David Parry

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder after shooting the victim multiple times in a public alleyway following an altercation.

The Crown sought 13 to 14 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 11 years.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of gun violence in a public place and the devastating impact on the victim's family against mitigating factors including the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a life sentence with a 12-year period of parole ineligibility.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after shooting and killing the victim outside Scotiabank Arena.

The accused admitted to the shooting but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, claiming he believed the victim was the Devil and that he was on a mission to save the world.

The court found that while the accused had a mental disorder, he exaggerated and fabricated symptoms.

Relying on the accused's organized conduct before, during, and after the offence, the court concluded he was capable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The NCR defence was rejected, and the accused was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Islam Elmajbri of two counts of sexual assault involving a patient, MC, in the emergency department of Toronto Western Hospital.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant, particularly due to his alcohol dependency and inconsistent testimony.

The judge accepted Elmajbri’s evidence that the touching was incidental and part of routine cleaning services provided by personal service workers (PSWs) in the ED, and that MC consented to being cleaned.

The court also ruled that the two incidents could be treated as a single transaction and admitted evidence of the second incident as similar fact evidence.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Elmajbri’s conduct was sexual in nature or that consent was vitiated by his position.

This criminal trial concerned charges of threatening death, assault with a weapon, and breach of probation against the accused.

The charges stemmed from an altercation between the accused and the complainant, who had a prior history, including a previous assault conviction of the accused against the complainant.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the Crown's two witnesses (the complainant and an independent eyewitness) against the accused's testimony, applying the principles from R. v. W.D. The court found the Crown's witnesses credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's self-defence claim and his overall testimony.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The Crown brought a Dangerous Offender application following the offender's convictions for multiple violent offences against his intimate partner, including assault causing bodily harm, choking, and forcible confinement.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal record, which included 134 convictions, many involving violence against domestic partners and strangers.

Relying on psychiatric evidence and risk assessments indicating a very high risk of violent reoffending and intractable behaviour, the court found that the offender met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation under s. 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Concluding that a determinate sentence followed by a Long-Term Supervision Order would not adequately protect the public, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied for an order remanding the defendant, Gregory Eze, for an assessment under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code, to determine if he might be declared a dangerous or long-term offender.

The court found that the predicate sexual assault offences qualified as "serious personal injury offences" under s. 752(a).

The court then assessed whether there were reasonable grounds to believe Eze might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, applying a low threshold of "real possibility." Reviewing Eze's extensive criminal record, including multiple aggravated assaults and other violent offences, the court found a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour involving significant violence and physical control over victims, coupled with a lack of remorse and insight.

The court concluded that the Crown met the burden under s. 752.1(1), allowing the application for a 60-day assessment.

The accused was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for shooting the victim.

The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The court noted that this was the accused's second first-degree murder conviction, but due to the Supreme Court's decision in Bissonnette, consecutive periods of parole ineligibility could not be imposed.

The court also ordered a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a lifetime non-communication order with the victim's family and a key witness.

The respondent brought a motion seeking to dismiss the applicant's spousal support claim on the basis that she did not meet the definition of "spouse" under the Family Law Act.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for interim disbursements.

The court dismissed the applicant's adjournment request, finding she had ample time to secure counsel.

Applying the Hryniak v. Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court determined that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the threshold question of whether the applicant was a spouse.

Based on extensive objective evidence, including the parties' statutory declaration for immigration purposes, tax returns, driver's licenses, and third-party affidavits, the court found that the parties did not cohabit continuously for three years and did not otherwise meet the definition of "spouse" as interpreted by the Molodowich v. Penttinen factors.

The court noted significant credibility issues with the applicant's evidence.

Consequently, the respondent's motion was granted, and the applicant's claims were dismissed.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a mid-trial application to exclude bank records due to late disclosure, arguing a violation of his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown sought to admit the records to corroborate a key witness's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while disclosure was not ideal, it did not render the trial unfair, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by recalling the witness for further cross-examination.

The court emphasized that exclusion of evidence for late disclosure is reserved for exceptional cases where no other remedy suffices.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.

The accused, Michael Assefa, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, exclusion of breathalyzer results, alleging a breach of his section 8 Charter right to privacy due to being video-monitored while urinating in a police holding cell.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court found the breach serious and its impact significant, leading to the exclusion of the breath readings.

However, the court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it was not one of the "clearest of cases" and an alternative remedy (exclusion of evidence) was available.

Following a trial where the accused was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault, the court considered whether entering convictions on both counts would violate the rule against multiple convictions.

The court found that the two assaults constituted a single transaction with sufficient factual and legal nexus.

On the joint position of the parties, the court entered a conviction on the first count and conditionally stayed the second count pursuant to the Kienapple rule.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a cleaner working in a downtown concourse.

The accused admitted to committing two common assaults but denied they were sexual in nature.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible and found the complainant's evidence reliable.

Applying cross-count similar fact reasoning, the court found that the first assault was intentionally sexual and that the second assault, occurring moments later, was also objectively sexual in nature.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses including assault, pimping, and material benefit from sexual services.

He sought leave to appeal his 55-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of evidence regarding the appellant's strategy to induce the complainant back into sex work as an aggravating factor.

The Court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unreasonable, considering both aggravating factors (domestic violence, significant injuries) and mitigating factors (limited duration of events, complainant's prior involvement in sex work, low financial gain), and the appellant's extensive criminal record indicating a high risk of recidivism.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his niece and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the absence of a motive to fabricate, the use of prior consistent statements, the evaluation of inconsistencies in testimony, and the weight given to the complainant's demeanor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which properly considered the complainant's age and the context of the defence's arguments.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal against sentence was also dismissed, as the sentence of two years less a day was deemed reasonable given the nature of the offences and the appellant's position of trust.

The applicant, Michel Lalancette, was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

Prior to sentencing, he brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the simple possession and trafficking provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

He sought to challenge the provisions as they apply to all scheduled substances.

The court held that the applicant lacked private interest standing to challenge the simple possession provision, as its invalidation would not mitigate his sentence for trafficking.

The court also declined to grant public interest standing, finding that other reasonable and effective means exist to challenge the provisions.

The constitutional challenge was therefore limited to the trafficking provision as it relates to heroin.

The appellant appealed a 24-month conditional sentence.

Based on unusual circumstances, significant pre-sentence custody, fresh evidence, and a Crown concession, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence unreasonable.

The court accepted a joint submission and varied the sentence to 12 months' incarceration, less 5 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of 7 months.

The two accused were charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm following an incident in a van outside a party.

The Crown alleged the complainant was highly intoxicated, blacked out, and did not consent or lacked the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse with both men.

The accused gave statements to police claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge rejected the accuseds' statements but found the complainant's evidence regarding her level of intoxication and blackouts insufficiently reliable to prove lack of subjective consent or lack of capacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated by an unlawful arrest and an illegal strip search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based on a confidential tip and observed behavior consistent with a drug transaction.

The Court also found that while the rearrangement of the appellant's clothing constituted a strip search, it was conducted reasonably and was necessary for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.