Sally A. Gomery

The Estate Trustee of Jean Marie Hayduk sought the court's determination regarding the validity of a will's disposition of a Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) and whether it revoked an earlier beneficiary designation.

The will contained a misdescription of the RRIF account.

The court applied the *falsa demonstratio non nocet* principle to correct the misdescription, finding the testator's intent clear despite the error.

The court further held that under section 52(2) of the *Succession Law Reform Act*, the later designation in the will implicitly revoked the earlier designation by instrument due to inconsistency, even without an explicit revocation clause meeting section 52(1) requirements.

The application was granted, confirming the will's disposition and the revocation of the prior designation.

The accused, Jacques Trudel, was convicted of trafficking crystal methamphetamine, possession of hydromorphone, and possession of proceeds of trafficking following a high-speed police chase and the seizure of drugs and cash.

The central issue was whether Mr. Trudel had constructive possession of the crystal methamphetamine.

The court found, based on circumstantial evidence, that the accused had knowledge and control over the drugs, given his active role in the common venture with his co-accused, his control over the vehicle's contents, and his instruction to evade police.

The defence's arguments regarding police testimony reliability and gaps in the Crown's case were rejected.

The plaintiff, Marcel Guibord, initiated a new action against the National Bank of Canada, its officers, a lawyer, and the federal and provincial governments, alleging fraud, conversion, and land claims related to a property previously subject to a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendants sought dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as it constituted an attempt to re-litigate issues already adjudicated in prior proceedings, including a summary judgment motion and appeals.

The court noted the plaintiff's claims were largely unintelligible and nonsensical, and that adding the Crown as a party did not legitimize the collateral attack on previous decisions.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff initiated a civil action against the Ottawa Police Services, seeking injunctions to compel the arrest of the Prime Minister for alleged extortion and damages for police interference with a citizen's arrest.

The defendant sought dismissal of the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the remedies sought were legally unavailable, the statement of claim lacked material facts, and contained pseudo-legal jargon and unsubstantiated accusations.

The action was dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought to remove the respondent as the sole estate trustee of the Estate of Mary Sullivan, primarily due to concerns regarding the authentication, evaluation, and sale of the "Sanders Portrait" a painting purportedly of William Shakespeare valued at USD $50,000,000.

The applicant alleged the respondent lacked expertise, acted diligently, and engaged in improper conduct.

The court dismissed the application, finding no compelling evidence that the respondent's administration endangered the estate, emphasizing that a testator's choice of trustee should not be lightly interfered with.

Costs were awarded against the applicant on a substantial indemnity basis due to unsubstantiated grave accusations.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim to add allegations of breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and to plead the doctrine of *contra proferentem*.

The court denied the amendments related to good faith and fair dealing, finding them to be unsupported legal conclusions without material facts.

However, the court granted leave to add the *contra proferentem* plea, deeming it a point of law permissible under the rules, despite its questionable value and the absence of supporting facts, and finding no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The applicant mortgagee brought an application for possession of a mortgaged property, judgment for the outstanding debt, and leave to issue a writ of possession following the respondent mortgagor's default.

The court held that a mortgagee may proceed by way of application rather than an action under Rule 64 where there are no material facts in dispute.

The court granted judgment for the debt and an order for possession, but denied leave to issue a writ of possession because the applicant failed to prove it had given notice to all persons in actual possession of the property as required by Rule 60.10(2).

The Crown applied for a bail review of a justice of the peace's decision to release the accused, who was charged with multiple serious offences involving the prolonged abuse of a child.

The reviewing judge found that the justice of the peace committed legal errors by misapprehending the timeline of the offences, failing to consider the gravity of the charges, and refusing to assess the potential for a lengthy sentence.

Conducting a fresh analysis under the tertiary ground, the court concluded that pre-trial detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, given the strength of the Crown's case, the heinous circumstances of the alleged offences, the accused's prior criminal record, and the lack of a meaningful release plan.

The application was granted and the accused was remanded into custody.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, appealed a decision declaring her seat vacant for breaching the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The application judge found she intentionally used her position to influence council regarding a fire department service charge levied against her son, and failed to leave a closed meeting where the matter was discussed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the application judge's findings on liability or the imposition of the penalty.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate, which overturned an Arbitrator's finding that he suffered a catastrophic impairment as a result of a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

The applicant had previously been involved in two accidents in 2002.

The Director's Delegate found that the applicant was already catastrophically impaired before the 2013 accident and that the Arbitrator erred by applying the material contribution test instead of the 'but for' test.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding the Director's Delegate's decision unreasonable because it relied on an unestablished fact that the applicant was already catastrophically impaired.

The Court also held that the Arbitrator's use of the material contribution test was appropriate in circumstances involving multiple accidents where it is impossible to determine which accident caused the impairment.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default so they could file a statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs had noted the defendants in default after they failed to file a defence for nearly a year.

A previous court order had granted the defendants an extension to file, which they missed, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulties retaining counsel.

The court applied the factors for setting aside a noting in default and found the defendants' delay significant and their explanations uncompelling.

The motion was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses a request from the parties to schedule a 20-day judge-alone trial in two non-consecutive, two-week tranches to secure earlier trial dates.

The court, acting as the local administrative judge for civil cases, granted the request.

The decision acknowledged the general preference for continuous trials but found the non-continuous format warranted due to significant delays in the case (partially administrative and pandemic-related) and the consent of all parties.

The court emphasized the need to avoid further deterioration of evidence and provide closure to the plaintiff, who had been involved in litigation for many years.

Elke Kasanda, as Estate Trustee, sought directions for a trial of various issues, including the removal of co-trustees Helmut Sartarelli and D. Scott Murray, and disclosure of legal records from Murray concerning the deceased's estate planning and business sale.

The court dismissed the motion for disclosure of Murray's records, citing solicitor-client privilege and lack of evidence for waiver or exception.

The court adjourned the balance of the motion for directions, granting Elke leave to bring a separate motion to remove Helmut and Murray as Estate trustees, noting that such a motion does not require the same evidentiary threshold as a motion for directions under Rule 75.06.

Mediation was ordered, with costs to be borne by the Estate.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a second court-ordered psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to support a defence of not criminally responsible.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a second assessment was not necessary because a comprehensive assessment had already been conducted by a forensic psychiatrist, and there was no evidence of new information that would shed further light on the accused's mental state at the time of the offence.

The defendant City of Ottawa requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff sought a declaration that the City's Property Maintenance By-Law violated section 7 of the Charter after receiving a notice regarding his overgrown lawn and a dead tree.

The court denied the City's request, finding that while the statement of claim had drafting deficiencies, it contained a core complaint that could be legitimate and was not so obviously frivolous as to warrant dismissal under the attenuated Rule 2.1.01 process.

The accused, charged with assault and robbery, brought an application for the production of third-party records held by the Victim/Witness Assistance Program.

The application was based on an email from the complainant indicating a desire to withdraw the criminal complaint due to a cultural and community agreement.

The court found that the accused established the likely relevance of the records, as the agreement raised questions about the complainant's motives and credibility.

The court ordered the records produced to the court for review at the second stage of the application.

The applicants agreed to purchase a property from the respondents, who subsequently breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by refusing to close.

The respondents argued that the Deposit Clause in the Agreement limited the applicants' remedy to the return of their deposit.

The court found that the Deposit Clause did not clearly and unambiguously waive the applicants' right to claim damages, but only precluded specific performance.

The court awarded the applicants $150,000 in damages, representing the difference between the agreed purchase price and the appraised value of the property at the time of the breach, relying on the applicants' appraisal evidence.

The defendant moved to stay a civil action brought by the plaintiff, her former spouse, which sought to lift a freezing order and preservation order previously granted in their ongoing family law proceeding.

The court granted the stay, finding that the civil action was an impermissible collateral attack and barred by issue estoppel, as the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a final order made between the same parties in another forum.

The defendant's request for security for costs was dismissed as unnecessary given the stay.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order regarding two children, aged 12 and 14 months.

The children had been removed from the mother's care following incidents of domestic violence and substance abuse, and placed with relatives.

The mother sought the return of the children.

The court found that the parents had repeatedly breached voluntary services agreements and that there was a risk of harm to the children if returned to the mother's care.

The court ordered that the children remain in their current placements.

The appellant, an Uber driver, sought accident benefits after an altercation with passengers resulted in him swerving his vehicle and injuring his knee.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied the claim, finding the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as it failed both the purpose and causation tests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal applied the correct legal tests from Chisolm and that the appellant's challenges were impermissible appeals of factual findings.