Alan D. Gold

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to quash the respondents' convictions for assault and enter a stay of proceedings.

The respondents, two off-duty police officers, had been convicted at trial of assaulting a teenager during a wrongful arrest for car theft.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to explicitly advert to the dual purposes of character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge's treatment of the character evidence was adequate in the context of his credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal restored the convictions and remitted the sentence appeals to a different summary conviction appeal judge.

The appellant appealed a costs order requiring him to pay the costs of an unsuccessful third-party records application to the Simcoe County Children's Aid Society.

The trial judge had relied on the court's inherent jurisdiction and rejected the need for 'fault' on the part of the accused to award costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the general principles governing costs awards against an accused, which require reprehensible conduct or a serious affront to the court's authority.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, the Crown introduced expert evidence from an FBI agent who testified that the crime scene had been 'staged' to look like a break-in, and offered opinions on the killer's motive and prior relationship with the victim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while expert evidence of crime scene reconstruction (the 'what') is admissible, the expert's opinions regarding the killer's motive and relationship to the victim constituted impermissible criminal profiling (the 'why' and 'who').

The Court found that the improper admission of this profiling evidence was highly prejudicial and could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and released on a promise to appear.

On the return date, no information was before the court at the specified time, but one was sworn later that afternoon.

The accused argued the court lost jurisdiction over the offence because the information was not laid before the time stated in the promise to appear, as required by s. 505(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while failure to comply with s. 505(b) results in a loss of jurisdiction over the person, it does not invalidate the information or result in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a condition of the respondent's conditional sentence that allowed him to leave the country for employment purposes for 15 days per month.

The Crown conceded the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 742.3(1)(d) of the Criminal Code to make the order but argued it made the sentence manifestly inadequate or involved an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle given the severe collateral consequences, the stringent house arrest conditions while in Canada, and the fact that the condition was the only viable road to rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with serious offences against his spouse.

The trial judge found the 19-month delay in the Ontario Court of Justice exceeded guidelines.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by including the neutral intake period in the systemic delay calculation, isolating the delay in the Ontario Court of Justice from the total time, and mischaracterizing inherent time requirements as systemic delay.

The total 23-month delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and scheduling complexities.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of money laundering after an undercover RCMP investigation involving transactions in the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Netherlands.

He appealed his convictions and 30-month sentence, raising issues of extraterritorial Charter application, hearsay exceptions for foreign bank records, jurisdiction, and unreasonable delay.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to order forfeiture of $3 million allegedly linked to prior uncharged drug offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on the Charter, evidence, or jurisdiction, and agreeing that the forfeiture provisions require a nexus between the property sought and the offences prosecuted at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking and his 22-month sentence.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, unreasonably searched, and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on intercepted communications and observations, and that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence despite a marginal s. 10(b) breach.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 18 months to credit the appellant for time served on subsequent charges that were withdrawn.

The applicants sought judicial review to avoid testifying before the Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry, which was dismissed.

The respondent Commissioner and intervenor City of Toronto sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the litigation raised an important constitutional question of public interest.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the applications were brought to avoid testifying, not in the public interest.

The Court awarded fixed costs of $25,000 to the Commissioner and $10,000 to the City of Toronto, payable jointly and severally by the applicants.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash an order that he stand trial on offences under the Excise Tax Act.

He argued that the joint representation of himself and his co-accused wife by the same counsel at the preliminary inquiry created a conflict of interest that breached the principles of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest at the preliminary inquiry stage or that his counsel's representation was compromised in a way that deprived him of a fair hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to apply the W.(D.) framework properly and misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's driving and alleged motive for racing.

The young person appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility and reasonable doubt.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on the basis that the complainant withdrew her initial consent to sexual intercourse, but the appellant continued the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the entirety of the evidence, including inconsistencies and corroborating evidence such as bruising, and made a credibility assessment that was open to him.

The appellant, a general contractor, was convicted of six counts of fraud relating to home renovation contracts and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from each count as similar fact evidence on the other counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the temporal connection and interconnectedness of the events made the evidence highly probative of fraudulent intent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence was substituted, as the court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the commercial relationship as a breach of trust and overemphasizing general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from a collision where his vehicle struck a stopped car on a highway ramp shoulder.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on speed and driving on the shoulder but failed to determine why the appellant's vehicle entered the shoulder.

The Court of Appeal held that the reason for entering the shoulder was a pivotal issue in determining whether there was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The failure to address this issue constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash summonses issued by the Commissioner of the Toronto Computer Leasing Inquiry, arguing the inquiry had unconstitutionally evolved into a criminal investigation into specific individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the inquiry's dominant purpose was to investigate municipal good government under section 100 of the Municipal Act.

The court held that the Commissioner was acting within her mandate by investigating potential misconduct as part of a broader fact-finding process, and that the incidental overlap with potential criminal matters did not render the inquiry ultra vires.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the strong circumstantial evidence and was entitled to reject the defence's evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the appropriate range and the appellant's good behaviour on bail did not warrant interference.

The appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Justice refusing a request for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister carefully considered the matters raised and that his reasons amply justified the refusal on any test for reconsideration.

The United States of America appealed a stay of proceedings ordered by an extradition judge after the requesting state failed to comply with a production order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there was no basis for the production order and that if the record lacked sufficient evidence for committal, the proper course was to discharge the respondents.

The stay was lifted and a new extradition hearing was ordered.

The applicant, a municipal councillor convicted of criminal offences, was granted bail pending appeal with a condition prohibiting him from performing his duties for the balance of his term.

The Crown sought an additional condition prohibiting him from running in the upcoming municipal election.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, finding no statutory bar under the Municipal Elections Act and little risk of reoffending, concluding that it should be left to the electorate to decide whether to elect someone with his criminal record.

The RCMP intercepted a package containing over six kilograms of heroin, removed all but one gram, and performed a controlled delivery.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued that possession of one gram was insufficient for the offence and that attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking is not an offence known to law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the quantity of a controlled substance is not part of the actus reus of the offence, and that the appellant's mistaken belief about the quantity did not alter his mens rea.

The court also confirmed that attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking is a valid offence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.