Court File and Parties
File #: 4911-999-15-5260
Citation: 2017 ONSC 6572
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
v.
HEATHER SPEED and RUSTOM IRANI
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE M. FUERST
On September 27, 2017 at NEWMARKET, Ontario
APPEARANCES:
M. Dionne Counsel for the Crown
A. Moustacalis Counsel for Defendant Speed
M. Sandler Counsel for Defendant Irani
CITATION: R. v. Speed and Irani 2017 ONSC 6572
Wednesday, September 27, 2017
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
FUERST, J. (Orally):
Aleeya Raza was murdered on the driveway of the Markham home where she lived. She died from blunt force trauma to the head. She was 28 years old.
Ms. Raza’s ex-boyfriend, Rustom Irani, and his girlfriend, Heather Speed, were charged with her murder.
Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed both pleaded guilty to second degree murder. They each acknowledged that they were a principal in the murder. The Crown cannot distinguish between their roles.
Crown and defence counsel jointly submit that Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed should each be sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.
The Principles Governing the Parole Ineligibility Determination
Section 745(c) of the Criminal Code provides that on conviction for second degree murder, the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment, with no eligibility for parole for a fixed period ranging from a minimum of 10 to a maxiumum of 25 years. Section 745.4 specifically empowers the sentencing judge to increase the parole ineligibility period from the minimum of 10 years to the period that the judge deems fit, up to the maximum of 25 years.
In exercising his or her discretion under s. 745.4, the sentencing judge must have regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendation of the jury, if any. As Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed pleaded guilty, there is no jury recommendation to be considered in this case.
As a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by the sentencing judge’s determination that, according to the criteria set out in s. 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his or her suitability for release assessed. The determination of the parole ineligibility period is “a very fact sensitive process”: see R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 18. The sliding scale of parole ineligibility reflects the fact that, “within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability”: Shropshire, at para. 31.
An increased parole ineligibility period does not require unusual circumstances: see Shropshire, at paras. 26 to 27.
In R. v. McKnight, (1999), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont. C.A.) the court held that in assessing the s. 745.4 criteria and in deciding whether to increase the period of parole ineligibility, all of the objectives of sentencing are relevant. Those objectives, as set out in s. 718, are denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm caused to victims or to the community by it; deterrence, both general and specific; the separation of offenders from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. The court, however, observed in McKnight that the statutory 10 year minimum ineligibility period limits the weight that can be accorded to the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation.
Regardless of the period of parole ineligibility imposed, the sentence remains one of life imprisonment. The sentencing judge does not decide when the offender should be paroled, but merely the period he or she must serve before parole can even be considered: see R. v. Trudeau (1987), 24 O.A.C. 376 (C.A.).
The Nature of the Offence and the Circumstances Surrounding its Commission
Mr. Irani and Ms. Raza dated for about six years, with some break-ups and reconciliations. Early in 2014, they moved into a room in a house in Markham. At the end of June, Ms. Raza ended the relationship and asked Mr. Irani to move out. He did so. She stopped communicating with him. She did not want further contact with him.
Mr. Irani sent many text messages to Ms. Raza, asking her to take him back. He tried to contact her through her friends. He left gifts at the house. Ms. Raza told her housemates and friends that Mr. Irani repeatedly called her and hung up. This continued until near the date of her death.
In July 2014, Mr. Irani sent messages to Ms. Raza threatening suicide. She contacted the police. Mr. Irani was hospitalized overnight on a Form 1. He was noted to have signs of depression.
Although Ms. Raza had asked Mr. Irani to return his key when he moved out, he never did so. One of Ms. Raza’s housemates saw Mr. Irani inside the house on four or five occasions after he moved out. On at least one occasion, he was leaving Ms. Raza’s room. Ms. Raza believed that he took her passport and other personal items belonging to her. The police later learned that Mr. Irani gave a necklace Ms. Raza had worn, to a woman he was dating at the time of Ms. Raza’s death.
Evidence suggests that Mr. Irani set up the iCloud account associated with Ms. Raza’s iPhone, and tracked her movements using an application on her phone.
Ms. Speed and Mr. Irani met after she began working at his family’s furniture business in July 2014. They began dating. On a number of occasions, she drove him to a place within sight of the house where Ms. Raza lived, or allowed him to drive there while she was a passenger in the vehicle.
On November 26 and 27th, 2014, Ms. Speed’s cellular phone contacted Ms. Raza’s phone at least three times. These calls led Ms. Raza to go to her mother’s home to sell or give away a cat she had posted on Kijiji. The last call was at 9:08:44 p.m. on November 27th. It gave Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed a good sense of the time when Ms. Raza would return home. They were at or very near Ms. Raza’s home when she arrived there.
Ms. Raza was attacked shortly after she parked her car in the garage of her residence. She suffered at least 20 impacts to the head from an implement. The injuries were consistent with strikes from the rounded end and the claw end of a hammer. No implement was found at the scene.
Ms. Raza was left on the driveway of her home. One of her housemates found her, hours later.
A clip from a compressed air pistol was found under Ms. Raza’s car. Packaging for the same make and model of air pistol was found in Mr. Irani’s vehicle. A receipt for the same make and model of weapon was found in his home. A photo that appeared to be Ms. Raza’s passport photo was found inside Ms. Speed’s car.
Ms. Speed’s jacket had blood on it that was confirmed to be Ms. Raza’s by DNA.
The Victim Impact Information
A number of Victim Impact Statements were presented from family members and friends. They describe Ms. Raza as a vibrant young woman who was kind, generous, and compassionate. She was a loving and loved daughter, sister, and friend. She had committed her professional life to work with marginalized members of the community. The impact of her death on those close to her has been immense. As her sister put it, “My loss carries the weight of constant sorrow in my body and mind”. Her father expressed the sorrow, grief, and pain that he feels every day and every night.
The Character of the Offenders
Rustom Irani is now 34 years old. He came to Canada from Dubai with his family when he was 17. He is a Canadian citizen.
Mr. Irani completed high school, attended community college, and then took two years of flight school, but was unable to graduate because he is colour blind. In 2013, he began to work at his family’s furniture business. He continued to be employed there up until the sentencing hearing, as he was out of custody and on judicial interim release.
Mr. Irani was diagnosed with anxiety disorder in 2010. Mr. Irani has no prior criminal record. His family describes this most serious offence as out of character for him.
Heather Speed is now 37 years old. She grew up in a home where she was exposed to domestic violence and alcoholism. She left home at the age of 15, and became estranged from her family.
Ms. Speed suffers from ADHD. She finished grade 10.
Ms. Speed has three children, whom she has not seen while she has been held in pre-trial custody.
While in pre-trial custody, she completed high school. She is committed to improving herself while she serves her sentence.
Ms. Speed has no prior criminal record.
The Positions of the Parties
Crown and defence counsel jointly submit that a period of parole ineligibility of 14 years reflects the domestic nature of this murder, which is a significant aggravating factor, while recognizing the mitigating effect of the pleas of guilty and the fact that both Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed are first offenders.
Analysis
Ms. Raza’s murder is properly characterized as a domestic murder. She made it clear to Mr. Irani that the relationship was over, yet he refused to accept her right to self-determination, and to move on with her life without him. These are important aggravating factors. It is a further aggravating factor that Ms. Raza was killed at her residence, a place where she was entitled to feel and to be safe. The offenders were, if not at the house, at least in the area of her residence, anticipating her to arrive home when she did. She did nothing to provoke their assault upon her. She was attacked in a brutal fashion, hit on the head multiple times with an implement or implements used as a weapon. Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed then left her to die alone on the driveway in the dark and cold. They did nothing to summon help for her. Their conduct was exceptionally callous and cruel. It has had a deep impact on those who loved and cared for Ms. Raza.
In mitigation, Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed pleaded guilty, which is a sign of remorse and willingness to accept responsibility for their actions. Ms. Speed explicitly expressed remorse to me in court. Although their pleas were not early pleas, they have saved months of trial time in a busy jurisdiction, and spared Ms. Raza’s family the agony of a trial. Neither offender has a criminal record.
I recognize that I must consider Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed individually for the purpose of determining parole ineligibility. However, I find that the principle of parity in sentencing applies, as they are similarly situated offenders. There is no basis to distinguish between them in setting parole ineligibility.
In R. v. Anthony-Cook, [2016] SCC 43, at para. 42, the Supreme Court of Canada held that trial judges should reject joint submissions as to sentence only where the proposed sentence “would be viewed by reasonable and informed persons as a breakdown in the proper functioning of the justice system”. I have no such concern about the joint submissions put to me by very experienced Crown and defence counsel in this case.
As the Court of Appeal for Ontario established in McKnight, a brutal attack on an unarmed domestic partner attracts an increased period of parole ineligibility in the range of 12 to 15 years. A period of parole ineligibility of 14 years falls squarely within this range. In respect of each of Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed, it meets the objectives of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code, and recognizes the seriousness of this murder and the degree of each offender’s moral culpability.
Conclusion
Mr. Irani, please stand. I sentence you to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years. I order you to provide bodily fluid samples for DNA analysis. I impose a weapons prohibition order under section 109(2)(a) for 10 years, and section 109(2)(b) for life.
The warrant of committal will be endorsed to reflect that Mr. Irani’s life sentence began to run on December 4th, 2014, until March 5th, 2015, inclusive, and then continued commencing on September 20th, 2017.
You may be seated.
Ms. Speed, please stand. I sentence you to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years. I order you to provide bodily fluid samples for DNA analysis. I impose a weapons prohibition order under section 109(2)(a) for 10 years, and section 109(2)(b) for life.
The warrant of committal will be endorsed to reflect that Ms. Speed’s life sentence began to run on December 3rd, 2014.
You may be seated.
I took those dates from the information in the court file. If I am wrong about them, it should be corrected on the warrant. Mr. Sandler?
MR. SANDLER: Correct, thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Moustacalis?
MR. MOUSTACALIS: Sorry. I don’t recall you mentioned the ancillary orders with respect to Ms. Speed.
THE COURT: Yes, I did.
MR. MOUSTACALIS: Thank you.
THE COURT: But the warrant of committal, December 3rd, 2014 is accurate?
MR. MOUSTACALIS: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything further, then, before I endorse the indictment?
MR. DIONNE: No, thank you, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Did we address the original indictment on the last occasion?
MR. DIONNE: We did.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DIONNE: It was marked withdrawn.
THE COURT: Thank you. I have endorsed Mr. Irani and Ms. Speed are each sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years, a DNA order, section 109(2)(a) order for 10 years, and a section 109(2)(b) order for life. Mr. Irani’s sentence began to run on December 4th, 2014, until March 5th, 2015, inclusive, and again on September 20th, 2017. Ms. Speed’s sentence began to run on December 3rd, 2014.
I think that’s everything, then.
MR. DIONNE: Yes, thank you.
MR. MOUSTACALIS: Yes, thank you.
THE COURT: All right. I would like to publicly thank all counsel for working to bring this matter to resolution. As I mentioned in my reasons for sentence, it saved months of court time, and in this busy jurisdiction, it is very much appreciated that you let me know in advance that the matter would be resolved. So thank you all.
MATTER CONCLUDED.

