Susan E. Lang

The appellants appealed an order declining jurisdiction on judicial review and habeas corpus regarding a child apprehension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applications judge properly declined jurisdiction because an effective alternative remedy existed in the ongoing proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court also noted that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and that habeas corpus was unavailable as the child was detained under valid court orders.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing that the trial judge's remarks during closing submissions created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the respondent failed to mitigate damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's comments were merely instructive cautions to junior counsel and did not indicate pre-determination.

Furthermore, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent's decision not to proceed with the property purchase was driven by uncertain septic system repair costs, meaning the duty to mitigate was not engaged.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that Amicone Design Build Inc. assumed the obligations of Island Cove Development Ltd. and 1078385 Ontario Limited, making it liable for the return of a $66,000 deposit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by evidence, including Amicone taking over the project, communicating with the respondents, and receiving the proceeds of sale.

The appellants called no evidence to rebut these reasonable inferences.

The appellant payroll provider paid the wages of the corporate respondent's employees without first receiving sufficient funds from the corporation.

The appellant sued a director of the corporation for unjust enrichment, arguing that its payment relieved the director of her statutory liability for unpaid wages under s. 131 of the OBCA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the primary obligation to pay wages belonged to the corporation, not the director.

The director received no direct benefit and was not unjustly enriched.

Furthermore, the appellant could not be subrogated to the employees' rights because the employees had been paid and had no claim against the director.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the City of Toronto for breach of contract and other claims arising from a public tender process.

The trial judge dismissed the action primarily because it was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act, finding the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts by September 1990 but did not commence the action until February 1997.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's limitation period analysis and found no palpable and overriding error in her alternative findings dismissing the substantive claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the equalization payment, spousal support, access, and costs components of a trial judgment.

The Court of Appeal varied the equalization payment to $64,000 on consent, fixed spousal support at $500 per month for three years on consent, upheld the access order based on an assessor's recommendation, and varied trial costs to $32,000.

The parties also resolved outstanding support arrears and ongoing child support.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The respondent, a 25-year employee of the appellant Board, was summarily dismissed for using his position to obtain a direct monetary benefit.

He had purchased computers at a discount from a registered employer and accepted a $1,000 payment from an employer representative, subsequently lying about these events during the employer's investigation.

The trial judge found the dismissal was wrongful and awarded 24 months' notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply the correct legal standard from McKinley v. B.C. Tel and by not considering the full extent of the respondent's misconduct.

The Court held that the respondent's intentional and repeated dishonest acts constituted a fundamental breach of his employment obligations, justifying summary dismissal.

The respondent sold goods to 'Promised Land' and sued the appellant numbered company for unpaid invoices.

The trial judge granted judgment for the respondent.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge decided the case on an unpleaded basis and improperly pierced the corporate veil, as the goods were allegedly purchased by a related entity, Promised Land Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleadings squarely raised the issue of the proper defendant, and the appellant and its related entity dealt interchangeably with the respondent, making both proper defendants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found the parties entered into a contract containing a performance guarantee, which the respondents breached, but limited damages to $1.00.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by finding a performance guarantee existed despite it not being explicitly pleaded as a term, and by failing to find it unconscionable.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to order the parties to bear their own costs despite a Rule 49.10 offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions on the contract terms were supported by the pleadings and evidence, and her discretion on costs was properly exercised.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the services it provided were real estate services under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the scope of services to be provided was a matter of factual dispute requiring a trial to determine the precise services and assess them against the legislative language.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of sexually assaulting a passenger who was confined to a wheelchair.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating he found the accused's evidence incredible based on the complainant's believability.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence as required by Sheppard.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited her long-term disability benefits and assessed her wrongful dismissal notice period at 12 months.

The respondent cross-appealed the calculation of short-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to mitigate her disability by not seeking medical assistance.

The court increased the notice period to 18 months based on the Bardal factors.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, affirming that short-term benefits should be calculated on base pay and commissions.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence for robbery.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: treating the unproven likelihood of a gun as an aggravating factor, and failing to apply the principle that a young offender's first penitentiary sentence should be as short as possible.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years and three months, in addition to nine months of pre-trial custody.

The defendants Garan, Lucow, Miller P.C. and Thomas W. Emery succeeded in their motion for a stay and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded them partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,000, payable jointly and severally by the plaintiffs and the co-defendant Kingsway General Insurance Company.

The appellant appealed his sentence for driving offences involving high speed, street racing, and impairment, which resulted in serious injuries to his passenger.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by treating a prior case as determinative rather than applying its principles to the specific facts.

However, upon re-sentencing, the Court agreed with the Crown that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the aggravating factors.

The Court concluded that a one-year custodial sentence was appropriate and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was adjourned on the first scheduled date because the trial judge had a potential conflict of interest.

The system accommodated a new trial date three months later.

The Court of Appeal held that this three-month rescheduling period was neutral for the purposes of the s. 11(b) assessment and that the total elapsed time did not exceed recognized limits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud related to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program.

They argued that the jury lacked a basis to find the plan was deprived of funds and that inadmissible hearsay evidence was admitted regarding the total detriment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the convictions and concluding that any hearsay evidence caused no prejudice since the appellants conceded the detriment exceeded $5,000.

The appellant father appealed a decision setting aside a trial judgment that had granted him custody of the child and ordering a new trial.

The appeal judge had found that the trial was unfair due to the trial judge recalling the mother to the stand on her own motion, a ten-month delay in rendering a decision, and the trial judge reopening the trial on her own motion for further evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusion that neither party received a fair trial and dismissed the appeal, ordering costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had allowed a motion on short notice, granted an extension of time, and ordered the appellant's factum and compendium removed from the file because they contained fresh evidence not before the lower court.

The panel found the single judge exercised his discretion appropriately and was correct in his order.

However, on consent of the responding party to expedite the appeal, the panel varied the order to allow the materials to remain in the file, provided the moving party does not rely on the fresh evidence without leave from the panel hearing the appeal.

The motion to review was otherwise dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a general contractor, was convicted of six counts of fraud relating to home renovation contracts and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from each count as similar fact evidence on the other counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the temporal connection and interconnectedness of the events made the evidence highly probative of fraudulent intent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence was substituted, as the court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the commercial relationship as a breach of trust and overemphasizing general deterrence.