Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.80.

The appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error by the summary conviction appeal judge and noting the case involved well-settled legal principles with no broader significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant called the police to report a car theft.

The responding officer smelled marijuana and saw drug paraphernalia in her apartment.

He told her he could arrest her but wanted to know what was going on, without informing her of her right to counsel.

The appellant subsequently showed the officer drugs belonging to her boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the officer threatened arrest, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) rights was a serious breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and acquittals were directed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and physical assault against the mother of his daughter.

At trial, the complainant testified she could not recall the incident, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's demeanour while recanting and by relying on voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant's demeanour to determine if her failure to recall stemmed from a wish to reconcile, and that the parties had tacitly agreed the voir dire evidence was admissible at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving a workplace employee with a learning disability.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the complainant to testify by CCTV while also admitting her videotaped police statement, misapplying the law of consent and mistaken belief in consent, improperly reconsidering a SOIRA registration order after sentencing, and upholding the constitutionality of lifetime registration under s. 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the trial judge properly admitted both CCTV testimony and the videotaped statement under ss. 486.2 and 715.2, and that the findings of lack of consent and rejection of mistaken belief in consent were supported by the evidence.

Although the trial judge erred in reconsidering the SOIRA order after sentencing, the corrected lifetime registration remained appropriate.

The constitutional challenge to the SOIRA lifetime registration provision under s. 7 of the Charter was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief and his 17-month sentence for mischief and sexual exploitation.

The mischief occurred when the appellant pulled the parking brake of a moving vehicle driven by his stepdaughter, who had refused to let him out.

The appellant argued the driver was unlawfully confining him, meaning she was not in lawful use of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown negated unlawful confinement as it requires a significant period of time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the cumulative sentence reflected no error in principle given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the sexual exploitation complainant.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle after causing a four-vehicle accident.

He testified that he was not impaired while driving but consumed a large amount of alcohol immediately after the accident (bolus drinking).

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant, relying on toxicological evidence based on a seven-ounce consumption scenario, but ignored evidence based on a ten-ounce scenario that could have supported the appellant's claim.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the error immaterial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to consider the ten-ounce toxicology evidence was a material misapprehension of evidence relevant to the appellant's credibility.

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions for mischief under $5000 and breach of recognizance arising from a road-rage altercation, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence concerning whether she had reviewed a prior written police statement.

The court held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, properly distinguished between the written statement and a later video statement, and remained alive to contradictions in the complainant's various accounts.

In any event, applying the governing test for misapprehension of evidence, any possible error was not central to the reasoning process and had no impact on the convictions.

The appeal was dismissed without calling on the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were responsive to the defence's argument that the complainant attempted to frame the appellant.

The Court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, concluding it could not reasonably undermine the complainant's credibility on material issues.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a parking lot hit‑and‑run collision.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding both identification and impairment and alleged the trial judge relied on improper hearsay evidence of a witness’s prior description of the driver.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the combination of eyewitness recognition and circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the identification finding.

It also concluded that the trial judge properly assessed impairment at the time of driving and that the prior description evidence was not improperly used to prove identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

Crown appeal from an acquittal following a judge-alone trial on charges of accessing and possessing child pornography discovered on a computer owned by the respondent but used by his partner.

The trial judge found the respondent suspicious that his partner may have downloaded prohibited material but concluded he lacked actual knowledge and acquitted him on the basis of “innocent possession.” The Court of Appeal held the trial judge misapplied both the doctrine of wilful blindness and the innocent possession doctrine.

However, the court concluded the factual findings did not establish the knowledge or control required for possession under the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code that his trial be held in English.

The appellant sought this order to challenge jurors for language competency under s. 638(1)(f).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis for a s. 530 order because the appellant's trial was already scheduled to be held in English.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and related offences arising from two incidents involving a former friend and business partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi evidence, which included a time-stamped store receipt, and misapprehended evidence regarding contradictions between his and his wife's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, her reasons for rejecting the alibi were adequate, and there was no misapprehension of evidence that played an essential part in the reasoning process.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault arising from an incident where he showered with a child after a sand fight at a campground.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to properly apply the analysis from R. v. W.(D.) when assessing conflicting evidence.

The Superior Court found the trial judge improperly equated disbelief of the accused’s testimony with proof of guilt and failed to conduct the full three‑step W.D. analysis regarding the essential elements of the offences, including the sexual purpose of any touching.

The court also found the evidence of a sexual component to the touching was insufficient and that the verdict relied on speculation rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The convictions were therefore set aside and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from an impaired driving incident involving a multi‑vehicle collision and breath samples taken outside the statutory two‑hour window.

The defence advanced an intervening drinking theory, asserting that alcohol was consumed after the accident but before the breath tests.

The trial judge rejected the defence as incredible and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant alleged misapprehension of toxicological evidence, improper judicial notice of surrender times for intermittent sentences, and improper use of compelled statements.

The court held that any errors were not material to the verdict and that the trial judge’s credibility findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges of obstructing a peace officer and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded certified court documents establishing the recognizance conditions on the basis that the Crown failed to provide adequate notice under s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court held that exemplifications of judicial records are admissible at common law without notice and that the trial judge erred by relying on contrary lower‑court authority rather than binding appellate precedent.

The court also held there was some evidence capable of supporting the obstruct police charge and that the directed verdict of acquittal was therefore improper.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered on all charges.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue a summary conviction appeal from convictions for obstructing police and breach of probation.

The trial judge had relied primarily on circumstantial documentary evidence linking the accused to a rented vehicle involved in the incident after assigning limited weight to tainted identification evidence.

The court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal were arguable and whether the interests of justice required appointed counsel.

The court found the trial judge had properly addressed identification deficiencies and reasonably relied on the rental documentation to infer identity.

Concluding the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit, the court dismissed the application for appointment of counsel.