Ralph Arnold Lee

The applicant and respondent were in a romantic relationship and lived together at a property solely owned by the respondent.

The respondent provided the down payment, while the applicant contributed significant unpaid labour to renovate the property.

After the parties separated, the respondent sold the property and retained the net proceeds.

The applicant brought a claim for unjust enrichment.

The court found that the applicant's labour conferred a benefit on the respondent with a corresponding deprivation and no juristic reason.

The court concluded the parties were engaged in a joint family venture and awarded the applicant a monetary remedy calculated on a value surviving basis, entitling him to half of the adjusted net proceeds of the sale.

The Respondent mother brought a motion challenging Ontario's jurisdiction to determine parenting issues for her child, Alessa, arguing Nunavut was the proper forum.

The court found that the child's habitual residence remained Nunavut, as the mother's trip to Ottawa with the child was exploratory and not a permanent relocation.

The Applicant father's unilateral withholding of the child was deemed a tactical self-help remedy that did not alter the child's habitual residence.

The court dismissed the Applicant's claim to jurisdiction, ordered the immediate return of the child to the Respondent, and directed police assistance if necessary for the child's return to Nunavut.

The Applicant mother sought full recovery costs following a successful motion to enforce parenting time.

The Respondent father failed to file costs submissions.

The court found the father's repeated failure to facilitate virtual parenting time, willful disregard for court orders, and attempts to cause harm to the mother constituted bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.

Despite the finding of bad faith, the court awarded a fixed amount of $6,500, less than the full recovery sought, considering the father's limited financial means and the overall objective of fairness and reasonableness in costs awards.

The applicant mother brought a motion alleging the respondent father breached a parenting order regarding virtual and in-person parenting time with their child.

She sought specified unsupervised parenting time in Nova Scotia and the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The court found the father in wilful non-compliance due to repeated missed virtual calls, obstruction of in-person visits, and disrespectful communication.

Applying Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court declined to exercise discretion in the father's favour.

The court ordered temporary, supervised in-person parenting time for the mother in Nova Scotia for two to three weeks during the summer, with the mother responsible for travel costs.

The OCL was appointed due to concerns about the child's emotional well-being, school attendance, and academic performance.

The mother brought an urgent motion seeking to have the parties' eight-year-old daughter returned to her full-time care before the start of the school year.

The daughter had been living with the father since June on what the mother claimed was a temporary basis.

The court found no urgency, noting the mother failed to establish the placement was temporary and that the impending sale of the matrimonial home created uncertainty about the daughter's future school district.

The motion was dismissed, and the daughter was ordered to remain in the father's care on an interim basis pending involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The mother brought an interim motion to relocate with the parties' three children to Kapuskasing following the sale of the matrimonial home in Smiths Falls.

The father, who had been exercising equal parenting time, opposed the move.

The court found that neither parent could afford housing in Smiths Falls and the mother had a reasonable plan and family support in Kapuskasing.

Noting the father's stated willingness to also move to Kapuskasing, the court permitted the relocation and ordered that equal parenting time continue in Kapuskasing, granting a 30-day grace period for the father to secure accommodation.

The Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville brought a motion within a status review application seeking temporary care and custody of three children.

The mother opposed the motion, supported by the father.

The Society alleged ongoing neglect, unhygienic living conditions, lack of supervision, domestic violence, and non-compliance with previous supervision orders.

However, since being served with the application, the mother had made significant positive changes, including separating from the father, moving to a safer home with a supportive cousin, and engaging with community and medical services for the children.

Applying Section 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which requires children to remain in current care unless their best interests "require" a change, the court found that while the Society's concerns were valid historically, the recent improvements meant that removal was not currently required.

This decision follows a two-day trial concerning custody and access for the parties' two children.

The father sought equal parenting time (50/50), while the mother sought joint custody with primary care to her and specific access for the father.

The court applied the "best interests of the child" test under the Children's Law Reform Act, giving particular consideration to the elder child's special needs for routine and stability.

The court found the mother better suited to meet the elder child's needs and ordered joint custody with primary residence to the mother, granting the father parenting time on alternating weekends and two mid-week evening visits.

The court also addressed the parents' communication issues, ordering the use of a communication program and emphasizing the need to avoid conflict in front of the children.

Child support and Section 7 expenses were also determined.

The appellant, the only son of the deceased, appealed an order by the application judge that the deceased did not create a life interest in the family home in his favour.

The deceased's will expressed a wish that the son use the family home as his home "for as long as he wishes" but also provided that the home be transferred to his three children jointly.

The appellant lived in the home but failed to maintain it, resulting in disrepair and tax arrears.

The application judge concluded that the deceased did not intend to create a life interest and ordered the home sold.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants sought a declaration of substantial interference with their right-of-way for boat launching over the respondents' land, due to the respondents' construction of a dock and placement of boats.

The court applied the test of substantial interference, considering whether the right-of-way could be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before.

The application was dismissed as the applicants failed to establish substantial interference, retaining approximately half of the waterfront for boat launching.

The court also commented on the importance of community relationships in neighbourhood disputes.

The Society brought a protection application regarding a 20-month-old child who suffered inadequately explained severe bruising while in the rotating care of her parents.

The child was apprehended and placed with the step-father's parents.

The mother and step-father complied with all Society recommendations and sought custody.

The father, who struggled with untreated ADHD, chronic pain, and marijuana use, sought sole custody but remained uncooperative with the Society and hyper-vigilant about minor injuries to the child.

The court found the child in need of protection and ordered custody to the mother and step-father, with supervised access to the father conditional on his compliance with treatment and parenting recommendations.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Prior to the trial, the deputy judge solicited and received a charitable donation from the paralegal firm representing the respondent, which he failed to disclose to the appellant.

The Divisional Court found that an informed person viewing the matter realistically and practically would conclude that the judge would not decide fairly.

The appeal was allowed, the trial decision was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.