Baaba Forson

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for assault and uttering threats, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering her detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

She argued the ORB erred in finding she posed a significant threat, seeking an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's determination of significant threat was reasonable, based on her history of violence, treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight into her illness and medication, and the risk of decompensation leading to violent behaviour if medication ceased.

The court also upheld the ORB's refusal of a conditional discharge, noting its inquisitorial function was fulfilled and a detention order was necessary for public safety, as the Mental Health Act would not provide sufficient control in all foreseeable situations.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.

The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.

In a highly contentious family law matter involving child custody and support, the trial judge appointed two amicus curiae—one for the self-represented mother and one for the father after his counsel withdrew due to non-payment of fees.

The Crown appealed the amicus appointments.

Although the appeal became moot when the trial concluded with both amicus participating, the Court of Appeal issued a comprehensive judgment establishing principles governing amicus appointments in private family law cases.

The court held that the trial judge erred in principle by appointing the mother's former counsel as amicus (injecting adversarial elements inconsistent with amicus's impartial role) and by appointing a second amicus (contrary to principle in family law contexts).

The court emphasized that amicus appointments should be rare, essential to adequate discharge of judicial functions, and subject to clear, detailed orders specifying the scope of duties.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had successfully defended against both criminal and civil forfeiture applications brought by the state.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding that while the plaintiffs knew they had suffered damage when the criminal forfeiture application was dismissed, it was not legally appropriate for them to commence an action until the related civil forfeiture application and the appeal of the costs decision were finally resolved.

Therefore, the claims were brought within the two-year limitation period.

The appellant was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers while walking to a counter-protest flag rally, having committed no offence and presenting no threat of violence.

The police relied on a purported common law power to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by others.

Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Court held that no such common law power exists: the power is not reasonably necessary because statutory arrest powers already address situations where individuals resist or obstruct officers taking less intrusive measures, and effectiveness of a police action alone cannot justify an arrest if less intrusive means were available.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of damages for battery, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and found no new trial was warranted on the issue of excessive force because the arrest itself was unlawful.

This appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to appoint two amici curiae in a highly contentious and complex family law trial involving interjurisdictional issues.

The applicant mother was self-represented and exhibited emotional instability, while the respondent father's counsel was removed due to lack of funds.

The Attorney General of Ontario, as intervenor, moved to set aside the amici orders, arguing they constituted a de facto appointment of state-funded counsel.

The trial judge dismissed that motion, and this court upheld that decision.

The court found the appointment of amici was essential for the judge to discharge judicial functions, stabilize proceedings, and ensure a fair trial, consistent with established legal principles.

The amici's roles were distinct from traditional counsel, as they could not be dismissed by the parties and were not obligated to follow their instructions, primarily serving the court's needs.

The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Defendants brought a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss the claim against them and to strike the claim against Commissioner Christopher D. Lewis without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion to strike the claim against Commissioner Lewis, finding no cause of action against him as vicarious liability for torts committed by OPP officers lies with the Crown, not the Commissioner, pursuant to the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Police Services Act.

However, the court dismissed the partial summary judgment motion against the remaining OPP Defendants, emphasizing the judicial caution surrounding such motions, particularly the risks of duplicative proceedings, inconsistent findings of fact, delay, and increased expense when the activities of multiple defendants are intertwined and do not dispose of the entire action.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) that granted the respondent reimbursement for non-emergency out-of-country hip surgery.

The surgery was performed before the General Manager issued a final decision denying the funding application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the HSARB unreasonably interpreted a request for further information as a denial of services.

Furthermore, the Court held that under the Health Insurance Act regulations, prior written approval from the General Manager is a mandatory prerequisite for reimbursement of non-emergency out-of-country medical services, and neither the General Manager nor the HSARB has the authority to retroactively approve such expenses.

The respondent amicus brought a motion for leave to include the trial judge's final decision as fresh evidence in the appeal record, and for leave to serve the respondent with appeal documents by email.

The Ministry of the Attorney General, appealing the trial judge's earlier refusal to set aside the amicus appointments, opposed the fresh evidence request.

The court granted the uncontested request for email service.

However, applying the Sengmueller test, the court dismissed the request to admit the trial decision as fresh evidence, finding it would not likely be conclusive of an issue in the appeal.

The Director of the Independent Health Facilities Program appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had found that the Director lacked jurisdiction under s. 20.1(2)(c) of the Independent Health Facilities Act to amend the respondent's licence to eliminate mammography and fluoroscopy services because the respondent had never commenced providing them, and thus could not have 'ceased' to provide them.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's literal interpretation of 'ceased' was unreasonable and ignored the statutory context and purpose, which is to allow the Director to control the provision of services.

The Director's decision to amend the licence was reinstated.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their action regarding a property sale.

The appellants challenged the sale on multiple grounds, including that procedures in a manual were not followed, that the motion judge was biased, that no auction occurred, and that the sale was improvident.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the lower court judgment, holding that the manual procedures did not have the force of law, the bias argument lacked merit, the motion judge properly accepted evidence that the auction occurred, and the appellants had adequate notice and failed to provide credible evidence of impropriety.

The applicants sought to set aside a sheriff's sale of their property, which was conducted to satisfy outstanding costs awards.

They alleged the sale was improvident, the required process was not followed, and they did not receive proper notice.

The court found that the sale price was not improvident based on a realtor's opinion, the auction was properly conducted, and the applicants had actual notice of the sale despite a minor procedural non-compliance with posting requirements.

The application was dismissed.

Following the successful dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action against 78 defendants, six groups of defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered the complexity of the claims, the plaintiff's mental health, and principles of proportionality and fairness.

The court reduced several of the costs claimed to ensure comparability and fairness, ultimately awarding a total of $71,000 in costs across the successful defendants.

The plaintiff brought a civil action against 78 defendants, including various Ontario government ministries, Crown attorneys, justices of the peace, and agencies, alleging malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts arising from past criminal convictions and child protection proceedings.

The Ontario Defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the claims against the Ontario Defendants without leave to amend, finding that the claims were statute-barred, constituted an abuse of process by attempting to re-litigate unappealed court orders, and failed to plead material facts disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

The Attorney General sought forfeiture of a leisure sailboat under the Civil Remedies Act on the basis that it had been operated while the owner was impaired by alcohol or drugs.

The owner disputed that he had been operating the vessel and was self‑represented, lacked legal training, and did not speak English.

The court identified a significant legal issue as to whether the Civil Remedies Act could extend to forfeiture of property in circumstances where the property was not alleged to be proceeds or an instrument of organized criminal activity.

Given the broader implications for forfeiture practices and the imbalance in legal resources, the court appointed amicus curiae to assist on the legal issues.

The application was scheduled to return for argument after arrangements for the amicus appointment were finalized.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, marital status, and family status regarding the denial of Ontario Works benefits and interim assistance.

The applications were deferred pending the outcome of the applicant's appeals to the Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT).

After the SBT dismissed his appeals, the applicant requested to reactivate his human rights applications.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario allowed the late reactivation requests but dismissed both applications.

The first application was dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code because the SBT had already appropriately dealt with the substance of the discrimination allegations.

The second application, which alleged the SBT discriminated against the applicant by denying interim assistance, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the SBT's adjudicative decisions are protected by judicial immunity.

This appeal addressed whether trial judges may fix rates of remuneration for amici curiae and order provincial payment in criminal proceedings where amici were appointed to preserve orderly process.

The majority held that while superior and statutory courts may appoint amici in exceptional circumstances, inherent or implied jurisdiction does not extend to fixing compensation rates absent constitutional or statutory authority.

The Court emphasized separation of powers and held public-funding allocation decisions belong to the legislative and executive branches.

Dissenting judges would have recognized fee-setting as necessarily incidental to the appointment power to protect judicial process integrity.

The appeal was allowed.

The Attorney-General sought forfeiture of insurance proceeds under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court held that the insurance proceeds constituted property acquired as a result of unlawful activity within the meaning of the statute because they became payable as a consequence of the killing.

However, the court concluded that ordering forfeiture would be clearly not in the interests of justice.

Given the absence of moral blameworthiness associated with a finding of not criminally responsible, the lack of deterrent value, and the respondent’s personal circumstances, forfeiture would be manifestly harsh.

The application for forfeiture was therefore dismissed.