Anthony Moustacalis

The respondent, a former Deputy Chief of Police, was subject to disciplinary hearings under the Police Services Act.

Prior to the hearing on the merits, the respondent resigned from his position.

The Commission determined that it lost jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing because the respondent was no longer a 'police officer' within the meaning of the Act.

The counts of misconduct were dismissed.

The appellant, R.C., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised six grounds of trial judge error and a seventh ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, supported by fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge in her credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The fresh evidence did not establish that trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable standard or occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Leave to appeal the sentence was refused as it was not pressed and found not demonstrably unfit.

The applicant, a Deputy Chief facing misconduct charges under the Police Services Act, brought a motion for third-party production of various documents from the Ottawa Police Service, including the personnel and application files of a civilian complainant.

The Commission assumed jurisdiction to order third-party production and applied the four-part West Park test.

The motion was dismissed regarding the personnel and application files as the applicant failed to establish their arguable relevance, but granted regarding specific notes and emails from two other individuals that were found to be arguably relevant.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission brought a motion for a publication ban to protect the identities of two complainants in a police misconduct hearing involving allegations of sexual harassment against the respondent.

The complainants sought the ban due to concerns about psychological health and potential workplace repercussions.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test and section 9(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the desire for privacy did not override the open tribunal principle and that no serious risk to the administration of justice had been established.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.

The appellant, convicted of kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, brought an application for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The court found that the appellant advanced arguable grounds of appeal, lacked the capability to effectively argue them without assistance, and demonstrated a lack of financial means to retain counsel privately.

The application for government-funded counsel was granted.

The applicant, having been convicted of human trafficking and obstruction of justice, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds but contested the tertiary ground.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his release would not harm public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the offences, the weakness of the proposed grounds of appeal, his prior breach of bail conditions, and an inadequate release plan.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault involving his stepchild.

The prosecution relied heavily on the complainant’s testimony along with evidence that the complainant had previously disclosed the allegations to friends, family members, and a boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly admitted the prior consistent statements to rebut defence suggestions of recent fabrication and motive to lie.

However, the trial judge erred by relying on those statements as proof that the offences occurred, effectively treating them as corroborative evidence during the W.(D.) credibility analysis.

Because this constituted an impermissible use of prior consistent statements, the convictions could not stand.

A new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five charges arising from a home invasion, including an imitation firearm charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence.

He appealed to strike his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the plea to the imitation firearm charge was uninformed because trial counsel failed to advise him of it.

Furthermore, the court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the remaining charges by failing to assess the strength of the Crown's case, review disclosure, or consider potential Charter claims before advising the appellant to plead guilty.

The guilty pleas were struck and a new trial was ordered.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty based on acceptance of witness evidence that the appellant was privy to discussions about the fraudulent nature of a bank transaction.

The trial judge also stated that, alternatively, guilt could have been established through the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's reliance on wilful blindness flawed her primary W.(D.) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, when read as a whole, did not establish guilt on the basis of wilful blindness alone, but rather on the basis of actual knowledge.

The court also noted that guilt could alternatively have been established through wilful blindness.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal, hearing the appeal concurrently with a co-accused's similar appeal, found no unreasonable delay, agreeing with the trial judge's calculation of 27 months net delay.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

John Christopher De Vos was found guilty of three counts of trafficking in firearms.

He challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of three years under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter due to gross disproportionality given significant mitigating factors.

The court determined a fit sentence of 18 months imprisonment followed by two years' probation, finding the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate and thus unconstitutional.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, a DNA order, and a victim fine surcharge.

The Crown applied to disqualify a lawyer, Mr. Goldstein, from assisting in the defence of Ms. Willett, the wife of his former client, Mr. Willett, whose trial was severed from hers.

The Crown argued a realistic risk of conflict of interest due to Mr. Goldstein's duties to his former client (Mr. Willett, whose appeal was pending) and his current client (Ms. Willett).

Ms. Willett and Mr. Willett asserted a joint defence and waived confidentiality, having received independent legal advice.

The court found a substantial risk that Ms. Willett's defence could inculpate Mr. Willett, undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application to remove Mr. Goldstein was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000, arguing that his guilty plea was neither voluntary nor fully informed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and his compromised mental state resulting from a prior motor vehicle accident.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a single count of fraud involving receipt of social services benefits to which he was not entitled over a period of more than four and one-half years.

He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment to be served in the community and ordered to pay restitution of $52,027.36.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plea was voluntary and informed, that the appellant had the requisite mental capacity to enter a valid plea, and that trial counsel's performance was not deficient.

A 16-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his 14-year-old cousin.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to police were admitted in breach of section 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and admitted all statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two fatal legal errors: (1) he improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding detention from the Crown to the appellant, and (2) he erred in concluding that section 146(2) protections did not apply because the appellant's detention related to a different offence (obstruction of police) than the ultimate charge (first-degree murder).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained and entitled to the protections of section 146(2), which were not provided.

The statements were therefore improperly admitted, and the conviction was set aside with a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's legal analysis regarding contractual interpretation, no material misapprehension of evidence, and no failure to consider relevant evidence.

The motion judge's factual findings met the reasonableness standard.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

A motion for directions brought by counsel in an appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought access to transcripts of cross-examinations on affidavits to assess potential intervener status and to clear his professional reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the intervener application and no basis to provide transcripts to a non-party to support a collateral issue unrelated to the core appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on three grounds: that the trial judge improperly drew an adverse inference from the failure to call a material witness; that the trial judge failed to adequately consider frailties in eyewitness identification evidence; and that there was no evidentiary basis to reject the appellant's account of an earlier incident.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge did not draw an improper adverse inference, adequately addressed eyewitness frailties, and was amply supported by the record in rejecting the appellant's version of events.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and appropriate given the severity of injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

Originally charged on a sixteen-count indictment alleging sexual offences against three teenage girls under age 16, the Crown invited dismissal of thirteen counts.

The trial judge acquitted on sexual exploitation and sexual assault charges but convicted on sexual interference.

Seven months later, the trial judge set aside the sexual interference conviction and substituted a sexual assault conviction, imposing a suspended sentence and two years' probation.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper reliance on evidence of a witness regarding different counts, misapplication of the burden of proof, and inadequate reasons for differential credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and provided sufficient reasons.