Paul Alexander

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault of his daughter between ages 11 and 14.

The four counts of sexual assault were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

He was sentenced to 18 months in addition to pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on two grounds: alleged infringement of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) due to an 11-month adjournment, and alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

A police officer was convicted of 46 offences related to fraud, making false documents, breach of trust, and obstruction of justice arising from nine fraudulent motor vehicle accident reports prepared in 2010 that resulted in insurers paying over $1,000,000 in claims.

The appellant conceded the actus reus but contested whether he was a knowing participant in the fraud scheme.

The trial judge found he was and convicted him on all but six counts, imposing a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of impermissible speculation, the application of the Kienapple principle, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

The offender, a former financial advisor, was convicted of Fraud Over $5,000 for operating a Ponzi-type scheme over eight years, defrauding multiple victims, many of whom were friends or elderly clients.

The court found the offender's breach of trust and the devastating financial and emotional impact on the victims to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, ordered to pay restitution of $109,150, and issued a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the same amount, with six years to pay following his release.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary or informed.

He suffered from Ankylosing Spondylitis and was denied his necessary medication while in custody, causing extreme pain.

He was also threatened and assaulted by another inmate.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the combination of lack of medical care, extreme pain, and threats deprived the appellant of the ability to make a conscious volitional decision to plead guilty.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a stabbing at a party.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on opportunity, motive, and prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses who recanted at trial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine its own witnesses under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, admitting their out-of-court statements as substantive evidence, and in his jury instructions regarding hearsay, post-offence conduct, and circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

Sentencing following jury convictions for aggravated sexual assault, two counts of sexual assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, four counts of assault, and threatening death against a former intimate partner during a prolonged abusive relationship.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount, emphasizing the degrading nature of the sexual violence, the abuse of a spouse or common law partner as a statutory aggravating factor, and the victim's enduring physical and psychological harm.

Finding little mitigation, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of five years.

Mandatory and ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration for life, and no communication with the victim during incarceration were also made.

The Crown brought an application under R. v. Khelawon to admit the videotaped police statement and preliminary inquiry evidence of a complainant who was reluctant to testify at trial.

The court found that while the evidence met the threshold for reliability, the Crown failed to establish necessity.

The court concluded that the police had not made reasonable or diligent efforts to locate the complainant, serve her with a subpoena, or secure her attendance at trial.

Consequently, the application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed, and the court declined to issue a material witness warrant.

During a criminal prosecution for sexual assault, the accused applied for an order requiring a Yoruba interpreter for pre‑trial proceedings and trial.

The court considered the scope of the right to interpreter assistance under s. 14 of the Charter and the evidentiary burden required to establish that an accused does not understand or speak the language of the proceedings.

Evidence showed the accused had been educated in English, communicated with officials and police in English, and previously participated in legal and immigration proceedings without an interpreter.

The court concluded the accused failed to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that interpreter assistance was necessary.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

Approximately 25 months elapsed between arrest and the second trial date.

The defence brought a motion to stay proceedings alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown failed to provide disclosure of a booking video despite repeated requests over many months.

The court found the delay constitutionally intolerable and granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in his blood, and speeding.

On August 24, 2012, police observed the defendant operating a van at excessive speed on Keele Street in Toronto.

Following a roadside investigation, the defendant registered a fail on a screening device and was arrested.

Breath samples taken at the police station showed readings of 100 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving due to lack of temporal connection between observed impairment and driving.

The court also found the defendant not guilty of driving over 80 mg due to unreasonable delays in obtaining breath samples that violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a gang-related confrontation at a public festival.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on former s. 34(2) self-defence, the refusal to leave provocation under s. 232 to the jury, and the trial judge’s review of the evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly presented self-defence and correctly focused the jury on the critical moment of the shooting.

It further held that there was no air of reality to provocation because the defence position was deliberate self-preservation, not loss of self-control, and found no material misstatement or omission in the evidentiary review.

The accused was charged with two counts of assaulting his domestic partner during a period of relationship breakdown.

The first count alleged an assault in the garage, which the court dismissed due to reasonable doubt arising from credibility issues and the defence's failure to cross-examine the complainant on key details.

The second count involved the accused swatting a mobile phone out of the complainant's hand while she was filming him.

The court found that while this technically constituted an assault, the force used was trifling and applied the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to acquit the accused.

The Crown sought to admit three out-of-court statements made by the complainant, Terry Solomon, regarding an assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The statements were made to: (1) his cousin Bertie Jean; (2) Police Constable Everett Dunbar; and (3) Police Constable Noel Hudson.

The complainant had left Canada and was unavailable to testify.

The Crown argued admissibility under the res gestae/spontaneous utterance exception or the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on necessity and inherent reliability.

The defence opposed admission and argued that if admitted, the 911 call in which the complainant stated he did not know who assaulted him should also be admitted for trial fairness.

The court found that none of the three statements met the threshold reliability requirement and excluded all three.

The Crown prosecuted historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred between 1985 and 1987 against a child complainant in a household setting.

The trial judge found the complainant to be sincere and generally credible, but held that significant inconsistencies across police, preliminary inquiry, and trial accounts, substantial gaps in recollection, and the risk of memory distortion over time undermined reliability.

The court also found the corroborative evidence of the complainant's mother unreliable.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard to frail historical evidence, the court acquitted on all counts.

The defendant was charged with failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, arising from a parking lot incident where her vehicle struck and ran over a co-worker.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene, but acquitted her of criminal negligence.

The decision turned on credibility findings, with the court rejecting the defendant's testimony as unreliable and finding that she deliberately failed to investigate the collision due to her vehicle being uninsured.

On a summary judgment motion, the moving party sought equitable subrogation to obtain payment priority over second and third mortgagees after its funds had been used to discharge a first mortgage in a failed mortgage transaction.

The court applied the fairness-focused subrogation framework from appellate authority and held the record was sufficient to decide the issue without a trial under the summary judgment test.

The responding parties failed to adduce admissible evidence showing prejudice, detrimental reliance on registration priority, or a genuine issue requiring trial on alleged negligence and fairness.

The court concluded denial of subrogation would create unjust enrichment because the responding mortgagees would be in a better position than if the first mortgage had not been paid out.

Summary judgment was granted, subrogation relief was ordered, and costs were awarded to the successful moving party.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings on historical sexual assault charges, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, abuse of process under s. 7, and prejudice from lost evidence.

The original charge was laid in 1986 and withdrawn shortly after, then re-laid in 2010 with additional counts.

The court found the 24-year gap between charges was neutral time and the institutional delay was within acceptable guidelines.

The court dismissed the abuse of process claim, finding no prosecutorial misconduct.

While the court found a breach of the right to make full answer and defence due to a lost exculpatory statement, it reserved the determination of the appropriate remedy until the end of the trial.