ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE No. 23-7240
BETWEEN:
TOWN OF HALTON HILLS Respondent
— AND —
ROGER GORDON Appellant
Before Justice Brian G. Puddington
Heard on November 14, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on February 4, 2026
Michael W. Lacy............................................................................. counsel for the appellant Konstantine Stavrakos........................................................... counsel for the respondent
Contents
Overview.. 1 The Legislative Framework. 2 The Trial 4 Analysis. 6 The appellant’s attack on the PSO was an impermissible collateral attack. 6 The doctrine of legal non-conforming use does not apply. 9 The reasons of the Justice of the Peace were sound. 10 The Sentence Appeal 11 A $7,500 fine and a 1 year probation order was an appropriate sentence. 11
Overview
1The appellant, Roger Gordon, was the property owner of an 85 acre plot at 15408 Clayhill Road in the Township of Halton Hills during the time period relevant to this case. On May 30, 2024, he was charged with an offence contrary to section 36(1) of the Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 (“BCA”), alleging that he had failed to comply with a Property Standards Order (“PSO”) made pursuant to section 15.2(2) of the BCA.
2On October 22, 2024, Justice of the Peace Curtis found the appellant guilty of failing to comply with the above order and on January 6, 2025, sentenced the appellant to a $7,500 fine and a one-year probation order. The appellant now appeals his conviction and sentence to this court, pursuant to section 116(2)(a) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.P.33 (“POA”).
3As there are several sections in different Acts at issue on this appeal, it is necessary to outline the legislative framework.
The Legislative Framework
4Section 36(1) of the BCA states that:
36 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if the person,
(b) fails to comply with an order, direction or other requirement made under this Act.
5The “order, direction or other requirement” in this case was the above mentioned PSO issued to the appellant pursuant to section 15.2(2) of the BCA.
6Section 15.2(2) of the BCA allows an officer who finds that a property does not conform with any of the standards prescribed in a By-Law to make an order “giving reasonable particulars of the repairs to be made or stating that the site is to be cleared of all buildings, structures, debris or refuse and left in a graded and levelled condition”. The officer must also state the municipal address or legal description of the property, prescribe a timeline for complying with the terms and conditions of the order and indicate the final date for giving notice of appeal from the order.
7The PSO was issued to the appellant on February 17, 2022 and alleged violations of sections 10.4, 10.7 and 12 of the Town of Halton Hills “Property Standards By-Law” - By-Law 2008-0137 (the “By-Law”). Those sections read:
10.4 No land shall be used for the parking, storing or placing of any vehicle, boat, machinery, mechanical equipment, appliance, any part or parts thereof, or any similar item, which is in an inoperable, discarded or dismantled state or condition, or is in a state of disrepair, or is in an apparently disused condition.
10.7 All accumulations of material, wood, debris or other objects that create an unsafe or unsightly condition, or are out of place and not in harmony with the surrounding area, shall be removed.
and
12.1 Garbage and refuse shall be stored in Receptacles and all garbage bags shall be temporarily stored within an enclosed garage, Accessory Building or in a covered garbage Receptacle until collection, and shall be removed in accordance with bylaws of the Regional Municipality of Halton or alternatively the Owner or Occupant shall cause a private refuse collection service to remove all garbage, rubbish, ashes, trade-waste or other refuse from the Property on a regular basis.
8There is no dispute on this appeal that this By-Law is a By-Law enacted by virtue of section 15.1(3) of the BCA. The appellant was ordered to do certain things in the PSO to remedy those alleged violations. Specifically,
Remove all, but not limited to vehicles, tractors, machinery, mechanical equipment, construction equipment, motors, appliances, etc., and any parts thereof (section10.4);
Remove all, but not limited to oil containers, fuel containers, fuel tanks, compressed air tanks, contractor material, metal, wood, plastic, concrete, etc., and any parts thereof (section 10.7); and
Remove all garbage and refuse from the property (section 12.1).
9The appellant was also informed in the PSO that if he was not satisfied with “the terms and conditions of the Order”, he could appeal to the Property Standards Committee (“PSC”). This avenue of appeal is guided by sections 5.6 and 5.7 of the By-Law and Section 15.3 of the BCA. The By-Law states:
5.6 On an appeal, the Committee has all the powers and functions of the Officer who made the order and the Committee may do any of the following things if, in the Committee’s opinion, doing so would maintain the general intent and purpose of the by-law and of the Town of Halton Hills Official Plan:
(a) confirm, modify or rescind the order to repair or demolish; and
(b) extend the time for complying with the order.
5.7 Any Owner or Occupant or Person affected by a decision under section 5.6 may appeal to the Superior Court of Justice by notifying the clerk of the Town in writing and by applying to the court within 14 days after a copy of the decision is sent.
10Section 15.3(3.1) of the BCA essentially mirrors section 5.6 of the By-Law, in that it outlines the same powers of the PSC on appeal. Section 15.3(6) bestows upon the Superior Court of Justice, sitting on appeal of a decision of the PSC, the same powers and functions as the PSC.
11After receiving the PSO, the appellant availed himself of the appeal provisions contained in the By-Law and the BCA and filed an application for a hearing of an appeal before the PSC on February 23, 2022 – approximately 6 days after the PSO was issued. In the application, which was filed as Exhibit 7 at the trial, the appellant proposed that the Part 10.4 matter be modified to permit him to relocate equipment so that it is not visible from the road. He also requested to rescind the section 10.7 matter completely, as those materials were part of his business, were transient, and are only stored there until they are sold or transported off site. The appellant in his application furthermore agreed to comply with part 12.1, the removal of garbage and refuse from the property.
12The decision of the PSC was filed as Exhibit 8 at trial. The PSC dismissed the appellant’s appeal, concluding that the appellant had failed to show how he was in compliance with the By-Law and had not taken good faith actions to address the violations. The appellant was, however, given 90 days from May 19, 2022 (the date of the decision) to comply.
13The appellant did not file a further appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, as permitted under section 5.7 of the By-Law and section 15.3(4) of the BCA.
14When the by-law officer later determined that the ordered remediation outlined on the PSO did not take place, the appellant was charged under section 36(1)(b) of the BCA for failing to comply with the PSO. The failing to comply with the PSO was what triggered the POA prosecution in this matter.
The Trial
15It is important to note that the appellant was not charged with having violated sections 10 and 12 of the By-Law. Rather, he was charged, under the BCA, with failing to comply with an order made pursuant to section 15.2(2) of the BCA, contrary to section 36 of the BCA. This is an important distinction. The PSO is not issued under the By-Law and does not gain force of law from the By-Law. Rather, it is the failure to comply with the PSO, not the By-Law, that gives rise to an offence under section 36 of the BCA. This is the offence that was before the Justice of the Peace at trial.
16A person who is convicted of this offence is liable to a fine of not more than $50,000 for a first offence and to a fine of not more than $100,000 for a subsequent offence. There is no minimum.
17There was no real dispute between the parties at trial or on appeal that the appellant did not comply with the order in this case. The appellant’s position at trial, however, was that he could not comply, because the underlying By-Law was vague.
18The appellant argues on appeal (and tried to argue at trial) that the plain language of section 10.4 of the By-Law was impermissibly vague because the relevant terms such as “dismantled state”, “disused condition” and “similar item” were not defined in the By-Law and thus were entirely dependent on the subjective impression of the enforcement officer. The appellant also attempted to argued that the same vagueness undermined section 10.7, as there were no objective standards determining what is meant for an accumulation of material to be “unsightly” or “not in harmony with the surrounding area”. Finally, the appellant noted that there was no definition in the By-Law of what was “garbage”, and queried, as an example, what should be considered garbage versus litter.
19At the trial for failing to comply with a BCA order under section 36(1) the appellant was prevented from raising these arguments, as the Justice of the Peace agreed with the prosecution that to raise such arguments would be an impermissible collateral attack on the PSO. In other words, the appeal provisions in the By-Law and the BCA outlined above should have been pursued, and the appellant should not have waited to be charged with breaching the order before raising such a defence. His defence of “legal non-conforming use” was also dismissed, and he was ultimately convicted of failing to comply with the BCA order.
20The Justice of the Peace found at paragraph 24 of his reasons that the PSO was properly issued to the defendant and contained all of the content required by statute in terms of the municipal address, the particulars of the repairs to be made, the timeline for complying and the final date for giving notice of appeal from the order. The order being in proper form, the Justice of the Peace then went on to review the status of the impugned items on the property after the timeline to rectify the violations had passed. His Worship found at paragraph 25 of his reasons:
In my view, the collective evidence, could allow for the application of common-sense plausible inferences regarding the subject property and the state of the items in question. Further, I found there was no evidence to suggest the items observed at the time of the inspections, subject to the Order, were being recycled, properly stored or for the purpose of future operation, but rather, over time had become abandoned, possibly forgotten and had become part of the landscape, based upon the growth and vegetation which was growing around and through the subject items in question. Further, the collective evidence clearly suggests that the objects observed throughout the property had created an unsafe and unsightly environment and were not in harmony with the surrounding area and were not addressed as per the said orders. In my view, the collective photos alone, adequately depicts “mother nature embracing and hiding man’s disregarded refuse, but not in harmony with nature itself, it was, as if the refuse had found a haven to be hidden.”
21The decision of the PSC stated that the PSO was to be complied with by August 19, 2022 (90 days after their May 19, 2022 decision). The photos of the property, filed as Exhibits 9(a), 9(b) and 10 at trial from November 2022 and May 2023 show numerous vehicles, machinery, fuel containers, what appear to be propane tanks, trailers and construction equipment still located on the property – months after the extension of time to comply with the PSO for their removal.
22The appellant appeals the conviction on several grounds, including a submission that the Justice of the Peace’s reasons were insufficient and therefore preclude meaningful appellate review. It is also submitted that the Justice of the Peace erred in concluding that the doctrine of legal non-conforming use did not apply, and that the appellant’s attempt to challenge the underlying By-Law was prohibited by the collateral attack rule.
23In oral submissions, while no ground of appeal was abandoned, the appellant focused their submissions with respect to the collateral attack issue. I will, nonetheless, address all grounds of appeal in these reasons.
Analysis
The appellant’s attack on the PSO was an impermissible collateral attack
24As noted by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Irwin, 2020 ONCA 776 (“Irwin”), while the early case law on the collateral attack rule focused on collateral attacks of court orders, the Supreme Court of Canada developed a distinct analytical approach in R. v. Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd., [1998] 1. S.C.R. 706 (“Maybrun”) when considering the collateral attack of administrative orders, such as the order in this case. As the court notes at paragraph 25 and 26 of Irwin:
For such orders, the tension animating the rule is between ensuring that the legislature’s decision to assign decision-making powers to administrative bodies is not undermined and that individuals have an effective means available to them to challenge administrative orders: Maybrun at para. 44, and Bird, at paras. 25-26.
The Supreme Court has also identified two important policy rationales that support the rule’s application to administrative orders. First, permitting parties to ignore established procedures for challenging an order would risk discrediting administrative bodies’ authority and thereby undermine their effectiveness. Second, if collateral attacks are allowed, the state will have to resort to criminal charges and sanctions to secure compliance: Maybrun, at para. 42; Bird, at paras. 27-28.
25When addressing the doctrine of collateral attack, the court should first review the defence or legal argument being asserted to determine whether it is correctly characterized as a collateral attack. As the Court of Appeal notes in Irwin at paragraph 41, “it is essential when considering the collateral attack rule that the court first determines whether an attack on the order's validity or judgment is being made. If it is not, that will be the end of the analysis.”
26At trial, the appellant attempted to challenge the validity of the Halton Hills By-Law, claiming that the By-Law itself was vague. In other words, he wished to argue that he was not guilty of the POA charge for failing to comply with the PSO, because the By-Law itself was of no force and effect. I agree with the Justice of the Peace in this case, and I find this was an attack on the validity of the PSO, which triggers the collateral attack analysis.
27The standard of review on applying the collateral attack rule is correctness. The question for this court, therefore, is whether the Justice of the Peace erred in his analysis of the rule’s application. I find that there was no such error on the part of the Justice of the Peace and this ground of appeal must therefore be dismissed.
28In coming to this conclusion, I again take guidance from Irwin. A summary of what the Court of Appeal was dealing with in Irwin is helpful.
29Robert Irwin was charged with six counts of failing to comply with orders under the BCA. The orders (issued in 2013) required him to obtain building permits or remove structures on his property in Vaughan, Ontario. Mr. Irwin did not appeal these orders under section 25 of the Act (which allows appeal to the Superior Court within 20 days). Instead, at his trial for failing to comply with the order, his defence was that for five buildings (Buildings 1, 2, 5, 6, 7), he claimed permits had been obtained years earlier. For two other buildings (3, 4), he argued no permits were required.
30At trial, the Justice of the Peace rejected the prosecution’s collateral attack argument and found that they had reasonable doubt and acquitted Mr. Irwin on all charges. On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, it was held that Mr. Irwin’s defence was in fact an impermissible collateral attack and the court entered convictions.
31Our Court of Appeal, in hearing the appeal, provided a helpful review of the law, particularly with respect to collateral attacks in a regulatory context. The Court of Appeal noted that the collateral attack rule prohibits a party from challenging the validity of an order in proceedings other than those intended to reverse or nullify it. (see paragraph 23 of Irwin). For administrative orders, courts are to consider the legislative intent using Maybrun factors, that include:
(1) the wording of the statute under the authority of which the order was issued;
(2) the purpose of the legislation;
(3) the existence of a right of appeal;
(4) the kind of collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of the administrative appeal tribunal; and
(5) the penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order.
(see paragraph 27 of Irwin).
32The Supreme Court of Canada notes in Maybrun that “these factors “are not independent and absolute criteria, but important clues, among others, for determining the legislature’s intention” (see Maybrun at para. 46).
33As mentioned, in Mr. Irwin’s case, he had different arguments with respect to different buildings. For five buildings (1, 2, 5, 6, 7), he claimed permits had been obtained years earlier. For two buildings (3, 4), he argued no permits were required.
34The Court of Appeal, applying the Maybrun factors, found that the defence of earlier acquired permits was not a collateral attack. For Buildings 1,2,5,6 and 7, Mr. Irwin argued compliance (he had permits), not that the orders were invalid. For the remaining buildings, however, where he argued no permits were required, the Court found those to be impermissible collateral attacks, and the convictions for those two buildings were upheld. The Court found that the legislature intended such disputes (i.e. a dispute challenging the validity of an order) to be resolved via a section 25 appeal, not penal proceedings.
35I summarize the decision in Irwin in detail above because it is similar to the case at bar. I find that the attacks Mr. Gordon wished to raise at his trial for failing to comply with the PSO are akin to Mr. Irwin’s attack for buildings 3 and 4, stating that no permits were required. It is an attack on the By-Law itself, and an attack that should have been resolved through the appeal provisions provided in the BCA.
36The BCA allows for appeals, similar to those in section 25 of the BCA, in section 15.3 of the BCA. In fact, the appellant availed himself of that route, but when his appeal was dismissed by the PSC, he chose not to appeal the matter further to the Superior Court of Justice. As a result, the order was confirmed and he was eventually charged with breaching it. Applying the Maybrun factors, I find that the wording of the statute, the purpose of the statute, and the clearly articulated routes of appeal all support the conclusion that the appellant’s challenge to the wording of the By-Law itself, and any vagueness with respect to its wording, could all have been addressed by the PSC and if necessary, the Superior Court of Justice.
37The PSC was well positioned to hear arguments on vagueness. If the appellant did not understand what “garbage” was, or wanted to assert that the items on his property were not, for example, “derelict”, he could have brought those arguments to the PSC and, ultimately, to the Superior Court of Justice. The PSC, citizens of the community appointed by city council, were also best positioned to determine whether or not items on a property were “in harmony with the surrounding area.” In other words, the appellant had the ability to argue that he was not “satisfied with the terms or conditions of the order” and appeal to the committee and the Superior Court of Justice. He did not.
38In the end, I agree with and find no error in the Justice of Peace’s finding with respect to the collateral attack rule. As His Worship notes at paragraph 22 of his reasons:
alleging that an Order is wrong, based on incorrect information or too broad of information, is not a defense to the charge. Thus, if the defendant, Roger Gordon disagreed with the Order, it should have been directed to and appealed by both the Property Standard Committee and to the Superior Court. The appellant courts have clearly stated that a defendant cannot remain silent until charges are laid. In the case of Roger Gordon, the collective evidence directs me to accept that, the appeal process to the Superior Court, was not pursued by Roger Gordon. And, according to the Bird decision, which rejected a "breach first, challenge later" approach to object to conditions of their orders, such an approach is not applicable to a due diligence defense.
39To allow the appellant to wait until charges were laid to raise arguments that could have been addressed by administrative bodies would, as our Court of Appeal warned, permit parties “to ignore established procedures for challenging an order” and “would risk discrediting administrative bodies’ authority and thereby undermine their effectiveness” (see Irwin at paragraph 26). The Supreme Court of Canada also expressly cautioned against this approach to challenging administrative orders at paragraph 42 of the Maybrun:
Such a solution would obviously have serious ramifications for both the government and society in general. Aside from the danger that administrative tribunals would be discredited, increasing recourse to penal sanctions would result. Rather than promoting co-operation and conciliation, which are among the basic objectives of such administrative mechanisms, this would result in a hardening of relations between governments and citizens. In many cases, this would seriously undermine the effectiveness of administrative schemes designed to respond to situations requiring immediate remedial action, as is often the case, for example, in environmental matters. (Emphasis added).
40Given that it became a point of contention in oral argument, I will also address the decision of Waterloo (City) v. 379621 Ontario Limited, 2014 ONCA 231. In this case, the City of Waterloo ordered the respondent 379621 Ontario Limited to remedy a violation of the light standard in its Property Standards By-Law. This case was raised on appeal before me as an example of the Ontario Court of Appeal dealing with an argument of “overly broad” and “vague” provisions in the context of an appeal that had been brought pursuant to the appeal provisions outlined in the BCA rather than a charge of a breach of a PSO order through a POA prosecution. The respondent points to this case to show that arguments about “vagueness” can be brought through the appeal provisions provided by the BCA. I agree.
41While there was discussion on appeal about the precedential value of Court of Appeal “Endorsements” as opposed to “Judgments”, the fact of the matter is, the Court of Appeal in this decision clearly dealt with arguments argued before a committee and the Superior Court of Justice. This solidifies, in my view, my finding that the proper appellate route in this case was through the provisions provided in the By-Law and the BCA in this case.
42The ground of appeal concerning the collateral attack rule must therefore fail.
The doctrine of legal non-conforming use does not apply
43As noted, the appellant focused their submissions on appeal on the collateral attack issue addressed above. There remains, however, an appeal against the Justice of Peace’s finding that the defence of legal non-conforming use did not apply, or conversely, was a collateral attack that should have been challenged before the PSC, and if necessary, the Superior Court of Justice.
44Put simply, the concept of a legal non-conforming use “addresses uses of land that were permitted at the time a by-law was enacted to allow uses to continue even though they may be in conflict with the new by-law.” (see 2185863 Ontario Limited v. City of Toronto, 2020 ONSC 6480 at paragraph 24.) The appellant, Mr. Gordon, argued at trial and in this court that this concept applies to his land because the property in question had been used in the exact manner that was impugned by the PSO prior to the enactment of the By-Law in 2002, and that the doctrine entitled the appellant to continue using the property in that manner notwithstanding the By-Law.
45The respondent submits that the doctrine of legal non-conforming use only applies to Zoning By-Laws, and not Property Standards By-Laws, and notes that the Superior Court of Justice and other courts have already found this to be the case. For example, in McDonald v. Belleville (City of), 2021 ONSC 1049, a case dismissing a statement of claim by a property owner who was essentially arguing that municipalities have no ability to regulate private property, the court found at paragraph 26:
The statement of claim suggests that the current state of the property is in some way cloaked with the status of “legal non-conforming” such that on-going violations of property standards by-laws are exempt. The “legal non-conforming” concept is applicable in some zoning contexts to structures enacted prior to a particular zoning law coming into effect. The concept has no application whatsoever to on-going violations of a property standards by-law. This claim has no merit. (Emphasis added).
46I agree that the doctrine does not apply to property standards issues. In the case at bar, the appellant was not being asked to tear down an existing structure, or change the manner in which the land was being used. He was being ordered to clean up his property. The reasoning behind not allowing this doctrine to apply to property standards is sound. It would be perverse to say that a property owner can leave garbage, oil cans and broken-down machinery on the property simply because that was the way it had always been done.
47Furthermore, as with the analysis above with respect to the collateral attack doctrine, if he wished to assert that his land was being used for a certain purpose, the appellant also had the ability to challenge the PSO through the BCA to the PSC and ultimately, if necessary, the Superior Court of Justice. By waiting until he was charged for failing to comply with the PSO to raise the issue of legal non-conforming use, he was again raising an impermissible collateral attack at his trial.
48For these reasons, the appeal with respect to legal non-conforming use must also fail.
The reasons of the Justice of the Peace were sound
49Again, it must always be remembered that the Justice of the Peace in this case was dealing with a breach of a PSO. He was not tasked with determining the interpretation of such an order. Having dismissed the collateral attacks on the PSO and the argument with respect to legal non-conforming use, His Worship’s decision then focused on whether the appellant had complied with a lawfully issued PSO. His Worship found that the order in fact complied with the provisions of section 15.2(2) of the BCA, and there was little dispute that the appellant had not complied with that order. In those circumstances, his reasons need not be verbose. He found that the order identified the property, the conditions to be rectified, and then found that, based on the evidence before him, the order had been ignored. The photographs from November 2022 and May 2023 in Exhibits 9 and 10, long after the PSO was issued, show that many of the items identified by the By-Law officer in his PSO remained on the property.
50In a POA prosecution under section 36 of the BCA, the Justice of the Peace made reasonable findings of fact and that the offence had been made out. In those circumstances, I do not find any error on the part of the Justice of the Peace. His Worship’s reasons for convicting the appellant are obvious from those reasons and there is no reason for this court, sitting on appeal, to find otherwise. This ground of appeal is therefore also dismissed.
The Sentence Appeal
A $7,500 fine and a 1 year probation order was an appropriate sentence
51Neither the prosecution nor the appellant made submissions with respect to a probation order. Nonetheless, the Justice of the Peace imposed a one-year probation order with the following conditions:
The defendant shall not commit the same offence or any related or similar offence, or any offence under a statute of Canada or Ontario or any other Province of Canada that is punishable by imprisonment;
The defendant shall appear before the court as and when required;
The defendant shall notify the Court of any change of address.
52As can be seen, these conditions cannot be said to be particularly onerous.
53The Justice of the Peace had the jurisdiction to issue a probation order pursuant to section 72(1)(b) of the POA.
72 (1) Where a defendant is convicted of an offence in a proceeding commenced by information, the court may, having regard to the age, character and background of the defendant, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission,
(b) in addition to fining the defendant or sentencing the defendant to imprisonment, whether in default of payment of a fine or otherwise, direct that the defendant comply with the conditions prescribed in a probation order.
54The Justice of the Peace noted in his reasons for sentence that this was not the first time the appellant had been convicted of such an offence. His Worship therefore considered “the character and background of the defendant” and the “nature of the offence” when imposing sentence. The imposition of a probation order, carrying with it the possibility of further charges if he did not comply with that probation order, was appropriate in the circumstances. While it is true that the appellant is bound by the By-Laws prescribing property standards with or without a probation order, the probation order in this case carries with it the additional incentive to keep his property in compliance with property standards. If he continues to fail to comply with the PSO and now the probation order, additional penalties will attach. If he complies, the probation order adds no additional consequences to him.
55The appellant submits that the Justice of the Peace imposed an increased fine and a probation order based on a finding that his failure to utilize the appellate provisions of the BCA is aggravating. It is true that His Worship does make reference to this in his reasons for sentence. I agree with the appellant that this should not have been considered an aggravating factor. Raising arguments at trial, whether or not they are successful, should never be held against a litigant, unless they are so frivolous or vexatious that they need to be denounced and deterred. The arguments raised in this case do not in any way rise to that level.
56I disagree, however, that His Worship’s finding that the arguments were aggravating played a significant role in his decision to issue a $7,500 fine, or a probation order. The sentence in this case focused on the need for specific and general deterrence, as well as denunciation, and was based more on the particular circumstances of the appellant, rather than punishing him for raising issues at trial. As Justice Curtis noted:
If one intends to purchase property and live in a community, they must respect and abide by the laws which govern our communities; further it is my hope that the penalties chosen will also send an affirming message to those property owners who have faithfully been compliant to the municipal by-laws of their community, otherwise, anything less might instill mediocrity among most property owners.
57Put simply, the Justice of the Peace, through his reasons for sentence, was speaking to the Region of Halton. He was emphasizing that By-Laws enforcing property standards are for the benefit of all residents, and those who choose to ignore them will face consequences that increase with each violation. There is no legal error in sending such a message, and in fact, it is a message undoubtedly supported by the vast majority of residents in our community.
58Both parties agree that a sentence imposed by a trial court attracts significant deference. Having found no error in the ultimate sentence in this case, the appeal as to sentence is dismissed.
Released: February 4, 2026.
Justice B.G. Puddington