Darla A. Wilson

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a motion to set aside a noting in default.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) had repeatedly delayed filing a defence, despite extensions and changes in counsel.

The motion judge applied the principles for setting aside a noting in default, considering the full context, including the parties' behaviour and reasons for delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's comprehensive analysis and dismissed the appeal, affirming that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed given the defendants' prolonged non-compliance.

The appellant, Brian Kumar, sought a review of a single judge's order requiring him to post $5,000 security for costs before proceeding with his motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The underlying action involved allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Kumar, whose statement of defence was struck due to non-compliance with court orders.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed Kumar's review motion, affirming the original order for security for costs due to his consistent pattern of non-compliance with court orders.

The appellants, small and mid-size businesses, appealed a class action decision regarding business interruption insurance claims stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.

They sought coverage for revenue losses, arguing that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 or civil authority orders constituted "physical loss or damage" to their property under their insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that neither the virus's presence nor the civil authority orders met the "physical loss or damage" criteria for business interruption coverage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondents (defendants in the original action) on jurisdictional grounds.

The appellant (plaintiff) sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that removed his counsel of record.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that an order for the removal of counsel is interlocutory and must be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

Five bellwether individual issues trials were heard as summary judgment motions to determine whether class members who were placed in administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries were entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond their share of the aggregate damages award.

The court assessed the idiosyncratic harm suffered by each plaintiff, taking into account their pre-existing mental health conditions and other stressors.

The court awarded additional compensatory damages to three plaintiffs ($50,000, $25,000, and $75,000) who proved that their time in segregation caused specific, additional harm.

The claims of the other two plaintiffs were dismissed as they failed to prove causation.

The court declined to award punitive damages in any of the cases.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a long-standing negligence action stemming from a 2010 explosion.

The Plaintiffs brought motions to strike the Defendants' pleadings for alleged non-disclosure of settlement agreements and for the recusal of the case management and trial judge due to a perceived apprehension of bias.

The Defendants brought a motion for directions concerning the scope of damage claims, specifically challenging a new "reinvestment claim" advanced by the Plaintiffs.

The court dismissed both of the Plaintiffs' motions, finding no change in the litigation landscape requiring disclosure of the agreements and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the Defendants' motion for directions, ruling that the Plaintiffs' new reinvestment theory of damages was unpleaded, untimely, and would cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action served new expert reports very late, just prior to the third scheduled trial date.

The defendants objected to their admissibility due to non-compliance with the court-ordered timetable and the inability to secure responding reports.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay unreasonable, noting the issue of potential conflict with the original experts (retained through a company owned by the former solicitor's husband) was known since 2016 and highlighted by a recent mistrial decision.

The judge deemed the late reports presumptively inadmissible but deferred the final determination of admissibility to the trial judge.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and profound brain damage following a Caesarean section delivery.

She brought a medical malpractice action against the obstetrical and anaesthesiology teams.

The court found that the obstetrical team met the standard of care.

While the staff anaesthesiologist breached the standard of care in three respects, the court concluded that these breaches did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.

The court accepted expert evidence that the cardiac arrest was caused by an unpredictable and unpreventable amniotic fluid embolism, rather than hemorrhagic shock.

The court also ruled that the claim against the anaesthesiologists was not statute-barred due to the discoverability doctrine.

The action was dismissed.

This motion sought court approval of proposed settlements totaling $500,000 for tort and accident benefits claims on behalf of a party under disability who sustained a traumatic brain injury in a pedestrian-motor vehicle accident.

The court approved both the tort settlement of $60,000, finding it reasonable given uncertain liability and pre-accident conditions, and the accident benefits settlement of $440,000.

The court also approved the solicitor's reduced fees and a structured settlement of $325,000, emphasizing the importance of pre-funding structured settlements to guarantee rates and ensure certainty for the party under disability.

The plaintiff, One York Street Inc., brought a motion seeking production of the former counsel's file for the defendants, 2360083 Ontario Limited and LCIL Ltd., and other discovery-related orders.

The defendants had initially pleaded lack of legal advice regarding a lease and its extension, but later withdrew this pleading.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants had waived solicitor-client privilege by asserting affirmative defenses of misrepresentation and placing their state of mind in issue.

The court applied a two-step test for deemed waiver of privilege, finding that the legal advice was relevant to the defendants' reliance on alleged misrepresentations and that the defendants had made the receipt of advice an issue through their pleadings.

The court granted the motion for production of the Fogler's file, deeming privilege waived due to fairness considerations.

The defendants sought an adjournment of a five-day trial because one of the named defendants was scheduled to undergo spinal surgery.

The plaintiffs' counsel refused to consent to the adjournment, demanding medical records and authorizations to speak directly with the defendant's treating physicians.

The court granted the adjournment, finding the plaintiffs' counsel's demands inappropriate and contrary to the principles of professionalism, and ordered that the plaintiffs could not recover costs incurred after being notified of the adjournment request.

This application sought court approval for a proposed settlement of statutory accident benefits claims for a catastrophically impaired party under disability, along with approval of the applicant's counsel's contingency fee agreement.

The court approved the settlement amount but significantly reduced the solicitor's requested 33.3% contingency fee to 15% of the net recovery, finding the higher fee neither fair nor reasonable given the case's lack of complexity and risk.

The court emphasized the need for detailed justification for fees, especially for parties under disability.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs recovered $87,917 on a $15 million claim for breach of a royalty agreement, the court determined costs and interest.

The defendants had made a $400,000 offer to settle just prior to trial.

The court found the plaintiffs were successful on only one issue and failed to accept a reasonable offer.

Applying Rule 49.13, the court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer, and the defendants partial indemnity costs thereafter.

This resulted in a net costs award of $177,905.99 payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

Prejudgment interest was awarded at the Courts of Justice Act rate.

In a medical negligence action, the plaintiff sought to call multiple expert witnesses of the same specialty to opine on the same issues.

During a trial management conference, the pretrial judge ordered the plaintiff to elect which experts would testify to avoid duplicative evidence.

The plaintiff objected, arguing that only the trial judge had jurisdiction to limit expert witnesses.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction under Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to make orders streamlining expert evidence and preventing duplication, emphasizing the need for trial efficiency and early disclosure.

The parties requested a consent adjournment of the pretrial and trial dates because the plaintiff served a late expert report after their original expert became ill.

The court convened a case conference and criticized both parties' conduct regarding the expert reports.

The court adjourned the pretrial to September but directed the defendant to obtain their expert's responding report by August 31, 2022, in an effort to preserve the October trial date.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, who claims over $4 million in damages following a motor vehicle accident, to attend independent medical examinations by a psychiatrist, neurologist, physiatrist, and vocational evaluator.

The plaintiff opposed the assessments, arguing they were unnecessary and duplicative.

The court granted the motion, finding that given the complex medical issues, including alleged traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, and significant loss of income claims, trial fairness dictated that the defendants be permitted to have the plaintiff assessed by these specialists to respond to the plaintiff's expert evidence.

The court also admonished plaintiff's counsel for inappropriately attempting to impose conditions directly on the defendants' proposed assessors.

The moving defendants brought a motion on consent of all parties to transfer the action from St. Thomas to Toronto.

The action arose from a syndicated mortgage investment for a property in St. Thomas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that none of the parties were located in Toronto and the only connection to Toronto was the location of counsel's offices.

The court held that the convenience of counsel is not a sufficient basis to transfer an action under Rule 13.1.02.

The defendant Unifund brought a motion to strike the statement of defence of the third party for failing to attend an examination for discovery despite multiple notices and a prior court order.

Counsel for the third party argued they had been unable to contact their client.

The court criticized the delay and lack of effort to locate the third party, ordering counsel to retain an investigator and produce the third party for discovery by August 30, 2022, failing which counsel must move to be removed from the record and Unifund may renew its motion to strike.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to Unifund.

The plaintiff, a party under disability who suffered a traumatic brain injury after being struck by a car as a pedestrian, sought court approval of a proposed settlement in his tort and accident benefits claims.

The court reviewed the proposed contingency fee agreement and found it was not reasonable, reducing the fees to 25% for the tort action and 15% for the accident benefits claim.

The court also declined to order the settlement funds be paid as a lump sum, directing counsel to obtain structure options to protect the vulnerable plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to increase the prayer for relief from $7.5 million to $57.5 million and to specifically plead personal damage claims on behalf of the individual plaintiffs arising from the forced sale of an apartment building following an explosion.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and that the individual plaintiffs, as shareholders of holding companies, had no personal cause of action under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the significant delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed prejudice that was not rebutted, and that the proposed amendments failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.