Raynold Bélanger

A municipal fire and water services appeal arising from a hotel fire in Quebec where hydrants were snowed in, frozen, broken, or unusable, and firefighters allegedly committed operational faults while fighting the blaze.

The Court held that public law governs when private law applies to municipalities, but once a municipality moves from policy to operational implementation, liability is determined under Quebec civil law, including arts. 1053 et seq.

C.C.L.C. The city was liable for negligent maintenance of hydrants and for firefighting faults that causally contributed to additional fire damage.

The Court restored the trial judgment subject to a deduction of $77,000 for incidental reopening expenses and corrected the calculation of the additional indemnity under art. 1056c.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with conspiring with a police officer to obstruct justice, attempted obstruction of justice, and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts, finding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the conspiracy count, finding the trial judge's doubt was purely conjectural.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's doubt regarding the conspiracy and obstruction charges was based on the evidence and did not constitute an error of law.

Furthermore, the request for money without threats or violence did not amount to extortion.

The appellants failed to file their inscription in appeal in the trial court registry within the required deadline because the trial record had been urgently transferred to the Court of Appeal for a suspension motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and denied a motion for special leave to appeal under art. 523 C.C.P. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the dismissal of the appeal but allowed the appeal regarding special leave.

The Court held that the 'impossibility to act' requirement under art. 523 must be assessed from the party's perspective, not their counsel's, and that the ends of justice required granting leave since the opposing party suffered no prejudice from the procedural error.