Urdea’s analyses.
[35] Mr. Urdea’s also arrives at estimates of the speed of the vehicle from the projection of debris from the vehicle such as paint and plastic fragments and other debris. He considered the weight and size of fragments of debris projected from the vehicle and their final resting places after impact to estimate the speed of the vehicle on impact.
[36] Mr. Raftery critiques Mr. Urdea’s estimates of speed based on the final resting place of the debris from the perspective that Mr. Urdea bases his calculations on only three of nine pieces of debris (not counting the slippers). Mr. Raftery uses Mr. Urdea’s calculation method to arrive at speed calculations based on eight pieces of debris. He concludes that Mr. Urdea’s findings on speed using this method are arbitrary and unreliable. Mr. Raftery points out that Mr. Urdea took into account speed based only on three pieces without providing a basis for selecting the three pieces of debris he chose.
[37] In his examination of Mr. Urdea’s findings on the damage profile, Mr. Raftery works backward from Mr. Urdea’s analysis of the speed calculations which calculations Mr. Urdea derived from the nature of the damage to the vehicle. Mr. Raftery arrives at another conclusion on what configuration would more realistically be the outcome of Mr. Urdea’s findings. Mr. Raftery concludes that the damage configuration that would result from Mr. Urdea’s methodology would be rectangular in shape.
[38] Mr. Raftery finds that rectangular-shaped damage is not realistic. He presents calculations and a schematic illustration to demonstrate that a realistic damage configuration would be more in line with a triangular shape. Mr. Raftery concludes from this that Mr. Urdea’s estimation of speed based on the nature of the damage to the vehicle is unreliable.
[39] Mr. Soproni contends that in advancing his conclusions Mr. Raftery is not presenting a competing or alternative methodology to that of Mr. Urdea. He takes the position that he is challenging the foundation, the basic methodology Mr. Urdea employs, in arriving at his estimation for the speed of the vehicle.
[40] I find some fallacy in that argument. Mr. Raftery does not critique Mr. Urdea’s methodologies from an investigative vacuum. He uses his own tools to present his perspective on Mr. Urdea’s debris projection and damage profile theories. In effect Mr. Raftery uses other methodologies and perspectives to question the speed estimations Mr. Urdea arrives at from the placement of accident debris and the damage to the vehicle. In arriving at the conclusion that Mr. Urdea’s results are unreliable what Mr. Raftery actually does is find fault with the inferences Mr. Urdea draws from the accident data. This is the type of evidence courts have forbidden an applicant to adduce for an extradition hearing.
[41] Courts have made it clear that the purpose for the proposed evidence should not be to advance a view that competes with the evidence from the court of the requesting nation. It is not the task of the extradition court to weigh competing inferences that may arise from the evidence. This is what Mr. Soproni asks of this court. A competing view does not meet the standard of manifest unreliability, even more so when as in the case before me, the competing view is not based on the entire record that was before the court of the requesting nation: [France v. Diab, 2014 ONCA 374, at para. 63, (Ont. C.A.)].
[42] In France v. Diab, the extradition judge went so far as to characterize the requesting state’s expert report as: “shown to be based on some questionable methods and on an analysis that seems very problematic”; “susceptible to a great deal of criticism and attack”; “convoluted, very confusing, with conclusions that are suspect”. Notwithstanding that adverse opinion, the extradition judge concluded the French expert’s report was not manifestly unreliable: [France v. Diab, at paras. 61 and 63].
[43] Even were I to accept Mr. Raftery’s assessment of Mr. Urdea’s report, I would not find Mr. Urdea’s evidence to be manifestly unreliable. It is evident there are some shortfalls in the methodologies Mr. Urdea used in relation to debris and damage configuration to arrive at the speed of the vehicle. On the face things, some of Mr. Raftery’s criticisms appear to have some validity. But I cannot find that Mr. Urdea’s report descends to the level of manifest unreliability if the Court of Appeal in France v. Diab provides guidance for what that means.
[44] M.M. v. United States raises a central consideration for the judge on extradition. The Court cautions that before proceeding to hear evidence from a person seeking to challenge the evidence of the requesting state, “there should be a showing that the proposed evidence is realistically capable of satisfying the high standard that must be met in order to justify committal on the basis of reliability of the requesting state’s evidence”. The Court goes on to say there is no point in admitting the evidence if there is no reasonable likelihood that it will impact on the question of committal: [M.M. v. United States, at para. 77].
[45] I find that Mr. Raftery’s evidence is not of strength sufficient to justify disregarding Mr. Urdea’s report in determining the question of committal for surrender.
Conclusion on Adducing Expert Evidence
[46] Mr. Soproni has not rebutted the presumption of reliability. Mr. Raftery’s evidence did not meet the threshold of showing the manifest unreliability of Mr. Urdea’s report. I am not satisfied the expert evidence the Romanian court relied on is “so suspect that it is devoid of reliability and of utility to the fact finder”: [France v. Diab, at para. 126]. Mr. Raftery’s concerns about the reliability of the evidence are not sufficiently powerful as to justify the complete rejection of the evidence: [M.M. v. United States, at para. 72].
[47] I deny the Application to adduce the proposed evidence.
COMMITTAL FOR SURRENDER
[48] The A.G. (Can.) seeks an order committing Mr. Soproni into custody to await surrender.
[49] An extradition hearing is not a trial. Extradition is intended to be a simple and expeditious process by which Canada surrenders persons sought to its extradition partners: [M.M v. United States at para. 38]. My task under s. 29(1) of the Extradition Act is to determine whether there is evidence “of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada.”
[50] The inquiry in determining committal is whether the underlying facts of the charge would prima facie have constituted a crime were it to have been committed in Canada: [M.M. v. United States, at para. 65].
[51] I agree with the A.G. (Can)’s position that the evidence in the ROC is sufficient to justify Mr. Soproni’s committal for the unlawful act of manslaughter. On each of the essential elements of the predicate offence of dangerous driving there is evidence on the record that is not manifestly unreliable.
[52] Under certain circumstances excessive speed can alone ground a conviction in dangerous driving: [R. v. Richards (2003), 2003 48437 (ON CA), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 154, at paras. 10-11, (Ont. C.A.)]. There is evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the manner of Mr. Soproni’s driving was objectively dangerous to the public due to his speed and other circumstances surrounding the collision. Eyewitnesses estimated his speed at impact to be from 75 to 120 km/hr. where the speed limit was 50 km/hr. The Romanian expert evidence estimated that at the time of the accident the vehicle could have been travelling between 88 to 104 km/hr. and at the time of impact with the victim the estimated speed is at 90 km/hr.
[53] As discussed earlier, the objective test for dangerous driving involves an assessment of whether a reasonable person would have foreseen risk and taken steps to avoid it, if possible, and whether the accused’s failure to avoid the risk, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances. Areas in the factual context disclose that Mr. Soproni’s excessive speed created risk of injury to the public:
• There were people on the side of the road where Mr. Soproni was driving which he acknowledged by his statement that he saw children;
• The photos show residential homes and other buildings in the area;
• He was driving at an excessive speed as he approached a curve in the road before a crossroads leading to a risk he would have a problem keeping control of his vehicle at the curve;
• He had his radio on as he drove at a high speed which he acknowledged was why he kept driving after hearing “some hit, as of stone”.
[54] From a set of circumstances where Mr. Soproni was driving at an excessive speed over the 50 km/hr., through a curve in the road, with his radio on, in an area where people including children would likely be, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Mr. Soproni’s driving was a marked departure from the norm.
[55] A momentary lapse in attention or judgment is not sufficient to found criminality: [R. v. Roy, at para. 26 and R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at paras. 53 and 54, (S.C.C.)]. The evidence supports a finding that Mr. Soproni was aware of hitting something with some force. He continued to drive after he was aware he had hit something. The facts of the case before me do not support a finding of a momentary distraction or lapse of judgment.
[56] I find the facts support a finding of dangerous driving.
[57] Mr. Soproni concedes that manslaughter is made out if the predicate offence of dangerous driving is established. However, for completeness, I will address the elements of manslaughter.
[58] As noted above, the mens rea for the unlawful act of manslaughter is reasonable foreseeability of risk of bodily harm which is not trivial or transitory in the context of a dangerous act. Given the surrounding circumstances and the potential for great injury or harm to result from the contact with a speeding vehicle it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Soproni’s dangerous driving would likely subject a person to danger or harm that was neither trivial nor transitory.
[59] Consideration must also be given to whether there is a prima facie case that the unlawful act of the accused was a significant contributing cause of the victim’s death: [R. v. Maybin, at paras. 14 - 15]. I find a prima facie case has been met. There is no evidence on the record that anything but Mr. Soproni’s dangerous driving was the cause of the young girl’s death. The medical evidence in the ROC reveals that the lesions caused by the impact with the vehicle directly caused the victim’s death.
[60] The defence does not contest committal for surrender at this stage in the extradition process.
DISPOSITION
[61] The Application to adduce evidence is dismissed.
[62] I order Mr. Soproni committed into custody for surrender.
B.A. ALLEN J.
Released: May 25, 2018
COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-90000344-00MO
DATE: 20180525
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA
– and –
LASZLO SOPRONI
Accused
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Application to Adduce Evidence under Extradition, s. 32(1)(c))
B.A. ALLEN J.
Released: May 25, 2018