Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed a conviction for "over 80" after her vehicle was found in a snowbank.

At trial, the appellant claimed a third party was driving, a claim corroborated by a defence witness.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant and convicted her.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by failing to assess the corroborating defence witness's evidence separately from the appellant's, thereby misapplying the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The trial judge also erred by engaging in speculation regarding witness behaviour and by not making an explicit finding of collusion despite noting the opportunity for it.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting an unanticipated statement made to a customs officer without a voir dire, denying a mistrial application, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the officer's failure to note the statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions.

The court held that the voluntariness of pre-arrest statements had been admitted, cross-examination was sufficient to address any prejudice from the unanticipated evidence, and the jury charge was adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual assault against his former partner's 15-year-old daughter.

On appeal, he argued that the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge improperly curtailed cross-examination regarding the complainant's psychiatric diagnoses, the trial judge's reasons created a reasonable apprehension of bias due to harsh comments about the defence and the appellant's nationality, and the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's suicide attempts.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable, the curtailment of cross-examination was a harmless error, the trial judge's comments did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias despite being inappropriate in parts, and there was no material misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court found the trial judge miscalculated the institutional delay and erred in characterizing delay caused by the Crown's failure to notify its witness as neutral and institutional rather than Crown delay.

After recalculating the delay to 11 months and 26 days and finding specific prejudice to the appellant, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and the proceedings stayed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of ammunition without a license, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was entirely circumstantial, and that the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding compelling circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the drugs, cash, and ammunition, and concluding the trial judge did not make the error identified in R. v. Bui.

The applicant, appealing his summary conviction, ordered transcripts of his trial proceedings.

The authorized court transcriptionists, acting as independent contractors under the new Ministry of the Attorney General model, refused to provide copies at the $0.55 per page copy rate, insisting on charging the full $4.30 per page rate for a 'first certified copy' because the appeal was a new proceeding.

The applicant brought an application to compel the transcriptionists to produce the transcripts at the copy rate.

The Superior Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction over the administration of justice to make the order.

The court found that under the Criminal Code and O. Reg. 94/14, transcriptionists do not have the discretion to refuse a transcript order or to charge the first-copy rate for a transcript that was already produced for the trial.

The court ordered the transcriptionists to produce the transcripts at the $0.55 per page rate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in respect of a seven-year-old child.

The appellant argued the trial judge made three errors in assessing the child's credibility, including relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding a sex education book, speculating about the child's ability to operate a camera, and improperly assessing the child's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were grounded in the specific evidence and correctly applied a common sense approach to assessing the child's evidence without rigid stereotypes.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against his step-daughter arising from long-term abuse allegations spanning childhood to late adolescence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing improper speculation about the family’s prior housing arrangements and improper rejection of defence evidence from close family members.

The Court of Appeal held that any error concerning the housing-scam comment was peripheral, given the many unchallenged reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence.

It further held that the trial judge did not reject the younger siblings’ evidence solely because of relationship, but because the evidence supported a finding that they remained under parental influence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the application judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police had entered his apartment after a break-in and searched kitchen drawers to find identifying information, discovering drugs and a gun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the police conduct was an error in judgment rather than bad faith, and that the evidence should not be excluded under the Grant test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking marijuana after selling approximately 110 grams to an undercover officer via Craigslist.

The sentencing judge imposed a $750 fine.

On appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by focusing too heavily on general deterrence and failing to recognize the appellant's remarkable rehabilitation efforts.

The conviction and fine were set aside, and a conditional discharge was imposed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.80.

The appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error by the summary conviction appeal judge and noting the case involved well-settled legal principles with no broader significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant called the police to report a car theft.

The responding officer smelled marijuana and saw drug paraphernalia in her apartment.

He told her he could arrest her but wanted to know what was going on, without informing her of her right to counsel.

The appellant subsequently showed the officer drugs belonging to her boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the officer threatened arrest, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) rights was a serious breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and acquittals were directed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and physical assault against the mother of his daughter.

At trial, the complainant testified she could not recall the incident, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's demeanour while recanting and by relying on voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant's demeanour to determine if her failure to recall stemmed from a wish to reconcile, and that the parties had tacitly agreed the voir dire evidence was admissible at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving a workplace employee with a learning disability.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the complainant to testify by CCTV while also admitting her videotaped police statement, misapplying the law of consent and mistaken belief in consent, improperly reconsidering a SOIRA registration order after sentencing, and upholding the constitutionality of lifetime registration under s. 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the trial judge properly admitted both CCTV testimony and the videotaped statement under ss. 486.2 and 715.2, and that the findings of lack of consent and rejection of mistaken belief in consent were supported by the evidence.

Although the trial judge erred in reconsidering the SOIRA order after sentencing, the corrected lifetime registration remained appropriate.

The constitutional challenge to the SOIRA lifetime registration provision under s. 7 of the Charter was dismissed.