Susan E. Lang

The moving parties, a Michigan lawyer and his law firm, sought a stay of proceedings pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of jurisdiction simpliciter.

The moving parties argued that if they were forced to file a statement of defence, it might constitute an attornment to Ontario's jurisdiction, rendering their leave application moot and causing irreparable harm.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the leave application raised a serious issue, the potential for attornment constituted irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay against all parties due to the intertwined nature of the claims.

The appellant law firm obtained a charging order for its legal fees against funds held in court that were generated from litigation in which it represented the respondent husband.

In the underlying matrimonial proceedings, the motion judge dismissed the law firm's motion for payment out of the funds, instead ordering the funds paid to the respondent wife as retroactive spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the law firm's appeal, holding that the motion judge was entitled to treat the funds as available for spousal support and had the discretion to refuse to give the charging order priority over spousal support.

The respondent utility mistakenly underbilled the appellant for electrical consumption.

The respondent obtained judgment for the full amount of the underbilling.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no evidence to support its estoppel defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the appellant failed to show the required element of detriment, as the unexpected profits from the undercharging were used for discretionary reinvestment in the business.

The appellant commenced a third action asserting the same claim that was previously raised in a 1984 arbitration and a 1989 court action, both of which ended when the appellant failed to pay costs.

The motion judge dismissed the present action on the grounds of the expiration of the limitation period and res judicata.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that allowing the litigation to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and violate principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their proposed class action statements of claim for oppression against the respondents.

The claims alleged that a recapitalization plan was oppressive to minority shareholders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the prospectus explicitly warned of the financial risks, the recapitalization plan benefited the company by preventing immediate collapse, and the appellants failed to plead any specific loss or damage.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decision regarding retroactive spousal support, division of property, and costs following the end of an 18-year common law relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on support and the application of the 'value survived' approach for unjust enrichment, but allowed the appeal in part to credit the husband for $21,038 in liabilities that the trial judge had overlooked, reducing the equalization payment accordingly.

The appellants appealed an order striking their pleading against a law firm for failing to disclose the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's determination that the pleading lacked the necessary elements of an intention to injure the appellants and the use of unlawful means.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant occupied public lands under a land use permit that expired in 1997.

After his claim for an interest in the lands was dismissed in separate proceedings, the Crown applied for vacant possession.

The motion judge granted the application pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Public Lands Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no authorization to occupy the lands and that his various grounds of appeal were irrelevant to the Crown's entitlement to possession.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his alibi and erred in refusing to allow re-examination on a driving issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, supported the rejection of the alibi and that the compelling identification evidence rendered the re-examination issue non-determinative.

The applicant, the United States of America, sought a review of a decision granting interim release to the respondent pending extradition proceedings for alleged drug trafficking and money laundering.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in principle, particularly regarding the use of electronic monitoring and the role of the local police.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the bail judge properly assessed the flight risk and crafted appropriate conditions, including electronic monitoring, without improperly delegating risk assessment or exceeding jurisdiction.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order suspending his bankruptcy discharge and making it conditional upon the payment of $250,000.

The trustee and major creditors opposed an absolute discharge, citing the appellant's failure to disclose financial affairs, control of offshore accounts, and failure to assist the trustee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings under section 173 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, confirming the appellant was not entitled to an absolute discharge.

The court found the $250,000 condition was not oppressive given the appellant's dishonesty and unwillingness to make full disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conditional payment was increased to $262,000 to cover the successful creditor's costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on potential collusion between the complainant and her son, and on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and noting the lack of objection at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered and rejected a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired driving causing death and breach of recognizance.

At trial, the central issue was whether the appellant or the deceased passenger was driving when the vehicle rolled into a ditch.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the driver, noting it was amply supported by witness testimony and expert evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional sentence based on his aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors, including a high blood alcohol level and a prior drinking and driving conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended appraisal evidence, failed to consider his honest belief in the property's value, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the appraisals, correctly applied the elements of fraud, and imposed a demonstrably fit sentence given the breach of fiduciary duty and deliberate deception.

The appellants appealed their convictions and four-year sentences for importing cocaine.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling that if an exculpatory utterance was admitted, its entire context had to be put before the jury.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the four-year terms were within the appropriate range and that positive fresh evidence did not justify reducing the demonstrably fit sentences.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impersonation, fraud over $5,000, and failure to comply with a recognizance, and was sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment and eighteen months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of a serious medical condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's criminal record and the commission of the second offence while on bail.

The court also declined to reduce the sentence based on the fresh evidence, noting the institution's obligation to provide adequate medical treatment and the upcoming parole hearing.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence imposed on the respondent for three counts of assault with a weapon and two counts of uttering death threats against his wife and children.

The trial judge had emphasized the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation and stated he would have imposed a significant jail term had the respondent been born or raised in Canada.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in principle, holding that individuals born or raised in Canada should not be held to a higher standard of conduct than those who immigrated as adults.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a six-month custodial sentence.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner moved for an order sealing the private part of its record pending a judicial review application.

The underlying application was brought by a requester seeking access to police and securities commission records regarding allegations of his involvement in organized crime.

The sealing order was not opposed, but the requester's counsel sought access to the sealed record subject to a confidentiality undertaking to prepare for the judicial review.

The police and securities commission opposed access, citing the extreme sensitivity of the intelligence records.

The court granted access to the requester's counsel, finding that the benefit of full and informed submissions outweighed the risks of disclosure, provided counsel signed an expanded undertaking not to act for the client in any other proceeding arising out of the information.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the Ministry to confirm or deny the existence of records relating to a settlement with an individual, interpreting s. 21(5) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as requiring a two-part test.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation was unreasonable and clearly wrong, as the plain language of s. 21(5) does not require the institution to prove that disclosing the mere existence of the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a proposed landfill expansion.

The core issue was the interpretation of section 6.1(3) of the Environmental Assessment Act, specifically whether the phrase 'other than' meant 'in addition to' or 'different from' the standard requirements.

The Divisional Court held that 'other than' means 'in addition to', requiring the proponent to fulfill the comprehensive environmental assessment requirements listed in section 6.1(2).

The Minister's decision approving the Terms of Reference was quashed.