David Parry

The defendant, Andre Evans, was charged with 15 counts including procurement, human trafficking, assault, criminal harassment, drug trafficking, and various firearms offences involving two complainants, KJ and AB.

The court acquitted Evans on the procurement charges (counts 1 and 13) for both complainants, finding insufficient evidence of inducement.

However, Evans was found guilty of human trafficking (counts 2 and 12) for both complainants, as the court determined he exercised control and influence over their movements for exploitation, creating a culture of dependence and fear.

He was also found guilty of assault (counts 3 and 14) against both complainants, criminal harassment (count 4) against KJ, breach of a non-communication order (count 15), possession of marijuana and cocaine for trafficking (counts 5 and 6), and all five firearms offences (counts 7-11).

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of nine and a half years imprisonment for armed robbery convictions.

He abandoned his conviction appeal and argued two errors: first, that the trial judge failed to impose a sentence as short as necessary for a youthful offender's first penitentiary sentence, and second, that the trial judge granted insufficient enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting the conceded reduction of 7½ months for pre-sentence custody credit but dismissing the argument regarding the length of the sentence itself.

The final net sentence was reduced to 7 years and 4½ months.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after fatally shooting the victim in the chest during a dispute.

The court inferred the shooting was intentional for intimidation purposes but assumed the offender did not intend to hit the victim.

The court declined to revisit the constitutionality of the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong family support, the court imposed a sentence of six years, reduced to three years less 15 days after credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown sought an order under section 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code to introduce a videotaped statement of a child complainant in a sexual assault trial.

The defendant opposed, arguing the statement was not made within a reasonable time and should be excluded under the court's residual discretion.

The court found the delay in reporting was reasonable given the child's age, the accused's position of authority, and the child's belief she would be arrested if she told the secret.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statement and granted the order, subject to the complainant adopting the statement at trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and one count of failure to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment while the defence sought four years.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years, taking into account aggravating factors including the quantity of cocaine, the ongoing commercial enterprise, a prior conviction for similar offences, and breach of bail conditions, balanced against mitigating factors including the guilty plea, genuine remorse, youth, difficult childhood circumstances, and support from family.

The appellant pled guilty to two robberies and an assault, receiving a total sentence of 4.5 years plus 60 days.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused and that the sentencing judge erred by referencing a robbery he was not convicted of.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity justified by the appellant's lengthy youth record compared to his first-offender co-accused.

The court also held the factual error was harmless, as the robbery the appellant was convicted of involved similar violence, and the sentence was at the low end of the range for home invasion robbery.