Michael William Lacy

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal was the extraordinary delay (over four years) by the trial judge in delivering written reasons for judgment after announcing the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found that this prolonged delay, coupled with the complexity of the case, rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, rendering the reasons an "after-the-fact justification." Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Nicholas Berto, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failure to remain at the scene of an accident, and sought leave to appeal his 18-month and 6-month consecutive sentences.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the lesser included offence of dangerous driving to the jury, claiming his driving constituted two separate incidents with an intervening act.

He also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his intellectual disability and mental health for sentencing purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the intervening act argument as the dangerous driving was one continuous transaction.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it was not materially different from evidence already considered.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered all factors and the sentence was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside in light of R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant, J.J., appealed convictions for sexual assault and break and enter.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of DNA evidence, the imposition of an onus on the appellant to provide a benign explanation for DNA presence, and trial counsel's conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the DNA evidence in his reasons, did not reverse the burden of proof regarding innocent DNA transfer, and that trial counsel's prior representation of an investigating officer did not result in an actual conflict of interest impairing trial fairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted by jury of second degree murder after shooting a man he found breaking into his truck, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's role in the incident under s. 34(2)(c) of the Criminal Code as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of his use of lethal force.

The majority held that the phrase 'the person's role in the incident' in s. 34(2)(c) captures the accused's conduct throughout the incident from beginning to end, without requiring that the conduct be unlawful, provocative or morally blameworthy.

The omission of this instruction was a material error that had a bearing on the acquittal, warranting a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with Côté J. dissenting on the question of materiality.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder and robbery, appealed on the sole ground that his trial counsel breached the duty of loyalty, effectively depriving him of counsel.

The appellant argued that counsel acted as amicus curiae rather than defence counsel, undermining his defence through misguided actions and communications with the Crown, including lying to gain trust and sharing defence strategy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while counsel's actions were at times misguided and unethical (e.g., lying about his background), they did not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.

The court applied the two-part test for breach of loyalty, requiring an actual conflict of interest and impairment of representation, concluding that counsel's actions, though inadvisable, were not motivated by conflicting loyalties but rather by an attempt to manage a difficult client in a challenging case with strong Crown evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault against a 13-month-old child, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting expert medical evidence on the causation of the child's head injury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly preferred the Crown's expert opinion in isolation before considering the totality of the evidence, thereby misapplying the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

This led to a flawed assessment of the defence's alternative theories and a failure to properly consider whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought bail pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging his assault conviction and nine-month sentence.

The grounds for appeal included the trial judge's use of social context in credibility assessments and sentencing, alleged misapprehension of evidence, and whether simple assault is a lesser and included offense of aggravated assault.

The court denied bail, finding the grounds for leave to appeal were not frivolous but did not clearly surpass the minimal threshold, and that continued detention was necessary in the public interest, balancing enforceability and reviewability.

Michael Theriault appealed his conviction for common assault and his nine-month sentence, stemming from an altercation where he, an off-duty police officer, and his brother assaulted Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, after catching him stealing from their truck.

The trial judge had acquitted the brothers of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice but convicted Michael of common assault for striking Miller with a pipe when Miller was retreating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Theriault's appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence.

The Crown's cross-appeal against the acquittals was also dismissed without addressing its merits, as the Crown had indicated they would not pursue a new trial if Michael Theriault's common assault conviction was upheld.

The accused, Tuan Bui, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and 14 days (622 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a significant, unexplained 15-month delay in disclosure by the Crown, which was not excused by the COVID-19 pandemic or the alleged complexity of the case.

The court also determined that periods of defence unavailability did not cause the delay.

Consequently, the charges against the accused were stayed.

Three police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for misfeasance in public office, alleging Crown prosecutors mishandled stay applications brought by two accused persons who claimed the officers assaulted them during an arrest.

The majority held that prosecutorial immunity bars misfeasance claims by police officers against Crown prosecutors, as allowing such claims would fundamentally undermine prosecutorial independence and objectivity and imperil the accused's right to a fair trial.

The majority found that the mutually independent relationship between police and prosecutors is incompatible with a regime of legal accountability running from prosecutor to police.

In dissent, one justice would have dismissed the appeal, finding four policy reasons why prosecutorial immunity should not apply to deliberate and unlawful prosecutorial conduct causing serious harm to police officers facing findings of brutality, and that the high liability threshold for misfeasance adequately guards prosecutorial independence.

The appellant, Brandon Omardeen, appealed his convictions for multiple firearm-related offences and breach charges, as well as his sentence.

He challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability findings, the identification evidence, and the finding of consciousness of guilt based on his post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on identification, the absence of gunshot residue, or the inference of consciousness of guilt.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was found to be fit given the extensive aggravating factors and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant, Pierre Labelle, appealed his convictions for indecent acts, criminal harassment, and communicating for sexual services with a minor.

The primary issues on appeal were the trial judge's treatment of non-identification evidence, the reasonableness of the criminal harassment conviction against one complainant (J.V.), and the alleged improper use of the appellant's willingness to fabricate evidence as positive evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the non-identification evidence lacked probative value, the criminal harassment conviction was reasonable based on the evidence, and the trial judge correctly used the appellant's fabrication as a basis for rejecting his evidence, not as positive evidence of guilt.

The accused was convicted of drug trafficking and possession.

He appealed, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling from *R. v. Jordan*, dismissing the stay application.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the 30-month ceiling instead of the 18-month ceiling, as the accused was tried in the Ontario Court of Justice without a preliminary inquiry.

The Court determined that the Crown failed to justify the excessive delay, as the case was not complex enough and the Crown's reliance on the prior *Morin* framework was unreasonable given its dilatory conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action after a relative's death, which the defendants argued was statute-barred under the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs pleaded fraudulent concealment of CT imaging to toll the limitation period.

The motion judge dismissed the negligence claims, finding no causal connection between the concealed imaging and the failure to sue within the limitation period, but allowed breach of contract and PHIPA claims against the hospital to continue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by deciding the factual question of fraudulent concealment as a question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The Court found the plea of fraudulent concealment was neither patently ridiculous nor manifestly incapable of proof, and that factual disputes regarding causation should not be determined on such a motion.

The defendants, Michael and Christian Theriault, were charged with aggravated assault and attempting to obstruct justice following an altercation with Dafonte Miller, which resulted in Miller losing an eye.

The court found that Miller and his friends were "car hopping" and were caught by the Theriaults.

While the initial interaction and struggle were complex, the court found that Michael Theriault committed an unlawful assault when he struck Miller with a metal pipe after Miller was in retreat and seeking help.

The court found Michael Theriault not guilty of aggravated assault but guilty of the lesser included offense of assault.

Christian Theriault was found not guilty on both counts.

The charges of attempting to obstruct justice against both defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding intent and the context of their statements to police.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.

The appellant, L.K., appealed her convictions for sexual assault, criminal negligence, failing to provide necessaries of life, child abandonment, and obstructing justice, stemming from her involvement in the sexual abuse of her minor daughter by two acquaintances and her conduct during the police investigation.

She also sought leave to appeal her sentence and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, both of which were abandoned during oral argument.

The appeal focused on alleged deficiencies in the jury charge, including the absence of a W.D. instruction for exculpatory evidence, failure to provide a "no probative value" instruction for obstruction evidence, leaving criminal negligence with the jury, and an objective assessment of intent for child abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge functionally adequate, the criminal negligence charge properly left to the jury, and the error in the child abandonment instruction harmless due to the curative proviso.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

The appellants, Brandon Barreira, Joshua Barreira, and Chad Davidson, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

Davidson had admitted to shooting the victim, Tyler Johnson, but claimed manslaughter, while the other appellants denied party liability.

The appeal primarily focused on the trial judge's jury instructions, arguing a failure to adequately relate the evidence to the issues, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder verdict.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions inadequate for failing to properly summarize and relate the evidence to the specific elements of the offence and party liability.

While the court determined that the first-degree murder verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence, the instructional errors necessitated a new trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder was ordered for all appellants.

The appellants, Torcaso and Maione, appealed their convictions for break and enter, with Torcaso also appealing an assault conviction.

They argued that a letter sent to the trial judge by a juror created a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias argument, finding the juror denied authorship and the letter's content did not suggest bias.

The court also found no error in the jury instructions on identity, noting the trial was a "one issue trial" and the jury was adequately cautioned.

Torcaso's sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of striking the victim's surcharge; all other appeals were dismissed.