Anthony Moustacalis

The offenders pleaded guilty to second degree murder in the death of the male offender's ex-girlfriend.

The victim was attacked with a hammer in the driveway of her home.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that both offenders should be sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it reflected the domestic nature of the murder as a significant aggravating factor, while recognizing the mitigating effect of the guilty pleas and the offenders' lack of prior criminal records.

The appellant appealed his conviction from the Ontario Court of Justice on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the ineffective assistance of counsel undermined the validity of the verdict and resulted in unfair trial procedures constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft, robbery, uttering threats, breach of recognizance, and choking to overcome resistance, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of 30 months imprisonment less two months pre-trial custody credit.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on eyewitness testimony and the complainant's evidence regarding an altercation in which the appellant kicked and punched the complainant, demanded his wallet, and threatened to "rip his throat out." The appellant's self-defence claim was rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The appellant, a physiotherapy assistant, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by considering the complainant's demure dress in court and her apparent religious beliefs as factors bolstering her credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by treating the complainant's manner of dress and religious beliefs as relevant to her credibility, these factors were given minimal weight and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture against the respondent, who had defrauded his employer of over $900,000 and committed subsequent frauds while on bail.

The sentencing judge had declined to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture, citing the respondent's inability to pay, the impact on his rehabilitation, and the availability of civil remedies for the victims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge erred by applying general sentencing principles to the forfeiture analysis.

The Court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1,036,750, with 10 years to pay and a consecutive 10-year sentence in default.

The appellant was convicted in Jordan of murdering his ex-wife in the United States and served six and a half years of a 15-year sentence before being released under a general amnesty.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition from Canada to stand trial for the same murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant's double jeopardy claim, and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review application, holding that the committal judge correctly identified the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable, as the United States did not participate in the Jordanian prosecution and the potential sentence of life without parole did not shock the conscience.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from a traffic stop, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility during a blended voir dire and trial.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony, citing his presence during the officers' testimony as an opportunity to fabricate his story, and relying on his counsel's perceived reactions to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a legal error, holding that the appellant was entitled to have his credibility assessed without paying an evidentiary price for exercising his right to be present at trial.

The Court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis was tainted by this flawed credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm found under his passenger seat during a traffic stop.

He appealed, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights, was racially motivated, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the trial judge reasonably concluded there was no racial bias, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The accused applied for disclosure relating to police protocols for informants, procedures for after-hours search warrant access to judicial officers, and production of a confidential informant file.

The application was brought to support a proposed Garofoli challenge to search warrants and to explore potential abuse of process allegations including alleged judge shopping and possible police agency by the informant.

The court held that the requested materials were irrelevant to the merits of the prosecution and unsupported by any evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that confidential informant files are prima facie privileged and cannot be compelled absent the innocence-at-stake exception.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition and dismissed.

Following an unsuccessful civil forfeiture application brought by the provincial Attorney General seeking to retain seized property alleged to be proceeds of crime, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful respondents sought partial indemnity costs after recovering seized assets including a large amount of cash, real property, and a motor vehicle.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the proceeding was brought in good faith in the public interest.

The court rejected this argument, holding that government litigants pursuing property claims are generally subject to the same cost consequences as private parties.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs.

The defendants brought Rule 21 motions to strike a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, abuse of public office, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and Charter breaches arising from criminal fraud charges related to workers’ compensation benefits.

The court held that the action against the Crown was a nullity due to failure to comply with the notice requirement under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiffs’ claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, abuse of public office, or intentional infliction of mental suffering were untenable, even though the criminal charges had been withdrawn following a negotiated repayment.

Applying the jurisprudence on favourable termination, the court held that whether the withdrawal constituted a favourable outcome required a fact‑specific analysis and could not be resolved on a pleadings motion.

The Charter damages claim was struck because such relief is only available against the state and the action against the Crown was barred.

The remaining claims were permitted to proceed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual interference, seeking to strike his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant argued his plea was not voluntary or fully informed due to inadequate legal advice regarding the use of facts on sentencing, the status of a co-accused, and the Crown's disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the plea was voluntary, fully informed, and that trial counsel provided effective assistance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The accused appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident during physiotherapy treatment where the complainant alleged the accused grabbed her breast without consent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on irrelevant considerations, including the complainant’s religious beliefs and courtroom demeanour, and by applying an unduly critical approach to the accused’s evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant’s expressed religious commitment and limited observations about demeanour as minor factors among many when assessing credibility.

The court further held that the trial judge’s rejection of the accused’s account and her reliance on common sense in evaluating his conduct disclosed no legal error.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading because it omitted the phrase 'he is not a drinker', failed to state that no one smelled alcohol on his breath, and because the officer testified at the preliminary inquiry that he only had a 'suspicion' rather than reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no meaningful difference caused by the omissions and accepting the officer's explanation at trial, which negated any suggestion of an attempt to mislead.

A licensed paralegal and her firm sought judicial review of directions issued by a justice of the peace requiring paralegals to remain behind the bar in the courtroom until their matters were called and suggesting that matters involving lawyers be called ahead of those involving paralegals.

The applicants argued that the justice of the peace exceeded jurisdiction, breached natural justice, and violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by disadvantaging paralegals economically and professionally.

The court held that courtroom seating arrangements and management of the calling of cases fall within a judicial officer’s authority to control court process and maintain order.

Economic interests are not protected by s. 7 of the Charter, and the impugned directions did not engage life, liberty, or security of the person.

The justice of the peace therefore acted within jurisdiction and did not breach principles of natural justice.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man, was convicted of manslaughter by a jury in the District of Kenora.

He appealed his conviction on the basis that the jury roll from which his petit jury was selected was unrepresentative, as it systematically under-represented Aboriginal on-reserve residents.

The Court of Appeal found that the state failed to make reasonable efforts to address known, long-standing problems with the delivery and return rates of jury questionnaires on reserves.

This failure violated the appellant's rights under sections 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Four young persons were charged with the first-degree murder of a sixteen-year-old victim who was shot and killed in a residential building staircase.

The Crown alleged that the accused lured the victim into the staircase as part of a planned and deliberate execution, relying heavily on surveillance video and extensive text message evidence containing gang slang.

The court found three of the accused guilty as joint principals or aiders, concluding they orchestrated and executed the plan.

The fourth accused was found not guilty, as the evidence raised suspicions but failed to prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and kidnapping, arguing that the Crown and police engaged in improper jury vetting.

The Crown had requested police to conduct extensive background checks on prospective jurors, including traffic violations and police contacts, and to provide comments on their suitability.

This information was used by the Crown in exercising peremptory challenges but was not disclosed to the defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the extent of the jury vetting, the violation of privacy legislation and Crown policy, and the failure to disclose the information disrupted the balance in the jury selection process.

This created an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, wanted in the United States for murder, sought a disclosure order against the Attorney General of Canada for information regarding the United States' involvement in his prior prosecution and conviction for the same murder in Jordan.

The applicant hoped to use this information to argue double jeopardy, abuse of process, and a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it was premature and that the extradition judge lacked jurisdiction to order disclosure from foreign authorities.

The court noted that double jeopardy issues and related disclosure requests are properly within the purview of the Minister of Justice during the surrender phase of the extradition process.

The applicants, appealing their convictions, sought disclosure or production of band lists used by the Court Services Division to prepare jury rolls in the Kenora District and Simcoe County.

They argued the lists were necessary to demonstrate systemic underrepresentation of First Nations persons on the jury rolls, which violated their Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the requested records met the 'likely relevant' test for third-party production under O'Connor, as they could be used to test the statements of Crown deponents and understand the jury roll preparation process.