Michael William Lacy

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a criminal appeal judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral ruling the same day.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority below.

The intervener participated, but the dispositive issue was resolved by adopting the appellate majority's reasoning.

The appellant challenged a criminal appeal decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

It held that the appeal should be dismissed substantially for the reasons of the majority in the provincial appellate court.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 following a trial by judge and jury, and was sentenced to five and one-half years' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction on four grounds: that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that character could not be considered; that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to consider smaller quantities of a different drug; that the trial judge failed to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address; and that the trial judge erred in his instruction regarding the mistake of fact defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and also dismissed the leave to appeal sentence application.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an application by Raymond LeBlanc, who appealed convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, theft, theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of stolen property, as well as his sentence.

The appeal was adjourned to allow the applicant to pursue an application for production under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also granted a s. 684(1) order appointing counsel for the limited purpose of this application, now characterized as a motion for directions.

The court determined that, due to complex privilege and confidential informant issues, the other grounds of appeal should be determined first.

The matter was converted to a solicitor appeal, with Michael Lacy appointed as counsel.

The Associate Chief Justice will case manage the matter as necessary.

The appellant, J.D., appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapprehended the appellant’s evidence, erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework, or committed palpable and overriding error in rejecting the appellant’s testimony.

The court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended aspects of the appellant’s evidence, particularly regarding who suggested returning to the trailer and the analogy of “narcolepsy” for the appellant’s fatigue.

These misapprehensions were central to the credibility assessment and warranted a new trial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Norma Walton’s appeal from her convictions for theft over $5,000, finding that the trial judge’s repeated and intrusive questioning of the accused during her testimony, both in chief and in cross-examination, undermined the fairness of the trial.

The court held that the trial judge’s interventions usurped the role of counsel, created the impression of alignment with the Crown, and prevented the defence from presenting its case in an orderly fashion.

A new trial was ordered.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Aleksandr Shaporov’s conviction and sentence appeals for possessing and accessing child pornography.

The court addressed arguments regarding delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, the sufficiency and candour of the search warrant ITO under section 8, and alleged errors in the trial judge’s handling of the burden of proof and evidence.

The court found that, even after correcting for double-counted and misattributed periods of delay, the case’s complexity justified the time taken.

The trial judge’s findings on the ITO’s sufficiency and candour were upheld, as were his credibility findings and sentencing approach.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals of Habibullah Daniel Ahmadi, who was convicted of second degree murder for the fatal assault of Sara Anne Widholm.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in using Ahmadi’s out-of-court statements as circumstantial evidence of guilt, failed to consider critical evidence on intent, and improperly relied on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court found no legal error in the trial judge’s treatment of the evidence, including the assessment of intoxication and intent, and upheld the 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed P.P.'s appeal from convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial letters written years before the alleged offences and in permitting evidence of privileged marital communications without a valid waiver.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the credibility assessment of the defence and required a new trial.

The appellants, David Case and Celine Loyer, appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to the complainant's "flashback" memory being unreliable.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's memory and the confirmatory evidence to be reasonable and not fundamentally flawed.

The dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's reasoning regarding the reliability of the "sleeping flashback" was circular and illogical, and that the confirmatory evidence was overstated.

Both sentence appeals regarding a no-contact condition were also dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision following convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defendant caused a collision by speeding and running a red light, resulting in significant injuries to an elderly passenger, though causation of death was not proven.

The jury acquitted the defendant of impaired driving.

The court considered the defendant's pro-social background and remorse against the serious nature of the offences and his poor driving record, including recent breaches of court orders.

The Crown sought a three-year prison sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, a $2,000 fine for the refusal offence, and a total driving prohibition of 2 years and 9.5 months, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant, Adam West, appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and internet luring.

The appeal focused on the mens rea requirement for these offences, specifically whether recklessness as to the complainant's age was sufficient or if actual knowledge or wilful blindness was required.

The Court of Appeal, relying on its prior decision in R. v. Fox, affirmed that recklessness suffices for internet luring.

For the possession charge, the court found that the trial judge's findings of fact clearly established wilful blindness on the part of the appellant regarding the complainant's age, which is legally equivalent to actual knowledge.

The appeal was dismissed.

A York Regional Police officer, Jordan Nesbitt, was charged with breach of trust, fabricating evidence, and attempting to obstruct justice following a vehicle search.

The Crown alleged he planted cocaine and falsified reports to justify an unlawful search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, citing issues with witness credibility, the integrity of the scene, and plausible alternative explanations for the presence of substances.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

This decision addresses Ali Baek's Charter application to exclude evidence (10 kg of cocaine) seized from his residence, alleging breaches of his section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the warrants and orders, finding that the initial tracking warrant and production orders were issued without reasonable grounds due to erroneous, speculative, and misleading information provided by the police.

The police conduct was characterized as serious, involving reckless disregard for Charter rights and a failure of full and frank disclosure.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on Baek's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, leading to its exclusion.

The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and manslaughter at trial by judge alone after applying a chokehold to the deceased, who lost consciousness and died.

The trial judge found the Crown had not established the requisite subjective mens rea for murder, and that self-defence applied to the lesser included offence of manslaughter.

The Nunavut Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding errors of law in the trial judge's analysis of mens rea for murder and application of self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the further appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Crown's right to appeal an acquittal under s. 676(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is limited to questions of law alone, that the Court of Appeal failed to precisely identify any such error, and that there is no legal rule that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act requiring specific findings on mens rea.

The trial judge's self-defence analysis correctly applied an objective standard under each element of s. 34 of the Criminal Code.

Paramedics Christopher Marchant and Steven Snively were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to a shooting victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing a flawed analytical approach, insufficient/contradictory reasons, and misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Crown sought leave to appeal their 18-month conditional sentences, requesting custodial terms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeals and the Crown's sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that the paramedics' actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care and that the conditional sentences were fit.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, was charged with refusal to provide a breath sample causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

The court, in a judge-alone trial, considered the requisite mens rea for refusal offences under s. 320.15(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that Parliament's 2018 amendment clarified the mens rea to be knowledge that a demand has been made.

The defendant was found to have known a demand was made and refused to comply, thus satisfying the mens rea for refusal simpliciter.

However, the court acquitted the defendant of the aggravated offence of refusal causing bodily harm, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or was reckless as to whether the collision resulted in bodily harm, as the risk of injury did not rise above mere speculation given the information available to him at the time of refusal.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for breach of trust and his 18-month conditional sentence.

He had been acquitted of sexual assault involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of insufficient reasons, unreasonable verdict, and inconsistent verdicts, and the sentence on grounds of erroneous "double counting" of aggravating factors and insufficient reasons for rejecting a suspended sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the verdict reasonable and reconcilable, and the sentence appropriate.

The appellant, Qiao Zeng, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and inadequate, particularly regarding the two distinct routes to liability (aiding a planned murder and common intention in a kidnapping resulting in death) and the evidence relevant to each.

The blending of these routes and the lack of clear delineation between them for the appellant and co-accused likely confused the jury and may have led to a compromise verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.