Stephen Borins

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his claim.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, failed to plead the essential elements of any cause of action, and constituted an abuse of process as an attempt to relitigate previous court proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that the receiver conducted an improvident sale of hydrofoil vessels.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants presented no substantial evidence to support their defence and merely criticized the receiver's marketing efforts.

The court held that summary judgment was appropriate as there were no facts in dispute and the issue of an improvident sale was a question of law.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court also noted that the appellant failed to show any error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an accused found not criminally responsible.

The accused had twice attempted to grab a police officer's gun during suicidal episodes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by placing an onus on the hospital to prove the accused posed a significant risk to the public.

The Court also held that the Board's conclusion that the accused did not pose a significant risk was unreasonable, speculative, and contrary to the uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence regarding her impulsivity and lack of insight.

The appellant was convicted of extortion after demanding the complainant purchase the distribution rights to a book he wrote about their past criminal involvement, threatening to distribute it to her community if she refused.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the definition of a threat and the defence of reasonable justification, and failed to adequately review the complainant's cross-examination evidence where she admitted she was not explicitly threatened.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge adequate and the failure to review the cross-examination evidence not fatal given the short trial and the legal definition of a threat.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's failure to review the exculpatory cross-examination evidence constituted reversible error.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, former commercial insurance salespeople for the respondent, resigned and joined a competitor, subsequently soliciting clients from the respondent.

The respondent successfully sued for breach of a restrictive covenant at trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the clause was an unenforceable non-competition clause rather than a non-solicitation clause, as it contained no geographical limit and broadly prohibited conducting business.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment was set aside.

The appellant was severely injured when she lost control of her vehicle after hitting the respondent's dog on a country road.

At trial, a jury found the respondent 35% responsible and the appellant 65% contributorily negligent, assessing damages accordingly.

The appellant appealed the jury's findings on contributory negligence, apportionment of liability, and damages, arguing that the jury relied on unreliable evidence from child witnesses and was misdirected on mitigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and that the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to warrant appellate interference.

Following an appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of over $100,000.

The Court of Appeal found the claimed fees excessive for a one-day appeal that did not raise complex issues.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $20,000 plus disbursements.

In an endorsement regarding costs for an appeal, cross-appeal, and related motions, the Court of Appeal found the bills of costs filed by both counsel to be exorbitant and unhelpful.

The court made a single award of costs, fixing them at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST, payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and driving offences.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching his vehicle after he was arrested for failing to identify himself under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police did not know the appellant's identity with certainty and that the search of the vehicle for identification was progressive and reasonable.

The conviction and the five-year sentence were upheld, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of prohibitions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out several paragraphs of its pleading.

The motion judge held that a ruling of the Ontario Securities Commission is not a contract as required by s. 23(1)(b) of the Condominium Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that granting leave to amend would not cure the deficiency, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by considering all relevant factors.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to provide any evidence of what his defence would have been had the adjournment been granted.

The appellants, owners of hotels and other businesses, brought a civil action for defamation, interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to injure against an employee and union steward who delivered a speech to customers.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the dispute was essentially a workplace dispute governed by the collective agreement, thereby ousting the court's jurisdiction under the Weber framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the facts and context of the dispute were overwhelmingly employment-related and that the appellants had initially treated the matter as a workplace incident by taking disciplinary steps.

The appellants appealed an order finding them in contempt of a previous court order and sought leave to appeal a costs order of approximately $92,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellants knowingly and intentionally ignored the previous order and attempted to hide assets to frustrate the respondent's rights as a creditor.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion in awarding costs on a full indemnity basis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order declaring the respondents to be owners of a parcel of land, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a Rule 49 settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly exercised his discretion to refuse to enforce the original settlement due to significant prejudice to the respondents.

The Court characterized the application judge's decision as a refusal to enforce the settlement followed by a decision on the merits of the original application, which was within his power.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court decision that allowed an appeal from two arbitral awards.

The moving party argued the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal as required by section 49 of the Arbitrations Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the parties could not contract out of the statutory leave requirement.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, but the court extended the time for the appellant to move for leave to appeal in writing.

The appellants appealed a finding that their conduct regarding the composition of a condominium corporation's board of directors was oppressive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge's reasons.

The respondents cross-appealed a portion of the order enforcing a by-law that both parties agreed violated the Condominium Act.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal and amended the by-law to provide for a five-member board consisting of two residential unit owners, two commercial unit owners, and a fifth member elected under the current by-law.

The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed a decision granting declaratory relief to the respondent regarding an easement and an undertaking to grant a further access easement.

The appellant argued the easements were conditional on the respondent building a synagogue on its retained lands, which it later decided to develop for residential purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no language in the agreements or undertaking restricting the use of the easements to a synagogue, and no evidence that the change in use would increase the burden on the servient tenement.

The respondent's cross-appeal to stay the discharge of a Certificate of Pending Litigation until the easement was registered was allowed.

The appellant, manager of an income trust, appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of the trust's declaration of trust.

The dispute centered on the method and date for calculating the 'Net Realized Proceeds per Unit' for units redeemed by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the valuation date was the correct date for determining the redemption price under both calculation methods provided in the declaration of trust.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.