Paul Alexander

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

He brought a pre-trial motion under section 276 of the Criminal Code seeking to introduce evidence of prior sexual activity and discussions with the complainant regarding consent and her history of sexual trauma and PTSD.

The Crown and complainant opposed admission, arguing there was no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and that the evidence was unduly prejudicial.

The court found the evidence admissible, holding that the accused could rely on evidence of an established pattern of non-verbal communication of consent between the parties to support his defence, provided the evidence met the statutory requirements under section 276(2).

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the complainant's lack of embellishment as a factor that enhanced her credibility, rather than merely noting it as an absence of a negative factor.

The Crown conceded the error but argued for the application of the curative proviso.

The Court declined to apply the proviso because credibility was the core issue at trial and the impact of the error could not be dismissed.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and "Over 80" charges.

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach, excluded evidence, and acquitted the respondent, giving inadequate reasons and failing to apply s. 24(2) Charter principles.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons for breach and exclusion of evidence to be insufficient and legally erroneous.

A new trial was ordered before a different jurist, rather than entering a conviction, due to the lack of clarity in the trial judge's factual findings.

The applicant, Birhan Imam, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of attempted murder, alleging the preliminary inquiry judge applied an erroneous legal test for mens rea.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's reasons, finding that while a specific passage might appear ambiguous, when read in totality, the judge correctly identified and applied the "intention to kill" mens rea for attempted murder as established in R. v. Ancio.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The court also held that even if there had been a jurisdictional error, the committal would have been inevitable given the strong evidence of intent to kill, and thus, prerogative relief would have been declined due to lack of prejudice.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: that the trial judge erred in finding the appellant's evidence unbelievable due to the complainant's lack of motive to fabricate, that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and that the trial judge made inappropriate behavioural assumptions.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding motive to fabricate by rejecting the specific motive alleged by the defence based on the evidence, did not apply uneven scrutiny, and based credibility findings on the specific past interactions between the parties rather than generalized assumptions about behaviour.

Four accused were convicted of drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization (the Five Point Generals), conspiracy to traffic controlled substances, and firearms offences following a three-month jury trial based largely on intercepted communications.

The appellants challenged their convictions on five grounds: jury selection procedures, cross-examination limitations of the Crown's expert witness, exclusion of defence expert evidence, admission of extrinsic misconduct evidence, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

They also appealed their sentences, primarily challenging the credit awarded for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and three of four sentence appeals, allowing only Shane Evans' sentence appeal based on inadequate credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for unlawful confinement and assault.

The trial judge had found an honest but mistaken belief in consent, leading to the acquittal.

The appeal court found that the trial judge misapplied the honest but mistaken belief defence by focusing on events after the alleged offence and misapprehending critical evidence.

Additionally, the trial judge's reasons for the acquittal were deemed inadequate, failing to explain the verdict based on the complainant's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered before a different jurist.

The appellant, Marco Lupi, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was whether Lupi continued sexual intercourse after surreptitiously removing a condom, contrary to the complainant's express wishes.

The trial judge found that he did and that consent was vitiated by fraud.

On appeal, Lupi argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's inconsistent accounts to police and erred in applying the legal framework for consent, particularly R. v. Hutchinson.

The appellate court found no material misapprehension of evidence.

While it found the trial judge erred in distinguishing Hutchinson, it upheld the conviction, concluding that the complainant's consent was indeed vitiated by fraud due to the dishonest deprivation of control over sexual activity and exposure to the risk of serious bodily harm, including unwanted pregnancy and STDs.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, finding the 15-month sentence fit and within range.

The appellant appealed his sentence of indeterminate detention imposed following his conviction for robbery with a firearm.

The trial judge had designated the appellant as a dangerous offender and sentenced him to indeterminate detention.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying an improper presumption that the appellant must be sentenced to indeterminate detention unless it was established that a reasonable expectation exists that Long Term Offender sentencing is sufficient.

This error was contrary to the principles established in R. v. Boutilier.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal disagreed and allowed the appeal, setting aside the sentence and ordering a new sentencing hearing to be conducted expeditiously.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, raising new s. 10(b) Charter arguments for the first time.

The Crown brought an application under s. 685 of the Criminal Code to summarily dismiss the appeal.

The court held that the Crown has jurisdiction to bring a s. 685 application in summary conviction appeals.

The court granted the application and dismissed the appeal, finding that allowing the new grounds would cause substantial prejudice to the Crown as there was no evidentiary record from the trial to evaluate the claims.

The appellant, a registered investment advisor, was convicted of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a large-scale Ponzi-type scheme perpetrated over eight years.

He defrauded fourteen complainants of $413,500 by falsely representing that their money would be invested in shares or positions in various companies.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony as implausible and found he had deliberately misled complainants about the nature and risks of their investments, ultimately converting the funds to his own use.

The appellant was sentenced to four years in custody with restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld and the sentence was partially modified to include an additional restitution order and increase the fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal harassment.

The trial judge had found that while the respondent's conduct caused the complainants subjective fear, that fear was not objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by importing a proportionality requirement and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the objective standard from R. v. Sim and that his factual findings regarding the nature of the respondent's emails and the complainants' reactions were supported by the evidence.

The appellant, Rohan Shawn Getfield, appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of advice on adverse immigration consequences.

The Crown applied for an order that the Superior Court of Justice Protocol – Allegations of Incompetence applies, requiring the appellant to waive solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that an appeal based on an uninformed plea implicitly alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and constitutes a miscarriage of justice, thereby triggering the Protocol.

The court also held that such an allegation results in an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege to allow the Crown and the court to properly investigate and respond.

The Crown's application was granted, requiring the appellant to provide a waiver of solicitor-client privilege for the appeal to proceed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary hearing decision committing him for trial on first-degree murder.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for second-degree murder and interfering with human remains, but argued no evidence supported first-degree murder.

The Crown contended the murder occurred during a sexual assault or forcible confinement, relying on s. 231(5)(b) and (e) of the Criminal Code.

The court, reviewing the preliminary hearing judge's decision for jurisdictional error, found that a reasonable jury could infer a sexual assault in the elevator and that the murder was part of a continuous transaction with the sexual assault or forcible confinement, based on the short timeframe and the victim's cell phone activity.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, and the accused was ordered to stand trial for first-degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning to Canada from Panama with two suitcases containing 1.5 kilograms of cocaine in secret compartments.

She claimed she was unaware of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal on the basis that the trial judge admitted inadmissible expert evidence regarding courier knowledge without proper jury instructions, and ordered a new trial.

The court found that expert testimony suggesting couriers know they are carrying drugs constituted impermissible anecdotal evidence under R. v. Sekhon that invited the jury to reason from generalized conclusions about other cases to the appellant's specific state of mind.

The accused, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is mandatory life imprisonment with a discretion between 10 and 25 years.

Considering aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the murder, the use of a loaded handgun in a public place, the danger to the public, and the accused's association with a criminal gang, alongside mitigating factors like his young age, lack of prior criminal record, family support, and remorse, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years.

The Crown and the accused brought pre-trial motions in a severed first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to admit circumstantial evidence, including wiretaps, rap videos, and photographs, to prove the accused's association with a gang leader who allegedly directed the murder.

The court admitted the evidence, subject to editing to remove prejudicial content, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The accused brought a motion alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the Charter motion, finding that after deducting defence delay, the net delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the case's complexity justified the timeline.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purposes of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following observations by an experienced drug investigator in a parking lot in Vaughan, Ontario.

The investigator observed the appellant and another man transferring cylindrical bins from one vehicle to another, followed by an exchange of cash.

The appellant appealed, challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent search, arguing that the grounds for arrest disappeared when the pills could not be immediately identified, and that the police breached section 489.1 of the Criminal Code by failing to file a report to a justice as soon as practicable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was based on reasonable grounds, the search incident to arrest was lawful, and the manner in which the police exercised their discretion did not require return of the seized property.

An appeal from a conviction and sentence was dismissed as abated following the death of the appellant.

The appeal had been brought from a conviction entered on October 25, 2012 and a sentence imposed on December 31, 2012 by Justice Richard Lococo of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.