Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including hostage taking and intimidation of a justice system participant, after bringing an imitation explosive device into a courtroom during a family law proceeding.

He was sentenced to nine years in prison.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was disproportionate and failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no reversible error and properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors given the extreme seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm, as well as his three-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a series of assaults against a single complainant, including an attempt to throw her off a balcony.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in treating rehabilitation as a neutral factor.

Furthermore, the Court found no error in the denial of Downes credit for strict bail conditions, as the appellant failed to lead evidence regarding the specific terms of his house arrest and their impact on his liberty.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered cross-appeals from both the Crown and D.L. regarding convictions and acquittals arising from allegations of intimate partner violence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and extortion charges and sought a harsher sentence, while D.L. appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge’s assessment of evidence and sufficiency of reasons.

The Court dismissed both appeals, upheld the trial judge’s findings, and stayed certain duplicative counts.

The decision addresses the proper approach to consent in sexual assault, the scope of appellate review, and the principles guiding sentencing for intimate partner violence.

The appellant, convicted of drugging and sexually assaulting 14 women and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his convictions on three counts and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the use of similar fact evidence (despite a procedural oversight which was deemed harmless), or the determination that a determinate sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's high risk of reoffending due to antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using a 911 call to corroborate Crown evidence, and whether the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the time required to stash a firearm and move a vehicle.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge double-counted breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or sentencing approach.

The appellant, Pius Bempong, appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the jury's verdicts of not guilty for sexual assault but guilty for sexual interference, based on the same facts, were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the apparent inconsistency could be reconciled by a legal error in the trial judge's instructions regarding the definition of "force" in sexual assault versus "touching" in sexual interference, as per the framework established in R. v. R.V. The court clarified that the Crown is not required to cross-appeal an acquittal to rebut an inconsistent verdict argument raised by an appellant.

The appellant appealed his convictions relating to a home invasion and an assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence on the assault count, failed to consider an alternate suspect for the home invasion, and inadequately scrutinized unsavoury witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, entering an acquittal on the assault count because the trial judge mistakenly believed the identifying witnesses had prior knowledge of the appellant.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, as the alternate suspect was physically incapable of the crime and the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles.

The appellants appealed their convictions for forcible confinement arising from a home invasion, arguing that their identity as the perpetrators was not the only reasonable inference from DNA and fingerprint evidence found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the pristine condition of the mask containing DNA, the location of the fingerprint on the duct tape roll, and the victims' descriptions of the perpetrators.

The court concluded that innocent explanations for the forensic evidence were speculative rather than reasonable.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that, aside from a comment regarding the appellant being treatment consent incapable, the Board's decision was reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the trial judge gave only conclusory reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and made no comments about the complainant's evidence on Counts 1 and 2.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the imposition of an adult sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that an adult sentence was necessary to achieve accountability for the horrific crime while allowing for potential rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into his Aboriginal background and consider s. 718(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report detailing the appellant's systemic and personal challenges.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with additional probation conditions requiring the appellant to reside with his father, attend counselling, and participate in a Healing Lodge program.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice, challenging the legality of a search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in a brief endorsement, holding that whether viewed as a section 8 Charter issue or a search incident to arrest, the appeal could not succeed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an alcohol-related driving offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of involuntary intoxication and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary conviction appeal court judge's decision, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the appellant's experience with alcohol were supported by the record.

The court also dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting it was raised for the first time on appeal and lacked evidentiary support.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board applied an incorrect legal test by focusing exclusively on public safety and unreasonably disregarded expert evidence that he could be managed in a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly considered all statutory criteria and balanced the appellant's treatment needs against the risk he posed to the public.

The Court upheld the Board's conclusion that the proposed management plan was speculative and that the appellant was not an appropriate candidate for a medium secure setting due to his unwillingness to undergo a necessary medication trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife by cyanide poisoning.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior fraudulent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found the admissibility of the bad character evidence to be borderline at best, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court concluded that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the impugned evidence tipped the balance or that a new trial would produce a different verdict.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for poisoning her estranged husband with antifreeze-laced wine.

On appeal, she argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and sought disclosure of confidential informer information as well as the admission of fresh evidence regarding a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, upholding the confidential informer privilege, and rejecting the fresh evidence as inadmissible and unreliable under the Palmer test.

The youthful offender appealed her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on general deterrence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an error in principle as the judge failed to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation, and the principle that a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible.

Given the offender's youth, guilty plea, and fresh evidence of rehabilitation, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to time served plus probation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident where the complainant allegedly passed out after consuming alcohol, Ecstasy, and GHB.

The Crown's case relied on a witness who observed the appellant and the complainant in a bedroom.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on the elements of consent and knowledge of lack of consent, and in his answers to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury was not properly instructed on the crucial issues of the complainant's lack of consent and the appellant's knowledge of her lack of consent, and that the trial judge's answers to the jury's questions were incorrect and unresponsive.