Michael William Lacy

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, brought a motion to re-open a pre-trial Charter application, seeking to exclude evidence of his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The basis for the motion was an alleged material change in circumstances, specifically that the arresting officer, PC Shannon Swiderski, had embellished her testimony at trial regarding the odour of alcohol, thereby undermining her credibility and the lawfulness of the initial arrest and subsequent breath demand.

The court found that while the officer's trial testimony was indeed an embellishment, it did not constitute a material change that would have likely altered the original finding that she had honest, subjective, and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

Consequently, the motion to re-open the Charter application was dismissed.

The appellant, Trevor Basso, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a minor and his sentence.

He also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his intellectual disability and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it would not have affected the trial outcome.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's findings on the appellant's recklessness regarding the complainant's age were consistent with the mens rea requirements clarified in R. v. Carbone.

While the 12-month sentence was affirmed as fit, the court exercised its discretion to consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual assault under s. 271(a) of the Criminal Code.

Drawing parallels with R. v. B.J.T., the court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter due to gross disproportionality in hypothetical scenarios.

The remnant of the appellant's custodial sentence was permanently stayed.

The accused, Shabbir Dossa, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 24 months and 17 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that portions of the delay were attributable to the defence or constituted exceptional circumstances (discrete events or case complexity).

The court found no delay attributable to the defence and no exceptional circumstances.

The primary reason for the delay was the Crown's unacceptable and unexplainable delay in providing meaningful disclosure, particularly the accident reconstructionist report and ITOs.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the accused's 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, on trial for dangerous and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and death, applied for a directed verdict on the counts alleging bodily harm to two victims.

The Crown's case was in, and the defence argued that the evidence of soft tissue injuries and psychological sequelae was insufficient to establish 'bodily harm' as defined in the Criminal Code, and that objective foreseeability of injury was required.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that objective foreseeability of bodily harm is not an essential element for dangerous or impaired driving causing bodily harm offences, citing R. v. Creighton and R. v. K.L. While agreeing with the Crown that psychological injuries would not be considered for this ruling, the court found sufficient evidence from the victims' self-reports of physical injuries to allow the jury to consider the bodily harm counts.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, one count of simple possession, and two counts of breach of probation, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a pre-trial Charter application, arguing that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search violated his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in concluding that seized fentanyl and fentanyl/cocaine mixture were for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including confidential informant information and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trafficking convictions, finding the evidence overwhelming despite a minor error by the trial judge regarding a concession.

The accused young persons, C.C. and V.F., faced charges including sexual assault and gang sexual assault.

At the close of the Crown's case, they brought a directed verdict application, arguing insufficient identification evidence.

The court, applying the Shephard test, found that while similarity of names provided some circumstantial evidence of identity, it was insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt without further corroborating evidence.

Consequently, the motion for a directed verdict was granted, and both accused were found not guilty on all counts.

The court also noted other factors that would have made a conviction unsafe, including potential motives to fabricate by complainants and inconsistencies in their testimony.

The defendant, Robert Konashewych, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights (solicitor-client privilege) and s. 8 rights (unreasonable search and seizure) by police.

The alleged breaches arose from police taking possession of a presumptively privileged letter and other documents provided by his former spouse.

The court found a s. 7 breach due to police inaction regarding the privileged document but determined it did not warrant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) as the consequences were minor and did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found no s. 8 breach, as the documents were voluntarily provided by a private citizen, not obtained through state search or seizure.

The application for a stay was dismissed, but the privileged letter was ruled inadmissible unless privilege was waived.

The defence sought to exclude specific evidence related to the accused's infidelity and attempts to conceal it, arguing its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value in a circumstantial evidence case involving alleged will forgery.

The Crown contended this evidence was crucial to demonstrate the accused's motive and actions to prevent discovery of the alleged fraud.

The court dismissed the defence's application, finding the evidence highly relevant to the Crown's theory and that any prejudicial effect could be adequately mitigated by proper jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired operation and excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had found breaches of the respondent's s.10(a) and s.10(b) Charter rights, leading to the exclusion of breath samples and acquittal.

The appeal court found no s.10(a) breach but upheld the trial judge's finding of a s.10(b) Charter breach, agreeing with the assessment of "flagrant disrespect" by the police.

Consequently, the appeal court affirmed the trial judge's decision to exclude the breath sample evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and upheld the acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

He appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's central credibility finding against the appellant was tainted by two errors: procedural unfairness, as it was based on an issue not raised by the Crown in submissions or cross-examination, and a material misapprehension of evidence, specifically failing to consider that the appellant and a key defence witness were legally prohibited from communicating.

These errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice, precluding the application of the curative proviso.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing consent and credibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was intelligible, coherent, and based on the totality of the evidence, particularly the implausibility of the appellant's account and the plausibility of the complainant's testimony and physical state.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The appellant, S.A., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault against his wife.

The trial judge had found the victim credible and rejected the appellant's and his witness's evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof (R. v. W.(D.)), and erred in rejecting a witness's evidence.

Duty counsel also argued the trial judge engaged in stereotypical reasoning and found self-corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the trial judge's credibility assessment and application of the burden of proof sound, and that the judge's reasoning regarding the sexual assault was not stereotypical but grounded in the specific relationship context.

The Crown applied under s. 683(5) of the Criminal Code to suspend two conditional sentence orders (CSOs) imposed on the respondents, who were convicted of failing to provide necessaries of life.

The Crown argued that serving the CSOs before the appeal hearing would prejudice its sentence appeal, which sought penitentiary sentences.

The respondents opposed, arguing the Crown had not shown merit and that suspension was not in the interests of justice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the "interests of justice" did not favour suspending the CSOs, noting that re-incarceration after a sentence is served is not inevitable and that the impact of served house arrest conditions could be considered on appeal.

The appellant, Philip Grandine, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his 15-year sentence in the drowning death of his wife, Karissa Grandine.

This was his second trial, the first conviction having been overturned.

The appeal raised three grounds against conviction: error in leaving a criminal negligence by omission theory of liability to the jury without evidentiary basis, error in refusing to exclude evidence based on issue estoppel (computer searches for "autopsy"), and inadequate jury instruction on the use of the appellant's out-of-court statements.

The appellant also argued the sentence was excessive and based on an unproven aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding sufficient evidentiary basis for the criminal negligence theory, no issue estoppel error, and adequate jury instructions.

The court also found the sentence was fit and reasonable, rejecting the "almost murder" characterization argument and the breach of trust argument.

The appellant, Mark Staples, appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of his father and sister.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged errors by the trial judge regarding demeanour evidence, post-offence conduct instructions, discreditable conduct, circumstantial evidence, Crown's closing arguments, impermissible opinion evidence, and refusal to admit evidence of another unsolved homicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions, and concluded that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the substantial circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and post-offence cleanup.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a review under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code of the dismissal of his third bail application.

The application argued that a pre-trial ruling allowing a third-party suspect defence constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo bail hearing.

The motion judge found it arguable that the most recent bail judge erred by applying too high a threshold for "material change" and by not fully balancing factors in his alternative reasons for denying bail.

The application for a direction to review by a panel of the court was allowed.

This endorsement addresses two applications for leave to intervene in a criminal appeal from conviction, brought by the Canadian Police Association, Toronto Police Association, and Police Association of Ontario.

The underlying appeal concerns a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide necessaries of life to an intoxicated individual.

The court granted intervener status, finding that the associations had a substantial interest and could offer useful perspectives on legal issues such as the standard of care for police officers, the relevance of mistake of fact in objective liability offences, and the need for expert evidence on professional standards, provided they confined their submissions to legal arguments and avoided the merits of the appeal.

The appellant, an overnight attendant at a group home, was convicted of criminal negligence causing the death of a resident with developmental disabilities who drowned in a bathtub.

The appellant had left the resident unsupervised, contrary to an "eyes-on" protocol.

On appeal, the court found the verdict unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of causation.

The forensic pathologist's opinion on drowning was based on information not fully supported by the record, and he could not eliminate other potential causes like a sudden cardiac event.

The court noted a risk of the jury reasoning backward from the death to infer causation without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.