Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay a $185,000 fine for failing to produce financial documents in a family law proceeding.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and therefore required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order did not finally dispose of any issue in the proceeding and was not a contempt order.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the nature of a prior conviction and gave inadequate weight to rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences, the fact that the appellant was on probation and subject to a firearm prohibition at the time, and the paramount objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable because medical evidence was inconsistent with the violent assault described by the principal Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on substantial circumstantial evidence, including blood spatters and injuries, to find the appellant committed a simple assault.

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by considering the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

However, the court upheld the sentence as fit, noting that the appellant abused the trust of vulnerable fellow church members, causing an elderly couple to lose their home and life savings.

Despite the appellant being a first offender and initially a victim of a fraudulent scheme himself, the principles of denunciation and deterrence warranted the custodial sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a driving offence involving excessive speed and racing.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence and failing to strictly follow the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly considered all evidence and that the sentence was entirely fit given the finding that the appellant was racing.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no need for the warning as the trial judge was aware of the witness's problems.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the police officer's evidence reliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis to find the officer's evidence unreliable.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on a young first offender who suffered from a mental illness.

Although the law now requires a custodial sentence for the offence in question, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere because the respondent had successfully served the conditional sentence and addressed his mental health issues through prescribed medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and arson with intent to defraud insurers.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to make a threshold ruling on the admissibility of a witness's evidence regarding a conversation between the appellant and an accomplice, and in his jury instructions regarding the accomplices' prior convictions, guilty pleas, and the Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's instructions on unlawful confinement, attempted sexual assault, drunkenness, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, the use of prior consistent statements, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the evidence of identity overwhelming and the trial judge's instructions sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment allocating liability for environmental damages caused by the escape of toluene from an underground storage tank.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her factual findings, which were based on inferences drawn from incomplete evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's meticulous and detailed reasons.

The court also refused leave to appeal costs and upheld an amendment to the judgment to include GST.

In a family law dispute involving allegations of hidden assets and non-disclosure, the wife sought business records from a corporation formerly co-owned by her husband.

The husband had sold his interest to his business partner, who then refused access to the records.

The motion judge ordered the third-party partner and corporation to disclose the records under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the motion judge erred by relying on previous disclosure orders against the husband rather than making an independent determination of unfairness, the disclosure order was nonetheless justified.

The appeal was dismissed, but the husband was ordered to reimburse the third parties for their reasonable expenses in complying with the order.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision setting aside a final order based on Minutes of Settlement in a family law dispute.

The parties had negotiated a settlement, but there was a dispute over whether a binding agreement had been reached before the respondent entered a residential treatment program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the parties were not ad idem and that the June Minutes of Settlement were no longer open for acceptance when the appellant signed them in October.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of 72 months' imprisonment for an offence involving the provision of ecstasy and a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of mens rea and mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge used inappropriate language regarding deportation, the 72-month sentence was appropriate given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's prior record for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's reasons which fully answered the issues raised.

The Court also declined to entertain Charter issues that were raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant posted $5,000 as security for costs for an appeal.

Because the appeal was allowed in part, the Court of Appeal amended its previous order to direct that the $5,000 security for costs be released and returned to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the Act is clear and unambiguous.

The respondent, a court officer, was convicted of assaulting a young person in his custody.

The trial judge imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence and two years' probation.

On appeal, the summary conviction appeal judge substituted a conditional discharge.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's sentence, holding that a custodial sentence is required for court officers who commit premeditated assaults on vulnerable prisoners, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for breaches of trust.

The appellant communicated in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

Believing he was communicating with a child, the appellant transmitted a video of himself masturbating.

He was convicted of communicating for the purpose of facilitating the exposure of his genitals to a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence was impossible to complete because the officer was not actually a child, and that the exposure offence required the parties to be in the same physical location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused's belief about the victim's age was sufficient for the inchoate offence, and that the exposure offence applies to images sent over the internet.