Reasonable doubt

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a fist fight at a football game.

He argued the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment to obtain a transcript for a section 11(b) Charter application, and in failing to apply the principles of R. v. W.(D.) when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the denial of the adjournment.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's reasons suggested she believed the Crown witnesses simply because she disbelieved the defence witnesses, contrary to the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge directed his mind to the application of W.(D.).

The court noted that the foundation for the conviction was evident from the record and the defence position was utterly implausible.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a driving offence involving excessive speed and racing.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence and failing to strictly follow the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly considered all evidence and that the sentence was entirely fit given the finding that the appellant was racing.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to explicitly apply the second step of the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge omitted the second step, her overall reasons, including her strong credibility findings, demonstrated she considered whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the burden of proof, motive to lie, and the risk of innocent collusion between the complainants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. framework by asking if his evidence 'might reasonably be true' rather than if it raised a reasonable doubt.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the inapt phrase, the trial judge clearly understood the Crown bore the burden of proof throughout.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the error could have affected the verdict given the credibility issues.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judgment that upheld her conviction.

She argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, ignored the requirements of R. v. W.(D.), and improperly relied on prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided an adequate analysis of the evidence, applied the proper burden of proof, and did not rely on prior discreditable conduct in his assessment.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s pre-Lifchus jury charge failed to properly distinguish proof beyond a reasonable doubt from proof on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the substantial compliance approach from post-Lifchus Supreme Court authorities, the court held that the charge, read as a whole and in the context of the full trial, adequately conveyed the very high criminal standard of proof.

The court found no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the burden or standard of proof and no serious concern about the validity of the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, including the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation following a jury trial.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was inadequate, as it failed to distance reasonable doubt from a balance of probabilities and referred to it as an expression used in ordinary speech.

The Crown argued that defence counsel's closing address cured any defect in the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the charge deficient and concluding that the jury's expressed exasperation with defence counsel made it dangerous to assume they accepted her instructions on the law.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence, arguing primarily that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus jury instruction on reasonable doubt contained reversible error.

The majority held that although the charge improperly suggested reasonable doubt had its ordinary meaning and failed to state that probable guilt was insufficient, the charge as a whole substantially complied with Lifchus because it strongly linked reasonable doubt to the presumption of innocence and clearly framed the self-defence issue.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the combined misdirection and non-direction created a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, raising five issues regarding the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt was adequate and substantially complied with the requirements.

The Court also found no errors in the trial judge's review of evidence on intent, instructions on circumstantial evidence, handling of the deceased's statements, or conclusions regarding the appellant's character evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the hatchet killing of the victim.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on consciousness of guilt, the admissibility of tattoo evidence, the Crown's theory of an attack on an unknown victim, and the charge on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a 'no probative value' instruction for post-offence conduct was not required because the conduct was relevant to identifying the murderer.

The court also held that the pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the required standard.

The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.

The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault male, sexual assault, and buggery, relating to historical allegations of abuse against a younger relative.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt substantially complied with the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions, which told the jury that 'reasonable doubt' had no special legal meaning and could be determined using their everyday life experiences, failed to locate the standard above a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica with drugs hidden in her purse.

Her sole defence was that she was an 'unknowing mule'.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt could not arise from an absence of evidence, and repeated this error when answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this misdirection was a reversible error, as the jury likely misapprehended the correct standard of proof regarding the lack of direct evidence of the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness identification, including testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellants argued that the verdict against one of them was unreasonable, and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the assessment of a witness's credibility, the application of the 'might reasonably be true' test, and the definition of reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable given the confirmatory evidence available.

The Court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions, while not perfect in light of subsequent jurisprudence, did not constitute reversible error.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had wrongly based the conviction on preferring the complainant's evidence over the accused's, rather than determining whether the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The accused was acquitted of three counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them to reject the accused's out-of-court confession if his trial testimony raised a reasonable doubt about it.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not improperly instruct the jury to evaluate the evidence in a piecemeal or two-stage fashion.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial that hinged on the credibility of the accused versus the complainant.

During the main charge, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, in a brief recharge requested by the Crown, the judge erroneously framed the core issue as whether the jury believed the complainant or the accused, omitting the third alternative that they might disbelieve the accused but still have a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, despite the error in the recharge, the charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the proper standard of proof, given the correct instructions in the main charge and the short time elapsed before the recharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with conspiring with a police officer to obstruct justice, attempted obstruction of justice, and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts, finding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the conspiracy count, finding the trial judge's doubt was purely conjectural.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's doubt regarding the conspiracy and obstruction charges was based on the evidence and did not constitute an error of law.

Furthermore, the request for money without threats or violence did not amount to extortion.