CITATION: Taylor v. Harper, 2026 ONSC 3260

COURT FILE NO.: FC-25-61

DATE: 20260603

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Harry Dean Taylor

Applicant

– and –

Kellie Harper

Respondent

Robert Murphy, counsel for the Applicant

Ralph Lee, counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: November 24 and 25, 2025

Justice M. Fraser

Part 1 - Introduction

1The Applicant, Harry Dean Taylor (“Taylor”) and the Respondent, Kellie Harper (“Harper”) began a romantic relationship in November of 2019. Their relationship ended in January 2022.

2From September 2020 until their relationship ended, the parties lived at the property municipally known as 9 Stubbs Lane and 15 Stubbs Lane, Whitney, ON (the “Stubbs Lane property”). Title to this property was held in the name of Harper alone.

3Taylor claims in this proceeding that Harper was unjustly enriched as a result of his contributions to the Stubbs Lane property during the course of their relationship, and he seeks compensation for those contributions to the property by way of the labour and money he put toward renovations.

Part 2 - Background

4At the time of trial, Taylor was 54 years old and Harper was 53 years old.

5Taylor met Harper through the dating application, Tinder. Their relationship started in late 2019.

6Both parties have adult children from prior relationships. The parties do not have children together and they were never married.

7By September 2020, Taylor and Harper were living together at the Stubbs Lane property. They continued to live at this property until they separated in January 2022.

8The Stubbs Lane property is a 2.3 acre piece of land in Whitney, ON. It has two dwellings on it: 9 Stubbs Lane and 15 Stubbs Lane.

9The Stubbs Lane property was purchased by Harper on July 31, 2020, for $130,000. This property was not publicly listed for sale. Rather, the opportunity to purchase this property came about when Taylor found out about the property through his former father-in-law.

10Harper paid the sum of $9,097.79 towards the purchase price. The remainder of the purchase price was financed by way of a mortgage secured against the property.

11Renovations were conducted to both 9 Stubbs Lane and 15 Stubbs Lane. The parties moved into 15 Stubbs Lane and Harper’s elderly father moved into 9 Stubbs Lane.

12Shortly after the parties’ relationship ended in January 2022, Harper listed and sold the Stubbs Lane property for $420,000. She alone received the net proceeds of sale amounting to $275,428.90.

2.1 Taylor’s evidence

13Taylor maintains that the intention of the parties when the Stubbs Lane property was purchased was that this would be a joint venture by the parties and that this property was to become their home together, not just Harper’s alone.

14Taylor has been a labourer his whole life. He has worked jobs that involved carpentry, maintenance, and plumbing. Taylor's last formal education was when he completed Grade 9. Taylor works as a laborer for McRae Mills, a lumber company located in Whitney, ON. He has been employed by this company since 2017.

15Taylor maintains that he suggested that the parties purchase the Stubbs Lane property because it contained two stand-alone homes, which would accommodate the parties in one and Harper’s elderly father in the other. Taylor maintains that the property was purchased on behalf of the both of them with the intention that while Harper was contributing the down payment to purchase the home, Taylor would contribute his carpentry/handyman skills and labour to renovate the two dwellings on the property.

16The purchase documentation confirms that the purchase price for the Stubbs Lane property was $130,000, that Harper made a down payment of $9,097.79 and that the balance due on closing was financed by way of the mortgage secured against the property.

17Taylor asserts that as soon as the Stubbs Lane property was purchased, he began to conduct significant renovations to 9 Stubbs Lane. The parties’ intention was that 9 Stubbs Lane would be prepared so that Harper's elderly father could live there.

18Taylor claims that he worked most evenings and weekends renovating 9 Stubbs Lane. He asserts that he made the following improvements to 9 Stubbs Lane:

1. He replaced all of the plumbing except for the bathtub;

2. He converted one room into two bedrooms;

3. He installed new electrical plugins, including those for a washer, dryer, and kitchen stove;

4. He installed light fixtures in the kitchen and replaced the ones in the bedroom;

5. He installed and insulated the floors;

6. He removed the chimney from the wood burning stove;

7. He reinsulated the walls and ceiling in certain places; and

8. He installed new doors and windows throughout the home.

19Taylor maintains that he also conducted renovations to 15 Stubbs Lane. He acknowledges that they were more cosmetic in nature. Taylor asserts that he did the following:

1. He replaced some of the plumbing;

2. He installed a new double sink in the kitchen;

3. He installed a new vanity in the bathroom;

4. He installed a ceiling fan in the kitchen;

5. He cut and adjusted part of the cupboards to fit the fridge in;

6. He installed a new hot water tank;

7. He insulated the basement walls except under the bedroom;

8. He installed a hood range in the kitchen;

9. He installed lights on the porch;

10. He installed a ceiling fan; and

11. He brushed the entire property.

20Taylor acknowledges that he did not keep track of his time or his hours. He maintains that he did not do so because he did not believe that it was necessary, given his understanding that the work he was performing was for the parties’ mutual benefit.

21Taylor estimates that he worked for the full week of August 3 to August 9, 2020, and that he worked during the evenings and weekends from August 10, 2020 to March 31 2021. Taylor was unable to work during the period of April 2021 to August 2021 because of hernia surgery, but he resumed work between September 2021 and December 2021 during the evenings and on weekends.

22Taylor maintains that the parties were each responsible for certain expenses: Harper paid the mortgage, property taxes and utilities; Taylor paid the satellite and internet for both buildings, as well as Harper’s father’s telephone bill. At the end of every month Taylor asserts that Harper would reconcile the bills that had been paid, and Taylor would e-transfer any amount he owed to Harper.

23With respect to the renovations, Taylor asserts that he and Harper paid for the building materials and supplies needed to complete the renovations. Taylor produced his bank statements showing that he made various purchases at hardware stores, which he claims were for supplies for the renovations.

24Taylor was able to obtain lumber at a discounted price from his employer at McRae Mills. He maintains that he also traded labour with others in order to obtain parts and materials for the renovations.

25Taylor additionally asserts that he and Harper paid cash for some of the materials so that there are no records for these transactions.

26Taylor used his own tools and equipment to conduct the work at the Stubbs Lane property. He was not paid for his labour.

27Once Harper’s elderly father moved into 9 Stubbs Lane, Taylor helped with his care. While Harper’s father had a personal support worker who would attend and assist with his care, Taylor also checked on him and prepared food for him while Harper was working out of town.

28Taylor produced a series of texts which passed between him and Harper. The communications demonstrate their ongoing efforts to create a home for themselves. The communications refer to the house consistently as “our house.”

29When the parties’ relationship ended in January 2022, Harper informed Taylor that she was selling the Stubbs Lane property. Taylor opposed selling the property because he considered it his home. Notwithstanding, Harper listed the Stubbs Lane property for sale on February 8, 2022.

30Harper accepted an offer and sold the Stubbs Lane Property for $420,000, more than three times the amount it had been purchased for one and one-half years earlier.

31After the mortgage, real estate commission, and legal fees were paid, the net proceeds of sale realized by Harper for the sale of the Stubbs Lane property amounted to $275,428.90.

32Harper purchased a new home with the proceeds from the sale. Taylor did not receive any portion of the proceeds.

2.2 Harper’s evidence

33Harper agreed that the parties began to date in 2019.

34Harper asserts that in 2020, she decided to purchase the Stubbs Lane property for the benefit of both herself and her father. She states that her father was elderly at the time and required assistance. The Stubbs Lane property was suitable for this purpose as it consisted of two independent dwellings located within approximately 50 feet of each other.

35Harper asserts that she alone paid the downpayment for the purchase of the Stubbs Lane property and that she alone paid the mortgage payments and most of the carrying costs associated with the property.

36Harper confirms that Taylor moved in with her at the Stubbs Lane property in September 2020.

37However, Harper asserts that the agreement between the parties was that Taylor would pay her $700 per month for rent and $50 per month for expenses.

38Harper maintains that Taylor rarely paid the $700 per month which he was supposed to pay and that he often borrowed money from her. Taylor would usually pay Harper back when he borrowed money from her, but because he would miss payments, Harper stopped lending money to him by the late fall of 2021.

39Harper maintains that Taylor’s labour for the renovations consisted of a few hours a week at most. She points out that Taylor was employed on a full-time basis and therefore his claim that he put in significant time to renovating the property is not credible. She asserts that, at most, Taylor worked three weeks over a one-year period spanning 2020-2021. She also claims that he actually caused more damage than he contributed.

40Harper further asserts that she paid for 99% of the materials that were needed to conduct the upgrades to 9 Stubbs Lane and that all out of pocket expenses incurred by Taylor were reimbursed to him fully by her, although no formal accounting of this has been presented.

41In her evidence in chief, Harper acknowledged that Taylor performed some renovations which included some plumbing work, laying down a floor, and installing drywall to separate rooms. She asserts that Taylor, on his own accord, changed a door to a sliding door because he received the sliding door free of charge. Harper denies that Taylor insulated the entire dwelling at 9 Stubbs Lane. Rather, she asserts that he insulated maybe two to three small areas with insulation he received at no cost. Harper admits that Taylor installed a ceiling fan at 15 Stubbs Lane and fixed a door which she claims his children broke. Harper states that it was her who painted and cleaned up the property at 9 Stubbs Lane and that she and her sister painted 15 Stubbs Lane.

42During cross-examination, however, Harper admitted that Taylor removed and replaced the kitchen cabinets; installed a granite counter top donated by a friend; removed the woodburning stove; installed new plumbing and a dishwasher; renovated the bathroom and replaced the vanity; framed and drywalled a new bedroom, turning one room into two; added insulation in one area of the home; moved doors and increased the height of doorways; replaced some doors and windows; installed new trim in a couple of areas; ran new electrical wiring in the kitchen and installed a new electrical box for a ceiling fan; levelled some of the floors; installed a new hot water tank; insulated the basement walls; and contributed to some of the painting.

43Harper also admitted that Taylor did pay her for the most part to cover his share of the bills. However, she asserted that he did not pay the $700 per month for rent as agreed upon. Harper asserts that, if anything, Taylor owes her unpaid rent and money which she lent to him.

44Harper additionally has provided an invoice from EcoHome Financial Inc. for the purchase and finance of the furnace for 9 Stubbs Lane. She alone paid for the payments for this loan and produced a copy of the EcoHome Financial Inc. buyout quote as of February 17, 2022. The amount outstanding at that time was $7,925.44.

Part 3 - Legal considerations

45The elements of unjust enrichment are: 1. a benefit, 2. a corresponding deprivation, and 3. the absence of juristic reason for the benefit and the loss: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] S.C.R. 269, at para. 32.

46As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Kerr at para. 31: “At the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment lies the notion of restoring a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain.” Put another way, unjust enrichment may be defined as “the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another, against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience”: Bruyninckx v. Bruyninckx, at para. 58 and Ingram v. Kulynych Estate, 2024 ONCA 678 at para. 51.

47The companion cases from the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr set out the current foundation for property claims between unmarried spouses upon separation. Cromwell J. in Kerr lays out a framework of principles which attempts to harmonize the various strains of the unjust enrichment jurisprudence in family law and non-family law cases.

48Unjust enrichment is a legal finding that leads to an equitable remedy to address an inequitable distribution of assets on separation. There are two stages to the application of an unjust enrichment claim: establishing the claim by meeting the test of unjust enrichment, and then determining the appropriate remedy, either monetary or proprietary.

49The test for unjust enrichment is:

(a) A benefit/enrichment conferred on the respondent;

(b) A corresponding deprivation of the claimant; and

(c) No juristic reason for the respective benefit and deprivation: Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52 and Kerr at paras. 31-32.

50The party claiming there has been unjust enrichment carries the burden of establishing that they gave something to the other party which that party received and retained. The benefit need not be retained permanently, but there must be a benefit which has enriched that party and which can be restored to the claimant in specie or by money: Kerr at para. 38.

51Some examples of benefits received include:

(a) Money;

(b) Title to a bank or investment account;

(c) Title to real property (sole or joint);

(d) Direct payment of expenses;

(e) Providing accommodations or use of real property that saves expenses;

(f) Labour, including administrative or physical labour that creates, enhances, or preserves property, including real property;

(g) Domestic services; and

(h) Anything else of economic value.

52It is not a “net benefit” analysis at this stage of the inquiry. Rather the court must determine whether there has been any benefit to the respondent as the analysis of the mutual conferral of benefits comes in later.

53The claimant’s loss is only material if the respondent has gained a benefit or has been enriched: Kerr at para. 39. The claimant must establish not only that the respondent has been enriched, but also that the enrichment corresponds to a deprivation which the claimant has suffered: Kerr at para. 39. There will usually be a relatively direct connection between the benefit to the respondent and the loss of the claimant, but it may not be as clear in some cases. Examples of cases where this is relatively clear have included instances where cash or property is given by one party to the other.

54In some cases, the benefit is less clear. Examples include:

(a) where one party pays for aspects of or improvements to real property when it is owned by the other; or

(b) where one party contributes labour or time that allows the other party to focus on building another asset, developing their career or saving them costs.

55Whether the deprivation was counter-balanced by benefits flowing to the claimant from the respondent does not get addressed in the first two steps of the unjust enrichment analysis: Kerr at para. 113 and Granger v. Granger, 2016 ONCA 945 at para. 48. That consideration is addressed when considering the defence and remedy stage, or in a limited fashion, at the juristic reason stage. It is only appropriate to consider mutually conferred benefits if they shed light on the parties’ reasonable expectations: Kerr at paras. 113-115.

56Finally, the benefit and corresponding deprivation must have occurred without a juristic reason: Kerr at para. 40. This means that there is no reason in law or justice, for the respondent’s retention of the benefit conferred by the claimant, making its retention “unjust” in the circumstances of the case: Kerr at para. 40. This involves a two-part test, the second part of which also has two parts:

(a) None of the usual categories apply:

(i) A gift;

(ii) A contract; or

(iii) A legal obligation; and

(b) (i) what were the reasonable expectations of the parties; and

(ii) whether there are any moral and policy-based arguments that would support the argument that the enrichment should be retained.

57The onus for the first part of the test, namely proving that none of the usual categories apply, is on the claimant. The onus for the second part of the test is on the respondent. If there was no contract between the parties, no evidence of donative intent, no applicable disposition of law, and no other traditional categories of unjust enrichment (mistake, duress etc.) it is likely that there will be no juristic reason for the retention of a benefit provided.

58If the three-part test for unjust enrichment has been met, the next stage of analysis is the remedy, which is either:

a. A monetary award; or

b. A proprietary award (normally a constructive trust creating ownership in property).

59The court must consider a monetary award first, which will often be sufficient in the circumstances of the case: Kerr at para. 47.

3.1 Monetary or Proprietary Remedy and the Joint Family Venture

60Remedies for unjust enrichment are restitutionary in nature, that is, the object of the remedy is to require the respondent to repay or reverse the unjustified enrichment: Kerr at para. 46. A monetary award is the preferred remedy. Justice Cromwell confirmed in Kerr that a proprietary remedy, such as a constructive trust, should only be considered if a monetary award is insufficient or inappropriate: Kerr at para. 50.

61Hoy A.C.J.O in Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14 at para. 52 summarized how the court should assess the appropriate remedy:

a. Have the elements of unjust enrichment – enrichment and a corresponding deprivation in the absence of a juristic reason – been made out?

b. If so, will monetary damages suffice to address the unjust enrichment, keeping in mind bars to recovery and special ties to the property that cannot be remedied by money?

c. If the answer to b. is yes, should the monetary damages be quantified on a fee-for-service basis or a joint family venture basis?

62If, and only if, monetary damages are insufficient, is there a sufficient nexus to a property that warrants impressing it with a constructive trust interest?

63A monetary award is the default remedy and should suffice in most cases to remedy the unjust enrichment. However, even if a monetary award is sufficient, consideration must be given to how the monetary award is qualified. Monetary awards can be calculated in one of two ways:

a. On a quantum meruit or “fee-for-service” basis, also referred to as “value received” basis; or

b. On a “value surviving” basis also known as the joint family venture approach: Kerr at paras. 49 and 55.

64Monetary damages calculated on a quantum meruit basis are likely appropriate where there is no joint family venture found between the parties. This approach strives to quantify the claimant’s contributions by placing a monetary value on the contributions. For unpaid services, this requires attempting to calculate the dollar value of the services provided. This is not a straight-forward exercise, nor an exact science. The assessment may consider:

a. The cost to the claimant of providing the service;

b. The market value of the benefit; or

c. The value placed on the benefit by the recipient.

65In this approach, the claimant is more like an employee seeking reimbursement for services rendered.

66In Kerr, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected relying on only the fee-for-service model for quantifying a monetary award premised upon the following reasons:

a. The difficulty of quantifying fee-for-service in domestic partnerships;

b. Fee-for-service is too rigid and not aligned well with the flexibility of equitable remedies for unjust enrichment;

c. There is no reason in principle why one of the traditional categories of unjust enrichment should be used to force the monetary remedy for all present domestic unjust enrichment cases into a “remedial straitjacket”; and

d. A restrictive reading of Peter v. Beblow, [1993], 1 SCR 980 is not accurate. It does not mandate quantum meruit: Kerr at paras. 58-79.

67Kerr established that the calculation of a monetary award is not limited to the “value received” approach stating that a monetary award calculated on a “value surviving” basis may also be used. The value surviving approach considers the accumulated wealth “surviving” at the end of the relationship. It tries to quantify the claimant’s “proportionate contribution” to the “accumulation of wealth”. The claimant is treated less like an employee, and more like a business partner in a family enterprise. This approach more closely approximates the existing property division regime for married spouses.

68Using the value surviving approach to quantify a monetary award may only be done where there is:

(1) there is a “joint family venture”; and

(2) there is a link between the claimant’s contributions to the joint family venture and assets and/or wealth accumulation; and

(3) the respondent is retaining a disproportionate share of assets resulting from that joint family venture.

69Where the unjust enrichment is best characterized as an unjust retention of a disproportionate share of assets accumulated during the course of what McLachlin J. referred to in Peter v. Beblow as a “joint family venture” to which both partners have contributed, the monetary remedy should reflect that fact: Kerr at para. 80. This measures the value surviving at separation “calculated according to the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant’s contributions”: Kerr at para. 87.

70It is a question of fact in each case whether there was a joint family venture. The onus is on the spouse claiming joint family venture to prove it: Tsai v. Dugal, 2022 ONCA 81 at para. 7. A joint family venture is assessed having regard to all of the relevant circumstances, with an emphasis on how the parties actually lived their lives. Accordingly, unmarried couples who very closely, or entirely, lived their lives as though they were married, would have access to claims and remedies that are more similar to those available to married spouses, albeit with an additional evidentiary burden.

71Paragraphs 90 to 99 in Kerr set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether there has been a joint family venture, specifically:

1. Mutual effort: whether the parties worked collaboratively toward a common goal i.e. pooling of effort; having children; jointly contributing to a bank account; jointly contributing to assets, including a joint home; splitting time on tasks on a schedule, including childcare; sharing tasks; allocating tasks to one or the other; hosting as a couple, especially as relates to business/career; more wide-ranging support for one party’s career; both parties working to support the family.

2. Economic integration: whether the parties shared expenses and amassed a common pool of assets i.e. had joint bank accounts; sharing of expenses; common pool of savings; shared bills; shared contribution to bills; division of spending and saving; making investment decisions together; managing financial risk and stability through both parties’ careers; filing taxes as common law partners; benefiting from efficiencies of scale for expenses; sharing medical insurance; being beneficiaries of life insurance; being named attorney for property and/or jointly on loans or mortgages.

3. Actual intention: whether the parties saw each other as domestic and economic partners – expressed or inferred, from actual conduct; statements to third parties about status; statements to each other about status; emails, texts, letters to each other about nature of the relationship; emails, texts, letters, to third parties about the nature of the relationship; filings for immigration purposes; filings for loan or mortgage approval; holding anniversary parties that emphasize the partnership of the parties; many of the aspects of mutual effort and economic integration also show intentionality by the parties.

4. Priority of the family: whether there was detrimental reliance on the relationship by one or both partners for the sake of the family. Reliance on shared future; leaving workforce for a time to raise children; relocating for the benefit of the other’s career; foregoing career/educational advancement for family/relationship; accepting under-employment to balance financial/domestic needs of the family unit; taking family vacations; hosting family celebrations. The length of the relationship is also relevant, as well as whether the parties have children together. Longer relationships and families with children are more likely to accumulate these types of factors.

72From a practical perspective, many of the facts that may arise are interrelated or go to more than one potential factor. Finding joint family venture is a highly fact-driven exercise and each case will turn on its own specific facts.

73If a joint family venture is found, the monetary award should be proportionate to the partnership contributions. There is no presumption of a half interest: Lesko v. Lesko, 2021 ONCA 369 at para. 34 (leave to appeal denied at David Joseph Lesko v. Kelly Sue Lesko).

74In the event the claimant seeks a proprietary remedy, the onus is on the claimant to show that a monetary award is insufficient and that there is a sufficient nexus to the property in question.

Part 4 -Analysis

4.1 What was the understanding between the parties

75The parties relate two very different histories of what transpired during the course of their relationship and their mutual understanding. I will first address my findings in this regard.

76I am satisfied that the arrangement between Harper and Taylor was more than a tenancy arrangement. They were in a relationship together. They both believed the relationship promised a long indefinite future together. They thought they were going to live the rest of their lives together as a couple.

77It is not disputed that Harper solely provided the financial investment to purchase the Stubbs Lane property. Taylor does not dispute this. That initial investment amounted to $9,097.79. The balance of the proceeds for the purchase was financed by way of the mortgage secured against the property.

78I do not accept Harper’s evidence that she and Taylor had agreed upon a tenancy arrangement wherein Taylor was to pay Harper a total of $750 per month for rent and expenses in order to occupy the Stubbs Lane property with her.

79Taylor denies there was any such agreement. He asserts that the parties had discussed this amount when estimating what they thought the monthly expenses would be for the Stubbs Lane property and what they would be both respectively contributing toward that cost.

80Harper introduced some text exchanges between her and Taylor which she suggests supports the conclusion that Taylor had agreed to pay the amount of $700 to her as monthly rent. In one of the text exchanges, in response to Harper asking for money from Taylor, he states:

Harper: 690 in October

November 225 plus 20 cash

Taylor: November just started and

u said 700 a month from each of us

That’s 21 hundred a month

81This text exchange is not consistent with Harper’s assertion that there was a rental agreement for a set amount for Taylor to pay as rent. The fact that Taylor framed his response as “u said 700 a month from each of us” supports, in my mind, a conclusion that the parties had agreed each would contribute toward the ongoing costs as a partnership arrangement.

82Secondly, Taylor has produced a number of text exchanges wherein both of the parties refer to the property as “ours”. It is clear in these communications that the parties were consulting with one another and that Taylor was very much involved in making the decisions respecting what renovations were reasonably necessary.

83There is absolutely no record of there ever having been an ongoing monthly payment made of $750. Even if, as Harper suggests, Taylor was not consistent in paying the “rent”, I would have expected there to be some record of payments that suggested a set amount payable monthly.

84Further, while Harper asserted, at trial, that the lack of a record of payments is due to Taylor not paying the rent as was expected of him, I find his failure to do so more in keeping with the conclusion that this was not actually the understanding between the parties in the first place.

85Harper’s position that there was a tenancy arrangement on these terms is also inconsistent with Harper additionally looking to Taylor to contribute toward additional ongoing expenses.

86The conclusion that there was a tenancy agreement is also not credible given that Taylor was conducting renovations without being paid nor given any other form of credit for his labour.

87Taylor maintains that it was the parties’ agreement that while Harper invested the financial resources to purchase the Stubbs Lane property, the parties anticipated that he would be donating his labour to the renovations and that this was to be his contribution toward the property. I prefer Taylor’s evidence as more credible given his narrative is simply more consistent with the actions of the parties.

88For instance, it is clear that there were ongoing payments for expenses being made and that the parties communicated between themselves to try to reconcile their respective shares. They each took responsibility for paying certain expenses (i.e. Harper paid the mortgage and the property taxes and Taylor paid for the satellite and internet for both homes on the Stubbs Lane property and paid for Harper’s father’s cell phone). It is clear from the text communications that they would then attempt to equalize their payment toward the expenses.

89I note that it was only when the relationship soured that Harper wanted Taylor to sign a document saying that he had been paying her rent. He refused.

90When the Stubbs Lane property was purchased, both parties testified that they believed they were in a solid relationship and “in it for life.” This seems more consistent with Taylor’s evidence regarding the parties’ arrangement and less consistent with Harper’s position that the parties had agreed upon a strict rental arrangement.

91As such, I conclude that that the parties purchased the Stubbs Lane property believing that this was a joint effort/investment by them for their future together.

92While the parties did not clearly define their expectations at that time or put it in writing, it is my view that Harper and Taylor both anticipated that Harper would provide the initial financial investment, Taylor would conduct the renovations, and that the parties would share the ongoing expenses to carry the Stubbs Lane property.

93It is clear, in my view, that the parties discussed the carrying costs of the Stubbs Lane property and anticipated that they would each contribute approximately $700 per month for the ongoing expenses. The fact that Harper made demands for more or less than $700, in any given month, supports the conclusion that the monthly amount discussed by them at the outset was a projected estimate.

94I also conclude that the parties anticipated that Taylor’s contribution, in return for Harper’s initial capital investment in acquiring the property, would come in the form of his unpaid labour in making improvements to the Stubbs Lane property.

95Harper did not, in her evidence, otherwise explain why Taylor was performing the renovations without compensation, if, as she suggests, he was simply a tenant. Instead, Harper minimized the amount of labour she asserts Taylor contributed.

96On this point, I accept Taylor’s evidence that he dedicated his evenings and weekends to performing the renovations and the photographs produced by him would suggest that the renovations conducted by him were substantive enough and can not be described as “minimal”.

97In my view, even though the relationship was not a long one, the labour contributed by Taylor easily matched in value the financial investment Harper made in the initial purchase of the property. In my view, Taylor’s construction skills made a significant contribution to the improvement of the property

4.2 Unjust Enrichment analysis

98Given I accept Taylor’s evidence with respect to the improvements he made to the Stubbs Lane property as outlined above, there is no question that he conferred a benefit on Harper, as the titled owner of that property. The enrichment was not insignificant and, in my view, likely equalled Harper’s own monetary contribution toward the acquisition of the property.

99The enrichment conferred in this instance also resulted from Taylor sharing in the ongoing expenses associated with the Stubbs Lane property.

100In my view, with the conferral of this enrichment upon Harper there was a corresponding deprivation by Taylor. Taylor was not compensated for the significant labour he provided to improving the Stubbs Lane property. The increase in the value made to the Stubbs Lane property through the renovations was enjoyed by Harper alone.

101I am also satisfied that no juristic reason has been presented to explain the benefit and corresponding deprivation. None of the usual categories which would support the finding of a juristic reason apply; specifically, the conferral of the benefit was not intended as a gift, and it was not required by contract or other legal obligation.

102Additionally, Harper has not offered evidence that would satisfy the contention that this conferral of a benefit on her, and the corresponding deprivation to Taylor, was consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, or that any moral or policy-based arguments justify the retention of the enrichment.

103I conclude that the three-part test for unjust enrichment therefore has been met by Taylor.

104The next part of the analysis which I must consider is what remedy, if any, is appropriate bearing in mind that the object of the remedy is to require the recipient of the benefit to repay or reverse the unjustified enrichment.

105Firstly, when considering whether a monetary or proprietary remedy is appropriate, only a monetary remedy is possible at this point given that the property improved by Taylor has already been sold.

106On that basis I must next consider whether any monetary damages should be calculated on a quantum meruit basis (also known as a “value received” basis) or on a “value surviving” basis (also known as the “joint family venture” approach).

107Taylor argues that while monetary damages would normally be calculated on a “value received” basis, the parties in this instance were engaged in a joint family venture. Rather than quantifying his damages based upon the value of his contribution, he claims he should be entitled to share in the increased equity realized upon the sale of the Stubbs Lane property. He asks that he be granted an equal share of the net proceeds from the sale of the Stubbs Lane property (which amounts to one half of $275,428.90 after the closing expenses were paid, including the balance owing on the mortgage, and the real estate broker fees and legal fees payable).

108I acknowledge that the parties’ relationship was short. However, that makes little difference to their intention when the Stubbs Lane property was purchased, and they began to live together.

109In my view, Taylor and Harper very much intended to, and did in fact, enter into a partnership venture which was intended to benefit both of them as a result of their mutual efforts. It is clear, in my view, that while Harper was contributing the initial downpayment for the property, it was intended and Taylor in fact conferred an equivalent value to the property through his labour by performing the renovations he did.

110This partnership included the two parties combining their resources to cover the cost of the ongoing expenses for the property as well as the cost of the materials required to complete the renovations. The only exception to this would entail the cost of a new furnace for 9 Stubbs Lane which was accomplished through a loan which Harper obtained amounting to $7,925.44.

111While the parties did not merge their bank accounts, they did attempt to divide up who paid what expense, and it appears they attempted to reconcile those expenses at the end of the day in order to ensure both were contributing to the costs.

112In my view, Taylor and Harper acquired and improved the Stubbs Lane property for their mutual benefit. There was clearly a pooling of effort and a sharing of resources by both of them and they both believed they had embarked upon a life-long co-operative mutually beneficial relationship together.

113In my view the elements to conclude that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture have been made out.

114Based upon the conclusion that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture, and the nature of their contributions, I find that Taylor is entitled to a monetary remedy which should be calculated on a “value surviving” basis.

115In this respect, the monetary award should be proportionate to the partnership contributions.

116In this instance, the Stubbs Lane property was sold for $420,000. The net proceeds realized by Harper, after the payment of the balance of the outstanding mortgage, the realtor fees and the legal fees, amounted to $275,428.90. Additionally, Harper owed $7,925.44 for a new furnace which was installed at 9 Stubbs Lane. This obligation assumed by her alone should, in my view, also be deducted from the sale proceeds of the home.

117While there is no presumption that there should be an equal division in the remainder, it is appropriate in this instance, in my view, given that I conclude that the parties regarded, and in fact made, equivalent contributions to the Stubbs Lane property.

118Based upon my conclusion that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture, and the nature of their contributions, I find therefore that Taylor is entitled to a monetary remedy which should be calculated on a “value surviving” basis and fixed in the amount of $133,751.73. I conclude that this sum is a reasonably fair and equitable remedy proportionate to his contribution.

Part 5 - Disposition

119An Order shall issue that Harper shall pay Taylor the sum of $133,751.73 as compensation based upon my finding that Harper was unjustly enriched.

120If the parties are unable to settle the issue of costs between them, they may provide written submissions to me. Submissions shall not exceed 3 pages, excluding bills of costs, offers to settle, and case law. Taylor’s submissions shall be delivered within 30 days. Harper’s submissions shall be delivered within 45 days.

Justice M. Fraser

Released: June 3, 2026

CITATION: Taylor v. Harper, 2026 ONSC 3260