John M. Connolly

The estate trustees sought the opinion, advice, or direction of the court regarding the application of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to a testamentary trust created for a beneficiary under a limited property will.

The court addressed whether the trust known as the “Susan Fund” could be terminated with immediate distribution depending on whether the beneficiary exercised a power of appointment by deed or will.

The court held that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier would not apply where no appointment was made, but would apply if the beneficiary appointed another beneficiary or her estate by deed.

The reasons clarified the implications of an earlier decision concerning a related trust and confirmed when the beneficiary could compel termination of the trust.

The beneficiary of a testamentary trust applied for termination of the trust and immediate distribution of its capital.

The trust provided that the beneficiary would take the capital absolutely 21 years after the testator’s death and granted her a power of appointment by deed or will.

The estate trustees sought the court’s opinion on whether the rule in Saunders v. Vautier applied, arguing that contingent interests and a potential gift-over prevented early termination.

The court held that the beneficiary’s life interest combined with the power of appointment by deed gave her effective dominion over the trust property and that no other person could ultimately benefit from the trust.

Applying the rule in Saunders v. Vautier and relying on Robinson v. Royal Trust Co., the court concluded that the beneficiary was entitled to immediate distribution of the trust assets.

The appellants appealed an order declaring the respondents to be owners of a parcel of land, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a Rule 49 settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly exercised his discretion to refuse to enforce the original settlement due to significant prejudice to the respondents.

The Court characterized the application judge's decision as a refusal to enforce the settlement followed by a decision on the merits of the original application, which was within his power.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breaching their duty of fidelity by communicating the respondent's confidential information to a competitor to assist in a government tender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on liability, causation, and damages.

The respondent's cross-appeal alleging inducing breach of contract against one of the appellants was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for damages arising from future sales of EPIPEN products in France.

The motion judge had concluded that a May 10, 1993 letter was merely an agreement to agree.

The Court of Appeal found the letter ambiguous, containing both language of a contract and language suggesting a future contract, and held that its proper characterization required trial evidence regarding the parties' history, industry practice, and subsequent conduct.

The respondents' cross-appeal on alternative grounds for summary judgment was dismissed as those issues also required resolving factual and credibility disputes.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to trial.

The appellant union appealed a trial judgment holding it liable for the balance of a deficit in a jointly funded dental plan administered by Great-West Life.

The union argued that Canada Post failed to remit proper premiums and that the governing agreement had been terminated, precluding liability for run-off claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the union shared responsibility for the deficit and that the agreement had not been legally terminated.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for $100,000 in life insurance proceeds following the death of his common law spouse.

The trial judge found the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy due to material misrepresentations about the deceased's health.

The appellant argued the insurer was estopped from avoiding the policy because it continued to accept premiums.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the misrepresentations were material and that the insurer's actions did not amount to an estoppel.