David G. Heeley

The applicants sought an order under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act to retain land on which their garage encroached, believing it was their own.

The respondents sought summary judgment dismissing the application, arguing adverse possession was not established and the Act did not apply.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, confirmed no adverse possession, and applied s. 37(1) of the CLPA, granting the applicants the right to retain the encroached land upon payment of fair compensation to the respondents.

The appellant, the only son of the deceased, appealed an order by the application judge that the deceased did not create a life interest in the family home in his favour.

The deceased's will expressed a wish that the son use the family home as his home "for as long as he wishes" but also provided that the home be transferred to his three children jointly.

The appellant lived in the home but failed to maintain it, resulting in disrepair and tax arrears.

The application judge concluded that the deceased did not intend to create a life interest and ordered the home sold.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants sought a declaration of substantial interference with their right-of-way for boat launching over the respondents' land, due to the respondents' construction of a dock and placement of boats.

The court applied the test of substantial interference, considering whether the right-of-way could be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before.

The application was dismissed as the applicants failed to establish substantial interference, retaining approximately half of the waterfront for boat launching.

The court also commented on the importance of community relationships in neighbourhood disputes.

The appellants appealed an order declaring the respondents to be owners of a parcel of land, arguing the application judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a Rule 49 settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly exercised his discretion to refuse to enforce the original settlement due to significant prejudice to the respondents.

The Court characterized the application judge's decision as a refusal to enforce the settlement followed by a decision on the merits of the original application, which was within his power.