Louise Charron

The parties separated after an 18-month marriage.

The trial judge ordered the appellant husband, who had a net worth of approximately $20 million, to pay $500,000 in lump sum spousal support to the respondent wife.

The husband appealed, arguing that the short duration of the marriage did not justify spousal support, or alternatively, that support should be periodic and limited to three years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the wife's earning capacity was impaired by the marriage and her parenting responsibilities.

The Court held that a lump sum was appropriate to promote her economic self-sufficiency and allow her to acquire stable housing for herself and the parties' child.

The appellants, comprising children of residential school attendees and estates of deceased attendees, appealed an order striking their claims against the federal Crown and other defendants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the secondary plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the federal Crown, finding it was not plain and obvious that the duty did not extend to them despite not being born at the time of the alleged breaches.

However, the Court upheld the striking of the Family Law Act claims, as the Act does not operate retroactively, and the estate claims, which were statute-barred under the Trustee Act.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for constructive dismissal to the respondent employee and dismissing the employer's counterclaim.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's numerous interjections and premature comments on the merits of the case prevented a fair presentation of its defence and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for injuries suffered when he was struck as a pedestrian by an unidentified motor vehicle.

The trial judge found the accident occurred in a vacant parking lot, not on a public highway, and therefore the reverse onus provision under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act did not apply.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant failed to prove the accident happened on a highway and that negligence could not be inferred from the injuries alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The corporate defendant was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following an investigation into asbestos exposure.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding that the Crown's unexplained pre-charge delay amounted to an abuse of process, which was upheld on initial appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the lower courts erred in inferring prejudice to the corporate accused and improperly placed a burden on the Crown to explain pre-charge delay absent bad faith, effectively creating a judicial limitation period.

The appellant appealed his convictions for wilfully attempting to obstruct justice and failing to comply with a recognizance, arising from conversations with a Crown witness while awaiting trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge erred by failing to assess the appellant's mens rea regarding his belief that, as a self-represented accused, he was permitted to speak to witnesses.

Furthermore, the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the witness felt intimidated, which the Crown conceded was not supported by the record.

Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a child protection application, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The court set aside the application judge's costs order against the foster parents, finding they were motivated by the children's best interests rather than self-interest.

The court noted it is not the norm to award costs against unsuccessful applicants in child protection cases.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs for both the application and the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by treating the offence similarly to importing cocaine.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by using importing cases as a benchmark.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to six years, noting the appellant's age and criminal record.

The respondent brought a motion to enforce a prior order and to dismiss the appellant's appeal for alleged breaches.

The Court of Appeal declined to dismiss the appeal, finding the facts did not justify such a remedy.

Instead, the court ordered the appeal to be expedited and imposed strict deadlines on the appellant to pay for and file the required transcripts, failing which the respondent could move again to dismiss the appeal.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay rent, remove his boathouse, and enjoining him from entering the respondent's property.

The trial judge found the boathouse was situated on the respondent's land and a landlord-tenant relationship existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the boathouse was at least partly on the respondent's land and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed.

The Court amended the trial judge's order, which was overly broad in declaring the respondent owned all the land on which the boathouse rested, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, now 43 years old, was charged with historical sexual offences against his sister, allegedly committed when he was between 14 and 18 years old.

The Crown successfully applied to transfer the charges from youth court to ordinary court under the Young Offenders Act.

The appellant applied for a review of the transfer order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the youth court system is ill-suited to meet the rehabilitative needs of a mature offender and that placing a 43-year-old in a youth facility would pose a risk to other young offenders.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and disguise with intent.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's former girlfriend, who initially provided a false alibi but later recanted and testified that the appellant confessed to her.

The trial judge drew an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to testify, treating it as an exception under Noble because he found the alibi was fabricated.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in drawing this adverse inference, as the defence did not advance an alibi at trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, which was based solely on the eyewitness identification of the complainant, a taxi driver.

The Court of Appeal found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to discrepancies in the complainant's descriptions, the brief and stressful nature of the encounter, and flaws in the photo line-up.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeals, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The appellants argued for no costs due to the novelty and public interest of the issues, while the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle and the appellants' conduct.

The Court of Appeal rejected both positions, noting that Rule 49.10 does not apply to appeals.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $25,000 total for both proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown introduced statements made by the appellant to third parties, which contained both inculpatory and exculpatory elements.

The trial judge instructed the jury that only the inculpatory portions of these statements could be used for the truth of their contents.

On appeal, the Crown conceded this was an error, as exculpatory portions of statements introduced by the Crown become evidence for the accused.

The Court of Appeal found the error was highly prejudicial, as it deprived the appellant of the combined defences of self-defence and accident, and declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge, who had overturned the respondent's conviction for 'over 80' while having care or control of a motor vehicle.

The respondent had driven her vehicle into a ditch and subsequently consumed more alcohol before police arrived.

The trial judge rejected her evidence of post-offence drinking and found she had care or control of the operable vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by substituting his own findings of fact regarding care or control and credibility, and by faulting the trial judge's application of the W.D. test.

The conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found three significant errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury: failing to properly instruct on the Carter co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, failing to warn the jury about the frailties of eyewitness identification, and failing to instruct the jury to disregard evidence related to a directed verdict of acquittal.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their third party claim against the officers and directors of the plaintiff corporation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in holding that a claim for contribution could not be maintained and that the representations of the third parties had to be made outside the scope of their office.

The Court held it was not plain and obvious that the third party claim could not succeed, set aside the dismissal, and awarded costs to the appellants.

The appellant appealed a judgment of Justice Juriansz.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court's conclusion and reasons.

The court also granted leave to appeal the costs decision but dismissed that cross-appeal, finding no error in principle in fixing costs based on a summary procedure quantum.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $7,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The sole issue at trial was the identification of the attacker.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the cumulative effect of several trial errors necessitated a new trial.

These errors included inadequate jury instructions on the frailties of eyewitness and in-dock identification, improperly allowing a prior unadopted statement to be considered for its truth, and admitting inadmissible police opinion evidence regarding the correctness of the arrest.