Publication ban

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his three-year custodial sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in relying on R. v. A.J.K. as mandating a minimum three-year sentence for penetration, and that she failed to consider relevant R. v. Friesen factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not apply a minimum sentence but rather a fit range, and appropriately considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness of digital penetration.

The defendant, Christian Almendares, was charged with two counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.D., the court found that the defendant's evidence created a reasonable doubt.

The court also expressed concerns about the overall reliability and context of the complainant's evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges were dismissed.

Ralph King was sentenced after being found guilty of sexual assault against three women during private healing ceremonies where he acted as a spiritual healer.

The offences involved inappropriate physical contact under the guise of healing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of a position of trust, significant impact on victims (two of whom were Indigenous and had prior trauma), multiple victims, and fraud.

Mitigating factors included his compliance with release conditions, prosocial lifestyle, and health issues.

The court emphasized the interplay between s. 718.04 (vulnerable victims, particularly Indigenous women, mandating primary consideration of denunciation and deterrence) and s. 718.2(e) (Gladue principles for Indigenous offenders).

The court found that the harm done to the victims and the Indigenous community, coupled with the lack of remorse, necessitated a significant custodial sentence.

This appeal addresses the application of the open court principle to court-approved settlements involving minors or persons under disability, as required by Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought sealing orders for motion records related to these settlements, arguing that such motions, heard in writing, are not subject to the open court principle, or that the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, privacy interests, and solicitor-client privilege justify sealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming that the open court principle applies to written proceedings and that neither parens patriae nor solicitor-client privilege provides a freestanding basis for sealing orders.

The court found that the appellants did not meet the Sherman test for a sealing order, as the privacy interests were not at serious risk of undermining dignity, and the protection of minors/disabled persons and solicitor-client privilege were not seriously jeopardized by public access.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence regarding sleeping arrangements and erred in the authentication of photographs.

The sentence appeal challenged the trial judge's consideration of a conditional sentence in light of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal precedents concerning sexual assault against children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and no error in principle in sentencing.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.

The accused, N.J., was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent, assessed through the credibility and reliability of the complainant, J.H., and the accused.

The court rejected the accused's implausible testimony, finding it undermined his credibility.

Despite some minor inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, her testimony was found to be clear, concise, cogent, logical, and plausible, corroborated by text messages and a nurse practitioner's report.

The court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and registered a conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with probation.

The appeal raised numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial bias, misapprehension of law, failures to assess credibility, non-disclosure, evidentiary inconsistencies, inappropriate limitation of amicus curiae, prejudicial media coverage, insufficient evidence, and Charter s. 11(b) issues.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record and found no error, dismissing the appeal.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for dismissing a s. 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in a sexual assault case.

The court analyzed three periods of delay, attributing some to defence and characterizing significant portions as institutional delay due to persistent physical and technological failures at the Burlington courthouse (HVAC failure, malfunctioning CCTV equipment).

Despite these systemic issues, the total delay of 16 months, 2 weeks, fell below the 18-month Jordan presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and the defence's decision not to utilize an earlier trial date contributed to the overall timeline.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal regarding the appointment of a litigation administrator.

The moving parties argued that the appointment was an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal.

The responding parties contended that the order became final because it was joined with a final order validating a provisional opt-out form.

The Court found that the appointment of a litigation administrator is an interlocutory order, distinct from decisions made under that authority.

Consequently, the appeal from the order appointing the litigation administrator was quashed, while the appeal concerning the opt-out form remained.

Following a trial where the offender was found guilty of sexual assault involving penetrative intercourse, the court delivered its sentencing decision.

The victim suffered profound and lasting physical, emotional, psychological, and financial harm.

The Crown sought a minimum of 3 years imprisonment, while the defence proposed a 24-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the violent and invasive nature of the crime and numerous aggravating factors.

Despite the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and potential immigration consequences, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years in the penitentiary, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a 25-year SOIRA order.

The accused, Blake Stacey, pleaded guilty to touching a 15-year-old for a sexual purpose, contrary to s.151 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence as primary in child sexual offence cases, alongside significant mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, Indigenous background (Gladue factors), and substantial rehabilitative efforts.

The accused had suffered childhood sexual abuse linked to Indian day schools and was at a low point due to trauma and substance abuse at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought 3-4 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 months (2.5 years) imprisonment, finding it sufficient given the mitigating factors.

The court also imposed a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, a DNA order, and specific s.161 Criminal Code orders for 10 years, prohibiting communication with the victim and certain internet use with minors, but declined broader prohibitions on attending places where children congregate or positions of trust.

The appellant, William James Epp, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of penetration was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the seven-year imprisonment sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, the appellant's age and prior record, and the harm caused.

The Crown applied for an order to protect the identities of a civilian police agent and an undercover officer involved in the investigation of a criminal case against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who faced charges including manslaughter, first-degree murder, robbery, and arson.

The application was brought under sections 486.31(1) and 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused did not oppose the order, and no media intervened.

The court granted the order, finding it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the safety and security of the police agent and undercover officer from intimidation or retaliation, while balancing this need with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

The order specified terms for pseudonyms, non-disclosure of identifying information, publication bans, and restrictions on recording and access to exhibits.

The Crown sought to vary an unsealing order for an Information to Obtain (ITO) related to a search warrant execution that resulted in a fatality, requesting to seal the identity of a civilian Toronto Police Service employee or impose a five-year publication ban.

The media outlets opposed the application.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the evidence did not objectively establish a serious risk to an important public interest sufficient to dislodge the presumption of openness under the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as refined by Sherman Estate v. Donovan.

The court noted the threats were directed at the officer who shot the deceased, not the civilian employee, and the link between the employee's identity and potential harm was speculative.

This decision addresses an ex parte application for a restraining order under s. 4 of the Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking Act, 2017, seeking to compel the respondent to stay away from the victim and destroy intimate images.

The court, noting this was the first such application in the Oshawa courthouse, provided reasons for its decision.

Despite finding the applicant's evidence compelling for an ex parte order, the application was deficient in form, particularly regarding publication bans and service details.

The court granted an interim 30-day restraining order instead of the requested 3-year order, allowing the applicant to rectify deficiencies and the respondent an opportunity to participate after service.

This is a judicial interim release (bail) hearing where the Crown sought the detention of the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court considered the accused's lengthy and violent criminal record, including previous convictions for assault and probation breaches, and current allegations of attempted murder and criminal harassment.

The proposed release plan, involving the Toronto Bail Program and electronic monitoring, was deemed insufficient to mitigate public safety concerns given the gravity of the alleged offences and the accused's history.

The court also considered the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code but found that the Crown had met its onus for detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused, Arthur R.C. Rule, pleaded guilty to accessing and possessing child pornography.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 18 to 24 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence, arguing extraordinary personal and medical circumstances and bringing a constitutional challenge to the sentencing provisions.

The court reviewed the extensive collection of child pornography, the accused's background, medical conditions, and the impact on victims.

Applying the principles of sentencing and recent jurisprudence, particularly R. v. Friesen, the court found that a conditional sentence was not available and would offend the proportionality principle.

A custodial sentence of 22 months was imposed, followed by a 3-year probation order with strict conditions, including internet monitoring and restrictions on contact with minors.

The Crown applied to revoke Sam Tsega's bail pending sentencing after he was found guilty of manslaughter.

Tsega was initially charged with murder but tried for manslaughter, meaning his bail was not automatically revoked post-conviction under s. 523(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought revocation based on the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice) under s. 515(10) of the Code.

The court reviewed five principles for post-conviction bail revocation, emphasizing that the Crown must generally present new facts.

The court found that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown were known when Tsega was initially granted bail by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and no new facts or breaches of conditions were alleged.

Considering the relatively short delay until sentencing and potential difficulties for Tsega to prepare while incarcerated due to the pandemic, the court concluded that the Crown had not shown that immediate incarceration was required to maintain public confidence.

The application to revoke bail was denied.

Mitchell Dubros appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash his committal for trial on a charge of obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, affirming that a preliminary inquiry judge's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is owed great deference.

The court held that there was "any evidence" to meet the threshold for committal, specifically evidence of threats made to dissuade witnesses, which constitutes obstruction of justice under s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code, and that the mental element of the offence was sufficiently established.

The appeal was dismissed.