Nathan J.S. Gorham

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He had originally elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, but due to scheduling delays that would have exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the Deputy Attorney General preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that his election to be tried in the provincial court vested his right to that mode of trial and that the direct indictment was an abuse of process aimed at avoiding a s. 11(b) Charter stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 577 provides broad authority to prefer a direct indictment even after an election is made.

The Court further held that there was no abuse of process, as the direct indictment actually facilitated an earlier trial date, consistent with the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, chambered, prohibited handgun found in his one-bedroom condominium during the execution of a search warrant.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict, contending that his brother or a third party may have placed the firearm in the unit.

The Court of Appeal held these submissions amounted to speculative inferences unsupported by the evidentiary record and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the court found no error in principle in the 20-month custodial sentence, holding it was restrained, consistent with parity, and appropriately reflected the aggravating circumstances of a loaded firearm in a residential building.

The appellant, Keldon Halstead, abandoned his appeal from convictions entered by Justice Shaun S. Nakatsuru of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, constituted by Fairburn A.C.J.O., Trotter J.A., and Harvison Young J.A., noted the abandonment at Mr. Halstead’s request and dismissed the appeal.

The decision is subject to a publication ban on the identity of a witness under section 486.31(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals of David Beak and Yostin Murillo from their convictions for first degree murder and sexual assault in the killing of Rhoderie Estrada.

The court found that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on constructive first degree murder, post-offence conduct, and the handling of evidence and objections were accurate and complete.

The grounds of appeal advanced by both appellants, including issues of causation, post-offence conduct, jury instructions, and procedural fairness, were all rejected.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeals of Khalid Yousuf and Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed, who were convicted of multiple offences related to drug trafficking, proceeds of crime, and possession of firearms after being found in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law, and that the verdicts were reasonable based on the circumstantial and direct evidence connecting both appellants to the contraband and the operation of the safe house.

The appellant, Travis Babbington, appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting his post-arrest statement to police, in instructing the jury on planning and deliberation, in failing to caution the jury about prior consistent statements, and in instructing on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s rulings or jury instructions.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a handgun under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The handgun was discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest, but police subsequently breached the appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 privacy rights through warrantless entries into his apartment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the breaches cumulatively.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that while the breaches were serious, their impact was minimal as they occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun, and society's interest favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder for killing his father.

Prior to sentencing, the applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years violates sections 12 and 15 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his long-standing mental disorders and substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offence reduced his moral blameworthiness, making the mandatory sentence grossly disproportionate and discriminatory.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application.

The court held that it was bound by the jury's verdict, which necessarily found that the applicant had the requisite specific intent for first degree murder, representing the highest level of moral culpability.

The court found no violation of section 12, as the sentence is not grossly disproportionate for an offender with such high moral blameworthiness.

The court also found no violation of section 15, as the applicant failed to demonstrate that the mandatory minimum sentence disproportionately impacts persons with mental illness, noting that those who lack criminal responsibility or the requisite intent due to mental illness are not subject to the mandatory sentence.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.

The appellant, M.G., appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault causing bodily harm against his wife, and his three-year prison sentence.

The complainant had recanted her allegations prior to trial and again post-conviction, claiming hallucinations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no palpable and overriding error in rejecting the recantation and accepting the complainant's earlier testimony.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of prior discreditable conduct evidence or in refusing to reopen the trial or declare a mistrial based on the post-conviction recantation.

On sentencing, the court found the three-year penitentiary sentence proportionate, consistent with jurisprudence for sexual assault involving penetration.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Jason Heath, appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions on demeanour evidence and the right to silence, and failed to correct speculative Crown closing arguments.

The central issue at his trial was whether he was acting under duress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were balanced and legally correct, particularly regarding the modified right to silence at borders under the Customs Act.

The court also found the Crown's closing arguments were permissible inferences from evidence, not speculation.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and appealed, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), and seeking exclusion of evidence.

The trial judge found a minor s. 10(b) breach but no ss. 8 or 9 violations, and declined to exclude the handgun evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for the appellant's detention and search, and that any Charter breach was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with a 22-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised four issues: reasonable apprehension of judicial bias due to repeated interjections, erroneous admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, incorrect and inadequate jury instruction on provocation, and an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the admission of prior conduct evidence as probative of motive and context, affirming the jury instruction on provocation, and deeming the sentence fit given the horrific nature of the murder and the appellant's prior domestic abuse convictions.

The appellant, Matthew Lewis, appealed convictions for obstruct justice, uttering death threats, and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the victim's motive to lie, approaching defence evidence piecemeal, and misapprehending defence witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, noting the case turned on credibility and that the trial judge's observations regarding defence witnesses and the victim's lack of motive to fabricate were supported by the record.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants, Gavin MacMillan and Enzo De Jesus Carrasco, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, and their nine-year sentences.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence, excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity, instructing the jury on consent (specifically regarding orgasms), and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences.

The court affirmed the trial judge's rulings on expert evidence necessity and impartiality, the proper application of s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding consent and prior sexual activity, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The sentences were deemed fit and not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, Safwat Sadek, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, uttering a threat, impersonating a peace officer, and firearm/weapons offences.

The appeal focused on the admissibility of evidence seized from his apartment and vehicles following alleged Charter breaches by police.

The trial judge excluded evidence from the apartment due to serious s. 8 Charter breaches but admitted evidence from the vehicles, deeming those breaches "technical." The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that even considering the serious apartment breaches, the s. 24(2) Grant analysis did not warrant exclusion of the vehicle evidence, as the connection was remote and the impact on privacy in vehicles was minimal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter/robbery, respectively, stemming from a fatal assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for second-degree murder, ordering a new trial due to the improper admission and use of lay opinion evidence regarding the likelihood of death, and the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire or provide a limiting instruction.

The appeal for manslaughter was also allowed, and a new trial ordered, due to inadequate jury instructions on aiding and abetting.

The robbery conviction was upheld.

The court dismissed other grounds of appeal, including challenges to the pathologist's cross-examination limits and the delay argument under the Charter.