Marshall Rothstein

This appeal addressed federal Crown civil liability for the Minister of Justice's handling of mercy applications after a wrongful conviction.

The Court held that the mercy power was a core policy function protected by qualified immunity, and liability required bad faith or serious recklessness rather than simple fault.

The appellant did not prove that ministers acted in bad faith or that any alleged review failures caused compensable loss.

The Court also rejected additional damages, punitive damages, and claimed extrajudicial fees tied to alleged abuse of process.

The Court held that arson under s. 434 of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, so self-induced intoxication short of automatism is unavailable as a defence.

The trial judge’s reliance on intoxication materially affected the acquittal, so the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appeal concerned judicial review of a surrender order under extradition legislation in relation to historic U.S. murder charges revived after modern DNA testing.

The appellant argued delay, evidentiary weakness, and prejudice rendered surrender contrary to fundamental justice and unjust or oppressive.

The Court held the Minister reasonably concluded those concerns should generally be addressed by the foreign trial court, consistent with comity and established extradition principles.

The Court found no reviewable error in the assessment of section 7 Charter concerns or section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The surrender order was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the Minister of Justice’s surrender order in an extradition matter.

The Court held the Minister’s decision was reasonable, that a possible fourth trial in New Hampshire did not meet the threshold of shocking the conscience or being unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1) of the Extradition Act, and that comity and international cooperation strongly favored surrender.

The Court held that the private use exception in child pornography prosecutions has three elements: lawful sexual activity, consent to recording, and strict private use.

Exploitation is assessed within the lawfulness inquiry, not as a separate extra requirement.

Because the trial judge failed to assess exploitation holistically under s. 153, legal error materially affected the acquittals and a new trial was ordered.

The Court allowed the Crown’s appeal in a jury-representativeness challenge arising from the underrepresentation of Aboriginal on-reserve residents on the Kenora jury roll.

The majority held the constitutional obligation is to provide a fair opportunity for participation through reasonable efforts in source-list selection and notice delivery, not to guarantee a proportionate jury-roll composition.

The order for a new trial was set aside and the manslaughter conviction was reinstated.

The Court allowed the Crown appeal and restored a detention order under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

It held that the public-confidence ground is a distinct and non-residual basis for pre-trial detention, not confined to exceptional cases or unexplained crimes.

The Court also held that review under ss. 520 and 521 is a hybrid remedy available only for significant new evidence, legal error, or a clearly inappropriate decision, and found no proper basis for the reviewing judge to overturn detention on these facts.

In this constitutional and procedural appeal concerning minority-language education litigation, the Court upheld the finding that trial-level conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and warranted a new trial on remitted issues.

The Court confirmed that, absent territorial delegation, a minority-language school board cannot unilaterally expand admissions beyond criteria set by valid regulation under s. 23 of the Charter.

The Court rejected treating a judge’s community affiliation alone as a sufficient basis for bias without stronger contextual evidence.

It further held that statutory language-rights claims under territorial legislation should proceed at the new trial on a full evidentiary record.

The appeal was largely dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The Court decided that under s. 20(a) of the International Transfer of Offenders Act, Omar Ahmed Khadr’s eight-year sentence could not be treated as five distinct concurrent eight-year sentences for placement purposes.

It held that the statutory scheme required placement in a provincial correctional facility and confirmed the Alberta Court of Appeal’s order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the auditors’ appeal and confirmed that an expert witness must be able and willing to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan assistance to the court as a threshold admissibility requirement, with remaining concerns about independence generally addressed at the gatekeeping weighing stage.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The appeal addressed the test for substantive equivalence under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in minority language education.

The court held equivalence must be assessed holistically from the perspective of rights holders, including facilities, programming, and travel burdens, rather than formal cost parity.

The court restored a declaration that the minority-language educational experience was not equivalent to nearby majority-language alternatives, while leaving responsibility and remedy issues to later phases.

The court also upheld phased proceedings and restored special costs for the successful public interest litigants.

In this patent damages appeal under s. 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, the Court upheld the Federal Court of Appeal decision and dismissed the patentees' appeal.

The Court agreed with the majority's reasoning on liability period, market-entry assumptions, and compensation for lost sales tied to unapproved indications.

This appeal concerns priority for statutory accident benefits under Ontario's no-fault automobile insurance regime after a claimant declined optional rental-counter coverage and was injured in a single-vehicle accident.

The core issue was whether the insurer had a sufficient nexus to the claimant to qualify as an insurer obliged to respond under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and the inter-insurer priority framework.

The Court accepted the appellate reasons below that the arbitrator erred in excluding the insurer from the statutory scheme.

The appeal was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that authorization under s. 225.4 of Quebec’s Securities Act requires a realistic chance of success and that the respondent failed to show credible evidence of a material change triggering timely disclosure obligations.

The Court dismissed an appeal from a civil contempt finding against a lawyer who returned trust funds to his client despite a Mareva injunction.

The Court held that civil contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act that breaches a clear order with notice, and does not require contumacious intent.

The Court also held the motions judge erred by reopening and setting aside the initial contempt finding on evidence that should have been filed at the liability stage.

On a statutory appeal from a specialized human rights tribunal, the Court held that judicial review standards apply, with correctness for the scope of state religious neutrality and reasonableness for most discrimination and evidentiary determinations.

The municipal council prayer, viewed in context, was found to be a religious practice by a public authority that breached the state’s duty of neutrality.

The practice created discriminatory interference with freedom of conscience and religion that was more than trivial or insubstantial.

The by-law attempting to regulate the prayer could be declared inoperative in relation to the complainant, and the remedial orders and damages were largely upheld subject to limits on the tribunal’s power to issue a general invalidity declaration.

The appeal was allowed.

In two joined criminal appeals, the court considered whether mandatory minimum imprisonment terms in s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code for possession of loaded prohibited or restricted firearms violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that while the impugned minimums were not grossly disproportionate for the respondents themselves, they were grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable licensing-type scenarios and therefore unconstitutional.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1, and the mandatory minimum provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The respondents' individual fit sentences were nevertheless upheld.

The Court dismissed Quebec’s appeal and held that Parliament could constitutionally require destruction of long-gun registry records under its criminal law power, while confirming Quebec had no legal entitlement to compel transfer of the data.

In a criminal Charter appeal, the appellant argued that trial delay became unreasonable due to a five-month period associated with a direct indictment.

The majority held that even if that period were attributed to the Crown, the overall delay remained reasonable after balancing all delay factors.

The court found no reversible error in the majority reasons below on the s. 11(b) analysis.

A dissenting minority would have allowed the appeal on the appellate dissent below.

The appeal was dismissed.