Alan D. Gold

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) upholding a finding of misconduct for corrupt practice and the resulting penalty of demotion.

The officer had released an arrested individual without charge and subsequently accepted hockey tickets from him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OCCPS reasonably concluded the officer's actions constituted corrupt practice, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias by the hearing officer, and the penalty was not disproportionate.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements and evidence of his prior discreditable conduct, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of this evidence.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the sentence was fit given the history of domestic abuse.

The appellants sought to proceed with an appeal regarding the Divisional Court's decision to admit fresh evidence, despite acknowledging the case was moot because the facility had been sold and new liquor licences were being issued with the consent of formerly objecting residents.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal, finding no live controversy remained and the respondent had no interest in the issue.

The appeal was dismissed as moot with no costs awarded.

The appellant pleaded guilty on the fifth day of trial to possession of cocaine and ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He was sentenced to 41 months' imprisonment, plus 7 months' credit for restrictive pre-sentence bail.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was unduly harsh and overlooked his rehabilitation and positive antecedents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the large quantity of drugs involved, which included over 769 grams of cocaine and 2000 ecstasy pills.

The appellants were charged with driving 'over 80' after failing breathalyzer tests.

At trial, they adduced expert 'straddle evidence' indicating that, based on their drinking patterns and average alcohol elimination rates, their blood alcohol concentrations could have been either above or below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that straddle evidence does not rebut the statutory presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as it merely confirms the accused consumed enough alcohol to reach a level exceeding 80 mg and does not tend to show the concentration was below the legal limit.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions/orders for new trials were upheld.

The appellant appealed the global sentence of twelve years imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to be thorough and well-reasoned, and the sentence entirely fit.

The appellant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to give a special jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness confidence, and that his Charter rights were violated during the seizure of blood and breath samples.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instruction was unnecessary and the evidence was lawfully obtained.

The appellant's sentence appeal seeking a conditional sentence or reduced term from his 21-month imprisonment was also dismissed.

The appellant, a Canadian businessman, was investigated by the RCMP for money laundering.

RCMP officers conducted searches of the appellant's investment company office in the Turks and Caicos Islands under the authority of the local police.

At trial, the appellant sought to exclude documentary evidence obtained during the searches, arguing that the searches violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not generally apply to searches and seizures conducted by Canadian officials in foreign jurisdictions, as this would interfere with the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state.

The evidence was admissible as its admission did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario revoking its liquor licence.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence regarding noise issues that had the potential to fundamentally alter the Board's conclusion on the public interest.

Consequently, the Court set aside the Board's order and remitted the matter to a differently constituted Board for a new hearing, with interim conditions imposed on the appellant's operations.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant unlawfully detained the complainant and lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him for causing a disturbance, as the complainant's loud and rude protestations were instigated by the appellant's improper actions.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' conclusions that there was no criminal disturbance and no reasonable grounds for arrest.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams, after the trial judge excluded the breath readings due to a s. 10(b) Charter breach for denying the appellant the use of his cell phone to call counsel while waiting for the Approved Screening Device.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding that the breath demand was valid despite omitting the word 'forthwith', and that there was no s. 10(b) breach because the police officer was in a position to require the breath sample before there was any realistic opportunity for the appellant to consult counsel.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give appropriate credit for 31 months spent on bail under pre-sentence house arrest.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying R. v. Downes to grant an 8-month credit, reducing the sentence for the New Brunswick offences to 9 months.

However, the court upheld the rejection of a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for general deterrence in fraud cases.

The total sentence was reduced from 20 months to 12 months incarceration.

The appellant, a bystander not targeted by any police investigation, successfully applied to quash an Ontario search warrant that relied on information obtained in breach of a British Columbia non-dissemination agreement and misrepresented B.C. court proceedings.

The application judge found a serious breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights but refused to award costs, applying the traditional rule that costs in criminal proceedings require serious Crown misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction under s. 784(1) of the Criminal Code to hear the appeal.

The Court further held that the traditional Crown misconduct rule does not apply with equal force to a bystander seeking a s. 24(1) Charter remedy.

Given the appellant's vulnerability, the need to encourage the vindication of Charter rights, and the Crown's decision to staunchly resist the application despite warnings of the warrant's flaws, the Court awarded the appellant $20,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the search warrant for his residence was invalid because it relied on an anonymous tip that only expressed a suspicion of criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the tip itself was not compelling, the police officer's independent observations of heavy blinds, condensation, and a vent provided sufficient grounds for the warrant.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal based on fresh psychiatric evidence showing the appellant's severe depression and fragility.

The six-month custodial sentence was varied to an 18-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to quash the respondents' convictions for assault and enter a stay of proceedings.

The respondents, two off-duty police officers, had been convicted at trial of assaulting a teenager during a wrongful arrest for car theft.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to explicitly advert to the dual purposes of character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge's treatment of the character evidence was adequate in the context of his credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal restored the convictions and remitted the sentence appeals to a different summary conviction appeal judge.

The appellant appealed a costs order requiring him to pay the costs of an unsuccessful third-party records application to the Simcoe County Children's Aid Society.

The trial judge had relied on the court's inherent jurisdiction and rejected the need for 'fault' on the part of the accused to award costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the general principles governing costs awards against an accused, which require reprehensible conduct or a serious affront to the court's authority.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, the Crown introduced expert evidence from an FBI agent who testified that the crime scene had been 'staged' to look like a break-in, and offered opinions on the killer's motive and prior relationship with the victim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while expert evidence of crime scene reconstruction (the 'what') is admissible, the expert's opinions regarding the killer's motive and relationship to the victim constituted impermissible criminal profiling (the 'why' and 'who').

The Court found that the improper admission of this profiling evidence was highly prejudicial and could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and released on a promise to appear.

On the return date, no information was before the court at the specified time, but one was sworn later that afternoon.

The accused argued the court lost jurisdiction over the offence because the information was not laid before the time stated in the promise to appear, as required by s. 505(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while failure to comply with s. 505(b) results in a loss of jurisdiction over the person, it does not invalidate the information or result in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a condition of the respondent's conditional sentence that allowed him to leave the country for employment purposes for 15 days per month.

The Crown conceded the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 742.3(1)(d) of the Criminal Code to make the order but argued it made the sentence manifestly inadequate or involved an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle given the severe collateral consequences, the stringent house arrest conditions while in Canada, and the fact that the condition was the only viable road to rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with serious offences against his spouse.

The trial judge found the 19-month delay in the Ontario Court of Justice exceeded guidelines.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by including the neutral intake period in the systemic delay calculation, isolating the delay in the Ontario Court of Justice from the total time, and mischaracterizing inherent time requirements as systemic delay.

The total 23-month delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and scheduling complexities.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.