COURT FILE NO.: 21- CA8218
DATE: 04/02/2022
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Applicant
– and –
S.B. Respondent
Hart Shouldice for the Crown
Nader Fakih for S.B.
HEARD: January 31st, 2022
SUBJECT TO FURTHER ORDER BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AN ORDER PURSUANT TO S. 486.4 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS PROCEEDING. THE IDENTITY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD DISCLOSE SUCH IDENTITY, INCLUDING THE NAMES OF OTHER CROWN WITNESSES, SHALL THEREFORE NOT BE PUBLISHED IN ANY DOCUMENT OR BROADCAST IN ANY WAY.
BAIL REVIEW decision
Justice Sally Gomery
[1] SB is charged with fifteen offences stemming from her alleged assaults, sexual assault and intimidation of MF. MF is the 10-year old daughter of JF, who was living with SB for several years. SB is also charged with breaching a non-communication order, by phoning JF while in custody a few weeks following her arrest.
[2] At a show cause hearing before Justice of the Peace Girault on January 5, 2022, the Crown argued that SB should remain in custody pending her trial. Among other things, it relied on SB’s criminal history. In 2007, SB was sentenced to eight years in jail for her role in the torture and killing of a developmentally delayed young woman whom she had befriended, then setting the house they shared on fire to destroy the evidence of this crime.
[3] The justice of the peace rejected the Crown’s arguments. She concluded that, given the terms of her release plan, SB was not at a substantial risk of reoffending while awaiting trial, and that her pre-trial detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.
[4] In this application, the Crown contends that the justice of the peace’s decision contains legal errors and is also clearly inappropriate. It says that, on a proper consideration of the relevant factors in s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, this Court should remand SB into custody pending trial. The defence argues that the justice of the peace committed no legal errors and properly took into account and weighed all relevant factors. It says that the Crown’s application should be dismissed.
[5] On the application, I must answer the following questions:
(a) Did the justice of the peace make any legal errors?
(b) Is the justice of the peace’s decision clearly inappropriate?
(c) If the justice of the peace’s decision ought to be set aside, should SB be remanded into custody to maintain the public’s confidence in the administration of justice?
(a) Did the justice of the peace make any legal errors?
[6] A person charged under the Criminal Code is, in most cases, presumptively entitled to remain free pending their trial. Section 515(10) of the Code sets out the exceptional circumstances in which an accused may be jailed pending their trial. It provides that pre-trial detention is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) it is necessary to ensure the accused’s attendance in court (the “primary ground”);
(b) it is necessary “for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice” (the “secondary ground”); and
(c) it is necessary “to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,
(ii) the gravity of the offence,
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more” (the “tertiary ground”)
[7] If a bail judge concludes that an accused’s pre-trial detention is not justified and orders their release, the Crown may apply to this court under s. 521 to set that order aside in favour of another order. Such an order could include either remanding the accused into custody or amending the terms of their release.
[8] As held by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328, a judge may intervene in a release decision if there is a material change in circumstances, if a bail judge made legal errors, or if their decision is clearly inappropriate.
[9] In its oral submissions, the Crown contended that the justice of the peace in this case made three legal errors in deciding whether SB should remain in custody pending trial. First, she did not properly consider the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences that SB is accused of having committed. Second, she refused to consider the potential for SB to be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. Third, she refused to weigh the cumulative effect of s. 515(10)(c) factors. I will review each of these arguments in turn.
Did the justice of the peace err in law by failing to properly consider the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences?
[10] Based on the synopsis of the charges filed by the Crown, the alleged incidents giving rise to the charges all took place in the family home or garage. They include:
- An incident on May 20, 2021, when SB accused MF of not eating her food fast enough, yelled at her, shoved food into her mouth, and then put a broom handle up against her throat while pressing her back against a refrigerator, choking her.
- An incident on September 22, 2021, when SB again became angry with MF for not eating fast enough and then, after MF dropped some food on the floor, poured bleach over it and forced MF to eat it. During this same incident, SB allegedly forced MF to sit on the floor in the bleach, resulting in burns and blisters on her buttocks, inner thighs, the top of her foot and her fingers.
- An incident on September 27, 2021, when SB was again angry because MF was not eating her food fast enough, and told her she either had to strip naked and stay in the pool all night or cut her own hair, resulting in MF cutting her hair under duress.
- An incident on September 28, 2021, when SB told MF that if she did not finish eating her food in the next 15 seconds, she would have to go into the pigpen naked. This pen, which was in the house, contained a very large and sometimes aggressive pig. After MF then dropped some of her food. SB dragged her to the pen and ripped off her clothing. When MF begged SB not to put her in the pig pen, SB told her that she had the choice of going to the park naked or getting in the pen and, when MF told her she would prefer the park, said she would still have to go in the pig pen. Part of this incident was witnessed by MF’s 13-year old sister EF, who left a cellphone on in the kitchen to record what would happen next before leaving the room. After EF left, SB allegedly bit MF on the face, pushed her into a steam cleaner, and chased her through the basement. Some of this was seen by EF. MF eventually escaped out of the house through a window, still naked.
- Incidents on unspecified dates between June 2014 and September 2021, when SB allegedly pushed MF up against a wall and covered her nose and mouth so she could not breathe; during a bath, struck MF with a milk jug, threw cold water on her and dunked her head backward into the water so she could not breathe; threatened to hurt MF’s family if she did not eat fast enough; and threw various objects at her, leaving marks on her body.
[11] SB was arrested a few days after the last incident on September 28, 2021, after EF disclosed what she had seen to an older sibling. The sibling reported this to MF’s parents, who questioned MF, took pictures of her alleged injuries, and obtained the audio recordings that EF had made. The CAS became involved on October 1st, 2021, and they contacted the police.
[12] The justice of the peace’s failure to recite all of these details is not a legal error. In providing a decision on bail, a judge or justice is “not required to deliver breathless prose or slavishly track the wording” of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code: R. v. Brooks, 2001 CanLII 28401 (ONSC), [2001] O.R. 533, at para. 45. A bail judge or justice is, however, required to show that they engaged in an analysis, in some meaningful and coherent fashion, that would either justify detention or mandate release. If detention is sought on the tertiary ground, as it was here, the bail judge or justice must refer to the factors specifically listed in s. 515(10)(c) in such a way that the reviewing court can be satisfied that the appropriate assessment was conducted. If the reasons provided indicate that the bail judge or justice simply did not do what s. 515(10)(c) and St-Cloud explicitly require, then this gives rise to an error of law.
[13] I find that the justice of the peace committed such an error here. She failed to properly consider the circumstances surrounding the pending charges against SB, because she misapprehended the nature of the Crown’s case, refused to conduct part of the analysis, and gave weight to irrelevant considerations.
[14] At the outset of her decision, the justice of the peace described the charges as follows:
So the accused, [SB], is before the court on numerous charges. I haven’t itemized them specifically. Suffice to say that they are between 2014 until her arrest on the 6th of October, 2021. There are allegations of assault, of sexual assault, of threats of intimidation, et cetera, et cetera. This is an historical matter.
[15] After mentioning that JF had five children, but that the allegations related only to the youngest, MF, the justice of the peace repeated that she would not go through all the details of the particular incidents then added that: “Suffice to say, that they were disclosed only in late stages of 2021 by the victim in this matter”. Later in her reasons, she again said that the case was “somewhat of a historical situation. I mean it’s not the first time that we’ve even seen before the court, historical sexual assaults”.
[16] These comments, coupled with the absence of any discussion of the specific incidents involving SB and MF, suggest that the justice of the peace fundamentally misapprehended the circumstances of the offences with which SB is charged. They cannot be accurately described as “historical”. Nine of the fifteen charges are based on incidents that allegedly took place in May and September 2021, in a four-month window prior to SB’s arrest. Some of them occurred just days before SB was arrested. It is only the other six charges that are based on incidents that may (or may not) have occurred much earlier, presumably because MF is unable to recall specific dates.
[17] Furthermore, when specifically considering the circumstances of the case, the justice of the peace focussed on facts that were clearly irrelevant to a proper analysis under s. 515(10)(c). She said this about the circumstances of the offences:
The circumstances of the offence, surrounding that the courts have specifically outlined especially when a weapon or a firearm is involved. Clearly that is lacking in this matter. Again the circumstances will be something that will have to be looked at in so far as by the — at the end of the day by the trier of fact. When I look at the circumstances of this, it is obviously within a family home. You know, there’s going to be some circumstantial perhaps evidence that will be, that will have to be tendered. But the circumstances in and of themselves, there’s no firearm. There’s no [indiscernible]. But they do go to a certain extent to the strength of the Crown’s case.
[18] There are two problems with this analysis. First, the involvement of a firearm in an offence is specifically mentioned in ss. 515(10)(c)(iii) as a particular circumstance that may argue in favour of pre-trial detention. But the converse is not true. The absence of a firearm does not automatically make the circumstances less serious, nor does it automatically undermine the strength of the Crown’s case. Second, the justice of the peace’s statement that the circumstances of the offences “will be something that will have to be looked at in so far as by the — at the end of the day by the trier of fact” implies that she is relieved from assessing relevant circumstances because this is properly the role of the trial judge. This flies in the face of the clear wording of s. 515(10)(c).
[19] I find that the justice of the peace’s misdirection on the nature of the case, her refusal to consider relevant circumstances, and her focus on irrelevant considerations prevented her from engaging in the assessment required under s. 515(10)(c). This amounted to a legal error.
Did the justice of the peace err in law by refusing to consider whether SB could be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment?
[20] I find, as argued by the Crown, that the justice of the peace erred in law by refusing to consider whether SB might be liable to a lengthy prison term if convicted. I likewise find that she failed to assess the gravity of the offences with which SB is charged.
[21] In the s. 515(10)(c) analysis, the court must consider the seriousness of the offences from two different perspectives. The court must consider the gravity of the offences, a relevant factor listed at s. 515(10)(c)(i). Based on para. 60 of St- Cloud, this task is straightforward:
For the purposes of s. 515(10)(c), what the justice must determine is the “objective” gravity of the offence in comparison with the other offences in the Criminal Code. This is assessed on the basis of the maximum sentence — and the minimum sentence, if any — provided for in the Criminal Code for the offence.
[22] Apart from this, the court must consider whether the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment, as indicated at ss. 515(10)(c)(iv). This is a subjective analysis. In assessing this factor, the court must consider “all the circumstances of the case known at the time of the hearing, as well as the principles for tailoring the applicable sentence”; St-Cloud, at para. 65.
[23] Based on her oral reasons, the justice of the peace considered neither the gravity of the offences with which SB is charged, nor whether she is liable, on conviction, to a potentially long prison term.
[24] In considering the gravity of the offences, the justice of the peace simply stated that “any time that a child is involved, a vulnerable individual, then the gravity of the offence is certainly a factor to be considered”. She made no reference to any minimum or maximum applicable sentence. When addressing whether SB could serve a lengthy prison sentence if convicted of the offences, the justice of the peace refused to reach a conclusion:
With respect to any custodial time, at this stage I think it’s too early for me to be able to properly assess that. (…) Here, obviously it will depend if she’s convicted of all offences or what offences and what will be the range. There is going to be a lot of issues with respect to obviously any counselling or anything that the person may have undertaken whether in or out of custody. So to me there’s too many unknown factors in order to able to absolutely conclude, you know, the accused if convicted would be serving a significant amount of time in jail. Obviously when one looks at just the provisions of the Criminal Code, if she is convicted then yes, I will, you know, I have to conclude that she would face a significant period of time in jail, especially with, coupled with the criminal record. But I don’t think I can make that determination at this stage.
[25] The justice of the peace needed to consider whether, assuming conviction, SB would be liable for a lengthy sentence. She did not. She acknowledged that SB’s charges could attract a substantial jail sentence, but then refused to give this factor any weight on the basis that she could not predict the outcome at trial.
[26] Defence counsel argues that the justice of the peace was merely refusing to speculate about whether SB might eventually face an application for designation as a dangerous offender or long-term offender. I cannot infer this from the justice of the peace’s comments on this factor. The justice of the peace quite properly says, elsewhere in her reasons, that she cannot speculate about a potential dangerous offender or long term application down the road. Her refusal to assess the potential for a lengthy sentence does not appear, however, to be based on this consideration.
[27] The justice of the peace’s failure to engage in the appropriate analysis of the gravity of the offences or SB’s potentially lengthy sentence on conviction amount to a legal error.
Did the justice of the peace err in law by failing to weigh the cumulative effects of all relevant factors?
[28] Since I have already concluded that the justice of the peace erred in law by failing to engage in the appropriate analysis under s. 515(10)(c), I must necessarily conclude that she failed to weigh the cumulative effects of all relevant factors.
(b) Is the justice of the peace’s decision clearly inappropriate?
[29] Since I have already concluded that the justice of the peace’s decision contains legal errors, I do not to consider whether it is clearly inappropriate. My views on this will nonetheless become apparent as I conduct a fresh analysis under s. 515(10)(c).
(c) Should SB be remanded into custody to maintain the public’s confidence in the administration of justice?
[30] Since I have concluded that the justice of the peace erred in law, I must conduct a fresh analysis of the Crown’s arguments for SB’s pre-trial detention on the basis that it is necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. This requires that I assess the four relevant factors listed at s. 515(10)(c) as well as any other relevant factor in this case, and then weigh them.
The strength of the Crown’s case.
[31] The Crown’s case appears relatively strong. While prosecutions for child abuse are often difficult due to the tender age of the victim, in this case the Crown will benefit from the absence of any significant time delay between the last three incidents and the police investigation, and the existence of corroborative evidence. MF gave a detailed statement to police days after the events of late September 2021. Her older sister EF directly witnessed some of the alleged events of September 28, 2021 and will presumably testify. MF’s parents will also testify about her physical condition and state of mind on September 29, 2021. There were photographs taken of MF’s alleged injuries that day. There is audiotape surreptitiously recorded by EF. On the first, taken September 28, 2021, MF can apparently be heard saying: "Ow, ow, please stop". On the second, the date of which is not mentioned in the Crown disclosure, SB can apparently be heard telling MF to "get in there now", MF can be heard pleading with SB, then apparently trying to say: "I can't breathe". A neighbor who called the police in May 2021 after hearing SB cursing loudly and yelling: “faster, faster” could also testify. Some or all of this evidence will, if admitted and accepted, corroborate important elements of MF’s account.
[32] On the whole, this factor weighs in favour of pre-trial detention.
The gravity of the charges
[33] In terms of the range of potential penalties, SB is charged with very serious offences. If she is convicted of sexual assault, she would liable for a minimum prison sentence of one year because MF was under 16 years of age. The maximum penalty that SB could face for that assault is 14 years in prison. Five of the charges against SB, assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm, can attract a maximum sentence of 10 years.
[34] The charges are therefore objectively grave. This again weighs in favour of pre-trial detention.
The circumstances of the offences
[35] In St-Cloud, at para. 61, the Supreme Court of Canada said that a non-exhaustive list of possible circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence that might be relevant under s. 515(10)(c) would include:
… the fact that the offence is a violent, heinous or hateful one, that it was committed in a context involving domestic violence, a criminal gang or a terrorist organization, or that the victim was a vulnerable person (for example, a child, an elderly person or a person with a disability). If the offence was committed by several people, the extent to which the accused participated in it may be relevant. The aggravating or mitigating factors that are considered by courts for sentencing purposes can also be taken into account.
[36] MF was a highly vulnerable individual due to her age and her relationship with SB, who was effectively acting as her parent. As mentioned by the justice of the peace, of JF’s five children, MF was probably the least likely to report abuse and most likely to be manipulated and intimidated. The alleged incidents occurred in or around MF’s home, where she should have felt the most secure, and involved prolonged, terrifying and degrading physical and psychological abuse, as well as sexual abuse. SB allegedly used a weapon, a broom handle, to choke MF. She also allegedly threw objects at her and intimidated her by threatening to harm members of her family.
[37] I agree with the Crown that the circumstances of the alleged offences can properly be described as heinous. This factor weighs in favour of pre-trial detention.
The potential for a lengthy jail sentence on conviction
[38] At para. 65 of St-Cloud, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that there are cases where aggravating circumstances may heighten the potential for a lengthy prison sentence. This is such a case.
[39] Some of the offences with which SB is charged, including sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm, could give rise to significant jail time on conviction. Her past criminal record makes a lengthy sentence much more likely. The crimes for which SB was convicted in 2007 involved the brutal and sadistic torture of a vulnerable victim, resulting in her death. If the allegations underlying the current charges are proved, it is inconceivable that a sentencing judge would not take this record into account.
[40] In her reasons, the justice of the peace discounted SB’s criminal record. She noted the absence of any new charges between her 2007 conviction and her arrest in 2021. She also expressed concern that SB could be subject to pre-trial detention based solely or primarily on her past criminal record. She noted that SB of course benefits from the presumption of innocence and that she could not be “re-tried and re-sentenced on [the 2007 offences] over and over and over again”.
[41] I do not agree with this analysis either factually or conceptually.
[42] First, although fourteen years passed between SB’s 2007 conviction and her 2021 arrest, there was not necessarily a long period of time during which SB engaged in no criminal activities. SB’s opportunity to commit crimes was limited while she was incarcerated between 2007 and 2011. She was released in March 2011 but was found to be in breach of her parole a few months later, in November 2011, and recommitted for an undisclosed period. She began to live with JF in June 2014. Based on the charges, her alleged abuse of MF may have begun around that time.
[43] Second, the recognition that SB’s past conviction would likely increase her prison sentence if she were convicted on these new charges does not undermine the presumption of innocence or expose SB to double jeopardy. In assessing whether SB is potentially liable for a lengthy sentence, her criminal record is obviously relevant.
Other relevant factors
[44] The Crown contends that I should also consider the lack of a meaningful release plan in assessing whether public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by SB’s release pending trial.
[45] The justice of the peace released SB on the condition that she reside with a surety, Dominique Gagnon. Mr. Gagnon and SB were romantically involved about eight years ago for a few months, but then largely lost contact for about six years before rekindling their relationship a few weeks before SB’s arrest. Mr. Gagnon posted $1000. A second surety, Michelle Aubin, works for Mr. Gagnon and does not have any independent relationship with SB. She also posted a $1000 bond. SB was required to attend counselling programs administered by the Elizabeth Fry Society and to complete an additions program.
[46] The justice of the peace did not require that SB observe a curfew or require that she be accompanied by a surety if she left the house, although she left it open to her sureties to impose such conditions. Defence counsel had suggested that SB would be willing to wear an ankle monitor, but the justice of the peace thought this was unnecessary. The only limitation that the court placed on SB’s movements, aside from the condition that she live with Mr. Gagnon, was that she was prohibited from being in a position of authority, guardianship or as a volunteer to anyone 13 years old or younger, and she was prohibited from being in the presence of anyone under the age of 16 without a parent or guardian being present.
[47] In my view, the release plan ordered by the justice of the peace was clearly inappropriate. Her decision on the secondary ground proceeded from the same two inaccurate premises that improperly influenced her analysis under the tertiary ground: the supposedly “historical nature” of the allegations giving rise to the charges, and the absence of any convictions since 2007. Based on these premises, the justice of the peace reasoned that any risk of reoffending could be mitigated through conditions limiting her access within her residence to vulnerable individuals.
[48] As I have already found, however, the charges that SB now faces are not historical in nature but very recent. The absence of convictions since 2007 provides little comfort in assessing the risk of reoffence because as little as four years may have passed between the date that SB was released from jail after breaching her parole, and the first date she began abusing MF. The release plan furthermore does not take into account SB’s history of breaching the conditions of her parole, and provides for no meaningful supervision over her movements.
[49] Defence counsel contends that, if I have any concern about the terms of SB’s release, I should impose further conditions that would mitigate those concerns rather than use the risk of reoffending as a proxy for the factors of paramount importance with respect to the tertiary ground. The Crown argues that any release plan involving Mr. Gagnon would be inadequate, because he is in a romantic relationship with SB and there is no evidence that either he or the other surety, Ms. Aubin, has any authority over her or any ability to control her movements.
[50] As noted by Justice Phillips in R. v. Rubec, 2016 OJ No. 7097, at para. 9, the four enumerated factors in s. 515(10)(c) are of paramount importance. While the risk that the accused may reoffend may have some relevance, it should not be permitted to drive the analysis. While I agree, I cannot ignore the fact that SB has breached conditions that the court has imposed in the past. The first breach occurred a few months after she was released on parole in 2011 and led to her recommittal. The second breach occurred just over three months ago, while she was in jail on the current charges. This alone puts into question Mr. Gagnon’s ability to provide meaningful oversight.
[51] I conclude that the absence of a meaningful release plan — that is, a release plan involving one or more sureties with some sort of authority over SB, and meaningful limits on her activities — is a factor that would tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. In keeping with the philosophy expressed in Rubec, however, this is not a paramount consideration.
Is pre-trial detention of SB necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice?
[52] This brings me to the question I must ultimately resolve on this application: is SB’s pre-trial detention required under s. 515(10)(c), that is, is it necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice?
[53] When assessing whether pre-trial detention is required under the tertiary ground, I must consider the impact of the accused’s release on a reasonably informed member of the public. As stated in R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 SCR 250, at para. 47: “This person is someone who is thoughtful, dispassionate, informed of the circumstances of the case and respectful of society’s fundamental values.” See also St-Cloud, at paras. 74-80.
[54] Defence counsel points out, correctly, that a pre-trial detention order is not necessarily appropriate just because the four enumerated factors in s. 515(10)(c) weigh in its favour; see St-Cloud, at para. 69. I must take a step back and consider the whole picture.
[55] Defence counsel urges me to find that pre-trial detention is not required because the Crown’s case is not overwhelming. He relies on para. 88 of St-Cloud where, after summarizing the principles applicable to the tertiary ground, Wagner J. concluded that “if the crime is serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence against the accused and if the victim or victims were vulnerable, pre-trial detention will usually be ordered”. Mr. Fakih argues that, conversely, if the evidence against the accused cannot be described as “overwhelming”, pre-trial detention should generally not be ordered.
[56] I agree that the strength of the Crown’s case is often a significant factor in the tertiary analysis. As aptly observed by Justice Trotter in R. v. Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254, at para. 55: “No matter how serious the allegations, and notwithstanding the potential penalty that an accused may face, detention based on a weak case tends to undermine confidence in the justice system, not maintain it”. Respectfully, however, I would not go so far as Trotter J. does in suggesting that the strength of the Crown’s case is almost inevitably a predominant factor. If the Crown’s case is neither overwhelming nor obviously weak, it is one consideration amongst other listed considerations in s. 515(10)(c). I see no basis in the language of the Code or in St-Cloud for making the strength of the Crown’s case the dispositive factor.
[57] I cannot be unduly influenced by the brutal nature of the crimes with which SB was previously convicted, nor the horrendous allegations that MF has made. I also must never lose sight of the fact that SB is presumed innocent of the current charges. At the same time, I cannot ignore the cumulative weight of the four listed factors in s. 515(10)(c), each of which weighs in favour of pre-trial detention. I do not see any other “larger picture” consideration that would mitigate that cumulative impact. The only other relevant factor, the absence of an effective release plan, also supports the Crown’s position.
[58] Taking into account the relative strength of the Crown’s case, the allegations of systematic and brutal abuse of a child in the accused’s care, the gravity of the offences with which she is charged, the potential for a lengthy jail sentence if she is convicted, and absence of a meaningful release plan, I must ask myself whether a reasonably informed member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if SB were allowed to remain free pending her trial. I conclude they would.
[59] I therefore grant the application and order that SB be remanded into custody.
Justice Sally Gomery
Released: February 7, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: 21- CA8218
DATE: 07/02/2022
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Applicant
-and-
S.B Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice Sally Gomery
Released: February 7, 2022