Mark Stone

The applicant requested to reactivate his human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal, which had been deferred pending the conclusion of WSIB proceedings.

The respondents opposed the reactivation due to the applicant's delay in filing the request.

The Tribunal granted an extension of time, noting the lack of prejudice to the respondents and the conclusion of the WSIB process, and ordered the application reactivated.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a previous decision that dismissed his human rights application.

The original application alleged termination based on disability, but was dismissed because the applicant had signed a full and final release after accepting a severance package.

The applicant argued for reconsideration based on ongoing medical issues and dissatisfaction with the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board.

The Tribunal found that these reasons did not meet the criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5(d) and dismissed the request.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of creed.

The parties agreed to resolve the application and entered into a written settlement.

The applicant filed a request to withdraw the application, and the parties jointly requested the Tribunal to finally dispose of the matter.

The Tribunal granted the request and dismissed the application.

The applicant, a practising Sikh, alleged discrimination in employment because of creed, specifically regarding the respondent's requirement that his beard be bound.

The World Sikh Organization of Canada (WSO) requested intervenor status to make submissions on the accommodation of uncut beards in the Sikh faith.

The Tribunal applied the four-factor test for intervention and granted the WSO's request, finding it was well-placed to provide assistance on the significance of uncut beards in the Sikh faith.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging his employment was terminated due to a disability.

The respondent requested early dismissal, arguing the applicant had signed a full and final release in exchange for a severance package.

The Tribunal found that the release clearly covered claims under the Human Rights Code and that there was no evidence of duress or insufficient consideration to vitiate the release.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The action was dismissed after the plaintiff failed to respond to a status notice.

The plaintiff's counsel argued the delay was due to the plaintiff's diagnosis with a brain tumour and subsequent death, which made obtaining instructions difficult.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that while the medical condition explained some delay, it did not excuse the failure to request a status hearing or the 11-month delay in bringing the motion to set aside.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and actual prejudice was found due to the plaintiff's death and the loss of evidence regarding mitigation.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

A summary hearing was scheduled by telephone, but the applicant failed to attend.

After waiting 30 minutes and confirming that notice was properly sent, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent terminated his employment during a medical leave and failed to assist him in obtaining insurance benefits.

The applicant also commenced two civil actions related to his injuries and insurance benefits.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application under section 45 of the Human Rights Code.

Finding a significant overlap in key factual disputes between the proceedings, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the conclusion of the civil actions to avoid inconsistent results.

The applicant, a janitor with a mental health disability, sought an interim remedy to allow him to listen to his MP3 player at work, which he claimed mitigated his symptoms.

The respondent had banned the device for safety reasons.

The Tribunal granted the interim remedy, finding the applicant had an arguable case, the balance of harm favoured him, and the remedy was just and appropriate, provided he only used the device in non-hazardous areas.

The appellants, owners of hotels and other businesses, brought a civil action for defamation, interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to injure against an employee and union steward who delivered a speech to customers.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the dispute was essentially a workplace dispute governed by the collective agreement, thereby ousting the court's jurisdiction under the Weber framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the facts and context of the dispute were overwhelmingly employment-related and that the appellants had initially treated the matter as a workplace incident by taking disciplinary steps.

In an application for certification in the construction industry, the Board determined the voter eligibility of several individuals.

The Board found that a working foreman did not exercise managerial functions as he lacked authority to hire, fire, or grant wage increases, and was therefore an employee entitled to vote.

The Board also determined that operating a compressor and moving scaffolding for painters fell within the union's work jurisdiction, making those employees eligible to vote.

However, an employee performing general site clean-up was performing labourers' work and was ineligible to vote.

The applicant union sought leave to withdraw its application for certification under the construction industry provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, following a representation vote held on January 15, 2001.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board granted leave to withdraw the application and directed the Registrar to destroy the ballots cast in the representation vote after 30 days, unless a party requested otherwise.

The applicant union sought to withdraw its application against the responding party employer.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board granted leave to withdraw the application.

The applicant, Lotto Sanitation Inc., sought to withdraw its application against the Universal Workers Union, Labourers' International Union of North America Local 183 and Joel Filipe.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board granted leave to withdraw the application.

The applicant union applied for certification, and a representation vote resulted in a tie with one segregated ballot.

The segregated ballot belonged to a casual employee who had resigned from her permanent part-time position and had not worked in the four months leading up to the vote.

The Board applied the tests from Madeira and EMS, finding that while the employee had an ongoing employment relationship by remaining on a call-in list, she lacked a close connection to the workplace at the time the decision concerning unionization was made.

The Board ruled she was ineligible to vote.

As the union did not receive more than fifty percent of the votes, the application for certification was dismissed.

The applicant employer requested a review of an Order to Pay termination pay to a former employee, a refrigeration mechanic.

The employer argued the employee was covered by the construction exemption in Regulation 327(2)(e) of the Employment Standards Act, which exempts persons employed in the repair of works at the site thereof.

The Board found that the majority of the work performed by the employee was repair work at the customer's premises, rather than maintenance.

Consequently, the employee fell within the construction exemption and was not entitled to termination pay.

The Order to Pay was rescinded.

The applicant union applied for certification.

The parties entered into a memorandum of agreement acknowledging a sale of business and the future intermingling of employees represented by two different unions.

The Board issued a consent order incorporating the agreement, which provided for the issuance of a certificate to the applicant for certain locations, the continuation of the intervenor's bargaining rights at other locations, and a future representation vote to determine the bargaining agent for the intermingled employees.

The union filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging the employer engaged in anti-union animus, including suspending the union president, interfering with a lease agreement, and failing to follow collective agreement discipline procedures.

A separate application was filed by employees to terminate the union's bargaining rights, which the union argued was employer-initiated.

The Board found the employer violated sections 70 and 72 of the Labour Relations Act regarding the suspension, lease termination, and discipline administration, awarding damages.

However, the Board dismissed the bad faith bargaining allegations regarding the cessation of union dues collection and service fee increases during a legal strike/lockout position.

The Board also found insufficient evidence of employer initiation or interference in the termination application and ordered the segregated ballots to be counted.

The union filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging the employer engaged in anti-union conduct, including suspending the union president, interfering in a lease agreement, and ignoring collective agreement disciplinary procedures.

A separate application was filed by employees to terminate the union's bargaining rights, which the union argued was employer-initiated.

The Board found the employer violated sections 70 and 72 of the Labour Relations Act regarding the suspension, lease interference, and disciplinary procedures, awarding damages.

However, the Board dismissed the union's allegations that the employer initiated the termination application or bargained in bad faith by altering union dues collection and service fees during a legal strike/lockout period.

The Board ordered the counting of segregated ballots in the termination vote.

The union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging the employers bargained in bad faith by insisting on terms regarding insurance and brokerage fees that were worse than those in the pre-existing service agreements.

The Board held that once the parties bargained a collective agreement (or had one imposed by arbitration), the service agreement terms on those subjects were superseded.

Following the expiry of the statutory freeze, the employers were entitled to alter those terms.

The bad faith bargaining complaint was dismissed.