Susan E. Lang

The appellant appealed her conviction for counselling to commit murder, arguing for a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

At trial, her defence of duress was rejected, and the trial judge found she had fabricated some journal entries.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from her trial counsel to show the continuity of her journal entries and the post-sentence criminal conduct of her former boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion and the appeal, concluding that the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result, as her behaviour with undercover officers was inconsistent with acting under duress.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because there was no evidence the complainant feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant feared for her safety.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for a global sentence of six months custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the joint submission, noting the appellant's persistent behaviour and related criminal record made the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and obstructing justice after brutally beating his pregnant common-law spouse, leaving her with permanent, severe brain damage.

He was sentenced to the maximum of 14 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody and his guilty plea, resulting in a net sentence of 8 years.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors such as his lack of a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was at the high end of the range, it was not demonstrably unfit given the extreme violence, devastating impact on the victim, and the appellant's lack of remorse.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their claim of economic duress and effectively dismissing their entire action against the respondent banks.

The motion judge had found that past dealings between the parties could not constitute economic duress to vitiate a restructuring agreement and release.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the 'plain and obvious' test for striking pleadings under Rule 21.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that a claim of economic duress based on past dealings would inevitably fail, and ordered the appellants to file a new, focused statement of claim.

The appellant, an inmate, was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing a fellow inmate and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing errors in the jury instructions regarding self-defence, manslaughter, after-the-fact conduct, and character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to hear evidence of the appellant's prior attempted murder conviction before making their parole ineligibility recommendation.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 16 years.

The self-represented appellant appealed a family law trial judgment regarding the valuation date, pension, matrimonial home, net family property, and child support.

At the outset, the appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence, which was dismissed as the evidence could have been adduced at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings or her exercise of trial management powers to curtail irrelevant cross-examination.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The insured died of carbon monoxide poisoning while repairing his son's motor vehicle in a closed garage with the engine running.

His blood alcohol level exceeded 80mg/100ml.

The appellant insurer denied coverage under an accidental death policy, relying on an exclusion clause for losses caused by 'operating a motor vehicle' while intoxicated.

The trial judge found the insured was not 'operating' the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that exclusion clauses must be interpreted narrowly and that 'operating' a vehicle, especially in the context of a blood alcohol threshold, focuses on driving rather than repairing.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a particularly egregious fraud involving elderly victims.

The appellant, who was in a position of trust, deprived the victims of a substantial portion of their savings and refused to acknowledge the harm or propose a method for repayment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence, as the principles of promoting responsibility and acknowledgment of harm would not be met.

The appellant town appealed a trial judge's decision declaring that a parcel of land was conveyed to it by mistake and was held in a resulting trust for the respondent developer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the conveyance was an inadvertent error by the respondent's real estate solicitor.

The Court also agreed that res judicata and limitation periods did not bar the claim, and declined to interfere with the trial judge's discretion to grant equitable relief despite the respondent's failure to convey other lands under a subdivision agreement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a Divisional Court decision which found that the insurer's notice cancelling the insured's weekly income benefits was inadequate to trigger the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Director's Delegate had applied the correct 'clear and unequivocal' test for the notice.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Divisional Court erred in requiring the reasons for cancellation to be legally correct under section 24(8) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Scheme; the reasons merely need to be provided to allow the insured to decide whether to challenge the cancellation.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay retroactive and ongoing spousal support of $1,100 per month.

He argued the trial judge erred in imputing income, setting the quantum, and making the award retroactive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant continued to have significant means despite transferring assets to his children, and that the respondent had a clear need for support.

The retroactive award was justified due to the appellant's failure to fully disclose his finances and his initial claim that the parties were merely in an employer/employee relationship.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding matrimonial issues, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to include an allegedly concealed $81,000 investment in the respondent's net family property and by refusing to award occupation rent for the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly accounted for children's trusts and properly exercised discretion under section 24(1) of the Family Law Act in denying occupation rent.

The appellant appealed a jury's allocation of fault in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the negligence particulars were unsustainable and that the respondent's opening address was highly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the negligence particulars were supported by the pleadings and evidence.

While the opening address was improper, the trial judge's clear and blunt corrective instruction to the jury was sufficient to cure the prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellants sought a stay of execution on a default judgment of approximately $57,000 that had stood unchallenged for over twelve years.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay.

The appeal from the Divisional Court order was dismissed.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed an order of the Divisional Court that upheld a decision by Blair J. regarding the control of court process and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal found that Blair J.'s order was discretionary and made within his jurisdiction.

Finding no basis to interfere with the order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the Requester.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement for the purchase of shares for $275,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the settlement was not contingent on a corporate reorganization and that payment was due within a reasonable time.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in ordering an additional payment for tax consequences, as the $275,000 was inclusive of taxes.

The Court also reduced the motion costs from substantial to partial indemnity, finding that a letter sent by the respondent did not constitute a Rule 49 offer.

The appellant appealed a decision holding that Ontario was neither the appropriate nor the convenient jurisdiction for his legal malpractice claim against a New York law firm.

The appellant had commenced the Ontario action after a New York court precluded him from continuing his litigation there due to his repeated failure to obey court orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario and that New York was the convenient forum.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice and a subsequent costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had thoroughly canvassed the appellants' objections to a master's report and made no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $25,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that he was unlawfully detained prior to a consent search that revealed crack cocaine, and that he was prejudiced by improper cross-examination and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings precluded a finding of detention, and that any potential prejudice from the Crown's improper cross-examination was sufficiently offset by the jury charge.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and his conviction appeal was previously dismissed.

He also filed an inmate notice of appeal against his sentence.

The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence appeal, noting that the sentence for first degree murder is fixed by law and therefore no appeal lies under section 675(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.