Alan D. Gold

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment careful and the verdict reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found that despite a potential error in principle regarding conditional sentences based on pre-Proulx case law, the sentence of one year imprisonment and two years probation was fit given the breach of trust and the complainant's age.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under section 9 of the Charter, finding the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the officer's subjective opinion was supported by objective facts, including the appellant's physical condition, apparent evasion of a RIDE program, and the discarding of open beer bottles by a passenger.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of possessing machines and materials adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code, relating to the manufacture of forged credit cards.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for' rather than 'altered so as to be suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the term 'adapted' in s. 369(b) is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favour of the accused to mean 'altered so as to be suitable for'.

As there was no evidence that the materials in four of the counts were altered, acquittals were entered for those counts, and a new trial was ordered for the remaining count where some materials had been altered.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for second degree murder based on the trial judge providing the jury with a transcript of the Crown's closing address.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the dissenting reasons of Laskin J.A. in the court below, restoring the conviction.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death, appealed his conviction on the basis that his statement to a commanding officer was admitted into evidence without a voir dire.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming a voir dire should have been held, it was a proper case to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied to revoke the respondent's bail pending his appeal of a fraud conviction, alleging he breached a condition prohibiting him from engaging in non-personal financial transactions.

The respondent argued the application was procedurally flawed because no arrest warrant was issued under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that an arrest warrant is unnecessary when the appellant is already in custody.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached his bail conditions by soliciting investments for a business, the court revoked his bail.

The Crown's application for a certificate of default was dismissed as premature pending the trial on the breach of recognizance charges.

The appellant appealed convictions for obtaining and attempting to obtain for consideration the sexual services of a person under eighteen, and also appealed sentence.

The court upheld the admission of a prior police statement, finding it relevant and not unfairly prejudicial in a judge-alone trial.

The court dismissed an extensive fresh evidence application alleging appearance of unfairness arising from comments by a provincial court judge to defence counsel and a chambers discussion during a pre-trial motion, holding there was no interference with the defence and no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed because the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's personal mitigation against the seriousness of sexual exploitation offences involving young persons and the need for deterrence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for break and enter and theft, arguing that the trial judge improperly reversed the onus on a statement voir dire when admitting an exculpatory police statement.

The respondent conceded the legal error but argued the curative proviso should save the conviction because the remaining evidence was compelling.

The court rejected that position, holding it was not satisfied the verdict would necessarily have been the same without the statement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal following conviction after jury trial on multiple serious offences arising from conduct against a single complainant, and after imposition of a seven-year penitentiary sentence.

The court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous, but found the applicant failed to establish that he would surrender into custody, relying on prior use of false identification, a past failure to appear for trial in another jurisdiction, an obstruction conviction, and the prospect of substantial additional incarceration on outstanding charges.

Applying the public interest analysis under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court held that enforceability outweighed reviewability given the seriousness of the offences, the length of sentence, concerns about interference with pending matters, and the absence of strong appeal grounds on the record before the chambers judge.

Bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a confrontation at his estranged wife's relatives' home while attempting to locate his child.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence consisting of an affidavit cataloguing inconsistencies from earlier proceedings, holding the evidence lacked due diligence, was not compelling, and would not have affected the result.

The court held that mischief under s. 430(1)(c) or (d) is not an included offence of unlawful entry into a dwelling-house with intent under s. 349, and further held that the trial judge erred by treating intent for mischief as presumptively flowing from the appellant's acts through an objective lens.

The threatening and assault convictions were upheld, but the appeal was allowed in part: one mischief conviction was replaced with an acquittal, and the other was set aside with a new trial ordered and proceedings stayed on that count.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences following a jury trial, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court accepted that the line-up procedure was flawed and that the trial judge omitted the second step of the W.D. instruction, but held the identification evidence was collateral and the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming hot-pursuit evidence.

The allegation of bias or improper judicial interference was rejected.

The court found the 15-year sentence offended the parity principle and reduced it to eight years concurrent on the robbery counts plus one year consecutive for the weapons conviction.

Criminal appeal arising from a conviction for criminal negligence causing death following a police shooting during a land claim protest.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge was required to hold a voir dire before permitting cross-examination on statements allegedly made by the accused to a superior officer, including whether that superior was a person in authority and whether the statements were voluntary.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, holding that the inquiry obligation was triggered and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the absence of a voir dire caused no substantial wrong and did not affect the verdict; the mistrial appeal, fresh evidence motion, and Crown sentence appeal were also dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis resin following a reverse sting operation in which the RCMP offered to sell them a large quantity of hashish.

The appellants sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the police conduct was illegal and constituted an abuse of process.

They also sought disclosure of legal advice the RCMP received from the Department of Justice, which the Crown claimed supported the police's good faith belief in the operation's legality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police are not immune from criminal liability and that their conduct in offering to sell narcotics was illegal.

Furthermore, by asserting good faith reliance on the legal advice, the RCMP waived solicitor-client privilege.

The Court ordered disclosure of the relevant legal advice and directed a new trial limited to the issue of whether a stay of proceedings should be granted.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which had found that section 231.4 of the Income Tax Act infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Strayer J.A. in the court below.

The Court held that section 231.4 does not restrict the rights guaranteed by section 7 or section 8 of the Charter, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the constitutional challenge.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The accused was convicted of fraud relating to a mortgage document.

At trial, the Crown was permitted to call reply evidence concerning the accused's conduct regarding a later mortgage and whether he held himself out as a chartered accountant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal that the Crown was erroneously permitted to call reply evidence in breach of the collateral fact rule.

The appellants, who operated an adult video store, were charged with knowingly selling obscene material without lawful justification or excuse.

The videos had been approved by the Ontario Film Review Board.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mens rea for the offence requires the Crown to prove the retailer knew of the specific acts that make the material obscene in law, not just that it involved the exploitation of sex.

The Court also held that while film board approval does not negate mens rea or provide a lawful justification, it may be relevant to wilful blindness or officially induced error of law.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appeal concerned whether a separately charged co-accused could be compelled to testify at the criminal trial of another accused arising from the same incident, and whether s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of fundamental justice, but that the constitutional structure contemplates a general rule of witness compellability coupled with use immunity, rather than an absolute right to silence for such witnesses.

The Court further held that s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act is constitutional, while recognizing varying approaches among the judges to residual protection under s. 7, including limited derivative-use immunity or case-specific exceptions grounded in fairness.

The Court also upheld the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial after the Crown's successful appeal from acquittal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The issue concerned whether the use of a police informant, who was to be paid in full only in the event of a successful investigation, constituted an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the informant's evidence was not inadmissible.

The appellants appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had dismissed one appellant's appeal against conviction and allowed the Crown's appeal against the other appellant's acquittal for conspiracy to commit robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Ontario.