Alan D. Gold

The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that police failed to comply with the informational component of s. 10(b) of the Charter by mentioning legal aid but not advising of existing 24-hour duty counsel services and the toll-free number for immediate free legal advice.

The majority held that where duty counsel services exist and are available in the jurisdiction, detainees must be routinely informed of their existence and basic means of access, absent valid waiver or urgency.

Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the Court held that both the breathalyser results and the incriminating statement were obtained in the course of the Charter breach and that their admission would render the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the principles from Askov and Morin to find that the delay from the time of the charge to the date set for trial was not unreasonable under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings and remitted the matter for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings for abuse of process should only be granted in the clearest of cases where fundamental principles of justice are violated.

The Court found this was not such a case and that compelling the accused to stand trial would not be oppressive or vexatious.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal which had allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that on the facts of the case, the accused was not detained.

Consequently, there was no infringement of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant, a street flower vendor, was charged with exposing goods for sale without a licence contrary to a municipal by-law and with obstructing a peace officer after refusing to obey an order to move.

The by-law scheme permitted only owners or occupants of abutting property to apply for a sidewalk use licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling provincial legislation did not authorize the municipality to discriminate between free-standing street vendors and owner/occupant vendors, rendering the by-law ultra vires.

Consequently, the conviction for obstructing a peace officer was also set aside, as the officer had no authority to arrest the appellant for failing to comply with an order enforcing an invalid by-law.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from an order staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the complexity of the case was an important factor justifying the delay, and ordered an expedited trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no ground had been established that would warrant the disclosure of the identity of the police informer.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that overturned his acquittals for criminal negligence causing death and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence relating to the manner in which the appellant was operating his vehicle prior to the collision.

The police installed a video camera without prior judicial authorization to monitor activities in a hotel room registered to the appellant, suspecting it was being used as a common gaming house.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the video surveillance violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding s. 8 was not violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless video surveillance violated the appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court concluded that the admission of the videotape evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith based on a reasonable misunderstanding of the law prior to the Charter's full development in this area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a provincial commission of inquiry into alleged dealings between named private individuals, a corporation, and public officials.

The majority held that, in pith and substance, the inquiry functioned as a substitute police investigation and preliminary inquiry into a specific Criminal Code offence, thereby intruding on Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The naming of private individuals, the close mirroring of s. 121 of the Criminal Code, and the inquiry's coercive powers were found cumulatively to render the Order in Council ultra vires.

The Court therefore allowed the appeal and did not decide the remaining Charter issues.

The appellant was charged with conspiracy to import a narcotic after his conversations with an undercover police officer and an informer were surreptitiously recorded without judicial authorization, but with the consent of the officer and informer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Criminal Code exception for participant surveillance is not unconstitutional per se, the state's use of participant surveillance without prior judicial authorization violates the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith based on the law as it was understood at the time, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was charged with murder and underwent two trials, the first resulting in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and the second ending in a mistrial.

A third trial was scheduled five years after the initial charge.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's refusal to accept a manslaughter plea and its objection to a judge-alone trial constituted an abuse of process, and that the five-year delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prosecutorial misconduct to justify an abuse of process.

The Court also held that the s. 11(b) right was not infringed, as the overall delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own tactical decisions, particularly his delays in retaining counsel, and the inherent time requirements of appellate and retrial proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

The conduct occurred before the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force, but the trial took place after.

The appellant argued that the statutory denial of a defence of mistake of age violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that applying s. 7 to the substantive elements of an offence committed before the Charter came into force would constitute an impermissible retrospective application of the Charter.

The original applicant was charged with narcotics offences and had monies seized.

He applied for restoration but died before trial.

His innocent administrator pursued the restoration.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that since no conviction was entered and the monies were no longer required as evidence, the innocent representative was entitled to restoration.

The public policy rule preventing a person from profiting from a crime requires a conviction or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which was absent here.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of bank robbery charges on the basis that his voluntary drug-induced intoxication caused an irresistible impulse, raising a reasonable doubt about specific intent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered guilty verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that loss of self-control or irresistible impulse caused by voluntarily induced intoxication is not a defence to a criminal charge in Canada.

The appellants appealed their convictions, raising issues regarding court election under s. 429.1 of the Criminal Code and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where an accused consents to be tried by a judge who is not a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction, the Attorney General may choose trial before either a county/district court judge and jury or a supreme court judge and jury.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence or the jury charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the judge precluded defence counsel from cross-examining a key Crown witness about an outstanding murder charge laid against him by the same police department.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by applying the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that cross-examination of a Crown witness concerning an outstanding indictment is proper to show possible motivation to seek favour with the prosecution.

The Court concluded that the curative proviso could not be applied because it could not be said that the jury would necessarily have reached the same verdict had the cross-examination been permitted.

The appellant was charged with fraud after falsely telling an undercover investigator that her car's transmission needed to be rebuilt.

The investigator, who knew the transmission only required minor repairs, was not deceived.

The trial conviction for fraud was substituted with attempted fraud by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's actions went beyond mere preparation and constituted an attempt under section 24 of the Criminal Code, regardless of the impossibility of actual deception.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal on charges of attempted robbery and firearms offences.

The trial judge had left the defence of non-insane automatism to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no evidence of non-insane automatism to be left with the jury and upholding the order for a new trial.

The accused was charged with second degree murder but committed for trial on first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown filed an indictment for first degree murder.

The accused challenged the committal by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mere filing of an indictment does not bar an accused from challenging a committal; an indictment is only 'preferred' when lodged with a trial court ready to proceed.

Furthermore, a preliminary inquiry judge only has jurisdiction to commit an accused for the specific charge laid in the information or an included offence, not for any other offence disclosed by the evidence.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.