Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and making child pornography available following a trial by judge and jury.

The conviction on the first count was stayed under R. v. Kienapple.

The appellant was sentenced to 21 months in jail plus three years' probation on the second count.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the making available count on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to adequately rectify the Crown's violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn regarding cross-examination of a defence witness; and second, that the trial judge's W.(D.) instruction was improperly limited to the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of impaired driving.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that his medication, Effexor, could explain some signs of impairment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding Effexor, as there was no expert evidence to support its effects on impairment-like symptoms, and speculated on its impact.

The trial judge also erred in applying the test for impaired driving by not considering alcohol as a contributing factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of several gun-related charges arising from a single incident in which he allegedly discarded a loaded handgun while fleeing from police.

The Crown's case relied on police testimony that the appellant appeared to have a gun and dropped it near where he was tackled, with the gun found in close proximity and a magazine still in his hand.

The defence argued the gun belonged to another individual who had placed it at the location.

The jury convicted on all counts save one, and the trial judge imposed an effective sentence of 43 months.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three grounds: improper jury selection procedures, prejudicial comments by the trial judge regarding defence counsel's opening, and inadequate jury instructions on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his Summary Conviction Appeal by Justice Ferguson, which upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Armstrong at trial.

The primary issue concerned whether the trial judge was obliged to demonstrate an appreciation of the potential impact of interpreter use on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges must bear in mind the effect of testifying through an interpreter on credibility assessment, no specific formulation is required and the approach depends on the circumstances of each case.

The court found no evidence in the trial record that the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's use of an interpreter.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellants, a father and stepmother, were convicted of second-degree murder in the death of their ten-year-old son following prolonged abuse.

On appeal, the father argued the trial judge erred in denying a mid-trial application for severance after late disclosure of photographs.

The stepmother argued the trial judge erred in finding her pre-arrest and post-arrest statements to police were voluntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no injustice in the denial of severance and upholding the trial judge's application of the law on voluntariness.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after a severe rear-end collision on a highway.

At trial, he argued that his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, violating his Charter right to silence, and that the subsequent breath demand was not made 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant volunteered the information freely and that the brief delay in making the breath demand was justified by public safety concerns at the chaotic accident scene.

The appellant appealed his convictions for intimidation, assault, and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence and rendered inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on one count of sexual assault while convicting on others.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the defence witness's credibility was justified and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court also held that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as each sexual assault count related to a distinct event and had to be evaluated individually based on the evidence of consent at the time.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of trafficking one kilogram of cocaine and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to correct Crown misstatements and in correcting defence counsel's instructions on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by relying on unproven prior trafficking, failing to apply the principle of parity, and imposing a sentence at the upper end of the range for a first offender.

With the admission of fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report, the sentence was reduced to five years.

The respondents were charged with tax offences.

During the trial, the Crown directed a stay of proceedings under s. 579 of the Criminal Code.

The respondents subsequently sought costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter for alleged prosecutorial negligence and Charter breaches.

The Summary Conviction Court judge held he retained jurisdiction to hear the costs application, which was upheld on certiorari by the Superior Court.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that once the Crown exercises its discretion to stay proceedings, the trial judge becomes functus and lacks jurisdiction to entertain a Charter costs application.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for murder.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by denigrating the defence and failing to properly caution the jury regarding inferences about his age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge fair when read as a whole.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's ruling that he was at least 16 and a half years old was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence holistically, including the appellant's appearance, criminal record, and peer group, and reasonably concluded he was over 16.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a bar fight where the complainant was stabbed.

The appellant admitted to being present and involved in the fight but denied stabbing the complainant.

The conviction relied heavily on the complainant's eyewitness testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a specific jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge was obligated to specifically call the jury's attention to the dangers of eyewitness identification, both generally and in the specific circumstances of the case.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after an improper question was asked of the Crown's expert, by admitting a statement he made at the hospital about having swallowed cocaine before, and by refusing an adjournment to call a defence expert on cocaine toxicity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary rulings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The trial judge's remedial instruction cured the improper expert question, the hospital statement was highly probative to the issue of duress, and the need for a defence expert should have been foreseen.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically cheques in the appellant's name found in the bedroom where the drugs were located.

The Court of Appeal held that no reasonable jury could conclude the appellant was in possession of the drugs based on the entirety of the evidence, as the absence of evidence left open other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after customs officials found 1.2 kilograms of cocaine wrapped in his t-shirt in a truck's fuse box.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing his credibility, including taking improper judicial notice, misapprehending evidence, and reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonably open on the evidence and any alleged errors were peripheral to the core reasoning.

An application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing the Palmer test.

The appellant, B.P. (YOA), appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's errors regarding the admissibility and reliability of the complainant's hearsay statement, the weight given to the complainant's mother's evidence despite misidentification, the failure to properly analyze the appellant's evidence against the burden of proof, and impermissible speculation about the complainant's knowledge of sexual activity.

The Superior Court of Justice found multiple errors in the trial judge's approach to hearsay reliability, assessment of witness credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's reliance on inadmissible evidence, an error in finding an unequivocal refusal, and an error in finding the incident was not a "single transaction." The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the entire video evidence was admissible as it was tendered without limitation, the trial judge's finding of an unequivocal refusal was supported by evidence and entitled to deference, and the appellant's late inquiry about providing a sample did not constitute an unequivocal offer or part of a "single transaction" to mitigate the initial refusal.

The appellants appealed their convictions for various firearms offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in identifying them from video surveillance footage, ignoring the lack of evidence from a search warrant, rejecting exculpatory witness testimony, and finding that the objects they carried were loaded restricted firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles for video identification, adequately considered the search warrant evidence, reasonably assessed witness credibility, and drew a logical inference that the firearms were loaded given the circumstances of the altercation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs and guns found in his girlfriend's apartment.

He challenged two pre-trial Charter rulings.

First, he argued that evidence from the apartment should have been excluded under s. 24(2) after the motion judge found a s. 8 breach due to the search warrant being executed at night without proper authorization.

Second, he argued his arrest was unlawful because the police lacked reasonable grounds, making the seizure of keys during the search incident to arrest unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the s. 8 breach was inadvertent and did not impact privacy interests, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was in joint possession of firearms.