Alan D. Gold

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The appellant argued the appeal judge made a clear error of law.

The Court of Appeal found no error, agreeing with the appeal judge that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to apply the proper legal principles from Stellato, specifically that any degree of impairment is sufficient and that fatigue does not foreclose the effect of alcohol.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him for extradition to Italy.

The applicant argued that Italy showed disrespect for the Canadian extradition process by proceeding against him in absentia, and that the Minister should have adjourned the proceedings pending a decision from the European Court of Human Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister properly exercised his discretion and made no errors justifying intervention.

The appellant, a Canadian resident, was sought for extradition to the United States on charges of failing to remit state sales tax collected at two New York car dealerships.

At the extradition hearing, the appellant sought disclosure of thousands of vehicle sales forms to challenge the investigator's claim that he had signed them.

The extradition judge refused disclosure and ordered committal, and the Minister of Justice subsequently ordered surrender.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that the extradition judge correctly applied the law on disclosure and reasonably concluded that the presumptive reliability of the Record of the Case had not been rebutted.

The application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach when police seized drugs from his home without a warrant.

The police had attended a domestic dispute, and the appellant's common law spouse volunteered the drugs to them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the breach was inadvertent and minor, and that the trial judge did not err in balancing the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof or provided inadequate reasons.

The appellant appealed his convictions for various firearms and stolen property offences, arguing that evidence seized during a search of his home should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found the search warrant invalid and a breach of s. 8, but admitted the evidence under the pre-Grant Collins framework.

Applying the new Grant framework, the Court of Appeal found that the significant carelessness of the police in drafting the Information to Obtain, combined with the intrusive nature of searching a dwelling house, outweighed the reliability and probative value of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the evidence excluded, and acquittals substituted.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after striking and killing a pedestrian while driving at a high rate of speed in a residential neighbourhood.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding causation without determining the victim's exact location, misapprehended evidence, failed to give credit for strict pre-trial bail conditions, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion, and concluding that the five-year sentence was not a substantial and marked departure from sentences customarily imposed for similar offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the evidence did not support a finding of lack of consent, there were inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence, and the trial judge erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the evidence of lack of consent adequate, the treatment of inconsistencies proper, and the finding of a position of trust supported by the evidence.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review.

Following the court's conclusion on a related appeal, counsel for the applicant conceded that the application for judicial review could not succeed.

The Court of Appeal accordingly dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition on a murder charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the extradition judge and concluding there was ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the appellant guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving a breach of trust against a vulnerable young person.

He argued the trial judge treated the evidence unevenly and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that MSN chat messages were highly inculpatory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 22-month sentence for an increasingly intrusive breach of trust by a step-father over an extended period.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay serious charges against six police officers due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed the 56-month delay primarily to the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for five of the officers, finding the trial judge erred in attributing the delay to disclosure issues rather than the inherent time requirements of a highly complex case.

A new trial was ordered for those five officers.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the sixth officer, finding the delay in his much simpler case was unreasonable because the Crown unnecessarily insisted his trial follow the complex trial of his co-accused.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his convictions for impaired driving causing death and related offences, as well as his sentence.

The delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to institutional difficulties at the penitentiary where he was incarcerated.

The Crown conceded the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal and a reasonable explanation for the delay, but argued the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal applied the Menear test, finding that the appeal was not hopeless and that the interests of justice favoured granting the extension.

The appellant, an elector, swore a private information against a city councillor alleging breaches of the Municipal Elections Act regarding campaign expenses.

The application judge quashed the summons, finding the appellant was required to follow the compliance audit procedure under the Act rather than proceeding by private information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the statutory scheme supersedes an elector's general right to lay a private information.

The Court also addressed the respondent counsel's failure to inform the lower court of the pending appeal, which led to the underlying charges being dismissed, but exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be grossly excessive, noting it was double what the Crown had sought at trial and out of proportion to the offence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for a massive fraud.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence was in accordance with a joint submission and fell within the appropriate range given the scale of the offence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a court officer, was convicted of assaulting a young person in his custody.

The trial judge imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence and two years' probation.

On appeal, the summary conviction appeal judge substituted a conditional discharge.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's sentence, holding that a custodial sentence is required for court officers who commit premeditated assaults on vulnerable prisoners, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for breaches of trust.

The appellant communicated in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

Believing he was communicating with a child, the appellant transmitted a video of himself masturbating.

He was convicted of communicating for the purpose of facilitating the exposure of his genitals to a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence was impossible to complete because the officer was not actually a child, and that the exposure offence required the parties to be in the same physical location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief about the victim's age was sufficient for the inchoate offence, and that the exposure offence applies to images sent over the internet.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of indecent assault and one count of sexual assault involving adolescent male victims over a 10-year period.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence across all counts and failed to provide adequate reasons for credibility findings.

He also appealed his 9.5-year global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for similar fact evidence and that the credibility findings were supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the accepted range for historical sexual abuse involving a position of trust.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences involving a loaded, sawed-off shotgun found under the driver's seat of a car he was driving.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the appellant had knowledge of the shotgun's presence.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including the gun's location and the appellant's exclusive use of the car, to infer knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no legal error and the inference of knowledge was reasonably open on the evidence.