Publication ban

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

The appellant, N.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility were insufficient and conclusory, failing to provide an adequate explanation for perceived inconsistencies in testimony.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not explicitly addressing the mens rea requirement of the sexual assault offence, having only found that the actus reus was proven.

The court emphasized the necessity for trial judges to provide comprehensive reasons that allow for proper appellate review of all elements of an offence.

The defendant was charged with nine criminal offences, including uttering threats, criminal harassment, and breaching bail orders, against his former spouse and her mother.

The court assessed witness credibility and circumstantial evidence, applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty of four counts (contact contrary to a release order, uttering threats to the complainant, criminal harassment, and uttering threats to the complainant's mother) and acquitted of five counts due to insufficient proof of authorship of certain social media messages or lack of evidence regarding specific release orders.

This endorsement addresses the publication of a decision concerning an application under s. 680 of the Criminal Code to set aside a detention order.

Due to a pre-existing non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, which applies via s. 28 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the full decision will not be publicly available until the publication ban ceases to be in effect.

The applicant, Craig M., sought bail release pending appeal of his conviction for sexual offences.

His appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging inadequate advice regarding his right to testify and mode of trial, and general inadequate performance.

The court found the claims regarding mode of trial and general performance frivolous.

While the claim about advice on testifying was not frivolous, it did not clearly surpass the "not frivolous" threshold due to a lack of supporting evidence, absence of a waiver of privilege, and problematic, evolving affidavits.

Given the seriousness of the offences and the weakness of the proposed appeal, the application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Justine Watson, was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, DNA from a Presto card registered to the defendant found at the scene, and similarities in appearance and possessions.

The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable in parts but accepted the security video evidence.

The court admitted hearsay evidence regarding the Presto card's chain of custody due to necessity and threshold reliability.

Ultimately, the court found the cumulative circumstantial evidence compelling, excluding other reasonable alternatives, and entered a finding of guilt.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, assault, and criminal harassment, alleging errors by the trial judge in assessing the complainant's credibility, placing undue weight on demeanour, accepting specific evidence, assessing photographic evidence, and unevenly scrutinizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered all inconsistencies, did not overemphasize demeanour, and was entitled to her conclusions on the evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

This decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario serves as a notice regarding a non-publication order imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code.

The order prohibits the publication of evidence, information, representations, and reasons from the underlying bail hearing.

Consequently, the full decision on the application to set aside a detention order will not be publicly available on the court's website until the non-publication order expires.

A physical copy is available at the Court Registry in the interim.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an identified error by the summary conviction appeal court judge regarding consent versus capacity to consent.

However, the court found this error inconsequential given the trial judge's thorough analysis of the evidence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, theft under $5,000, and unlawful confinement, stemming from an altercation with a complainant in a hotel room.

The trial judge had acquitted on other charges (sexual assault, robbery, choking, threatening death) where proof depended entirely on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence.

The appellant argued misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and error in the self-defence analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension, noting the trial judge's reasoned rejection of the appellant's evidence.

It also found no uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge carefully examined both sides and properly applied rules of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor, which negated the self-defence claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerns the application of a non-publication order under section 486.5(9) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario analyzed the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estate test for discretionary publication bans, balancing privacy interests against the open court principle.

The court confirmed that the mandatory publication ban under section 486.5(9) applies to information related to the application for the ban itself, and amended the lower court's order to explicitly include this mandatory ban.

The appellant, Joshua Brown, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making available child pornography, and his three-year penitentiary sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds were unreasonable verdict and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The sentence appeal grounds included reliance on an incorrect volume of child pornography and unproven aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and reasons sufficient, and that the inference of guilt was the only reasonable one.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in considering 2,500 files instead of 500, this error did not impact the fitness of the significant sentence warranted by the large quantity of child pornography.

The appellant, Anibal Rivera, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was consent, specifically regarding condom use.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis, the alternative finding of fraud vitiating consent, and the use of the complainant's hospital attendance to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, the fraud analysis was superfluous but not inconsistent with the primary finding of non-consent, and the complainant's hospital visit was appropriately used to corroborate her evidence regarding condom use and not to suggest that pursuing charges enhanced credibility.

This is an appeal from convictions for threatening, assault, and sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding peripheral Crown witnesses and alleged misapprehension of his own evidence concerning the sexual assault incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. C.L.Y., and reasonably assessed witness credibility.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the appellant's evidence was improbable and lacked credibility.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

Byron Carr, charged with mischief, obstructing police, and failure to obey a court order related to the "freedom convoy" occupation, brought a s. 520 bail review.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances.

The court granted bail, finding that the tertiary ground for detention was inapplicable given the mass nature of the alleged crimes and varying degrees of culpability.

The applicant satisfied the primary and secondary grounds for release with a new, robust plan, including two sureties (one a retired police officer), a $3500 bond, and strict conditions on social media, communication with organizers, and travel to Ottawa.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences involving his daughter.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing different levels of scrutiny, misapplication of *R. v. W.(D.)*, and misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's entitlement to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's, and finding no significant errors in the application of legal principles or assessment of evidence.

The appellant appealed a 15-year prohibition order imposed under s. 161(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following convictions for possessing, accessing, and making available child pornography.

The appellant argued the order was too long, beyond statutory provisions, too onerous, and insufficiently tailored.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's discretion, finding no error in principle or unreasonableness in the 15-year duration or the general conditions.

The court accepted two minor concessions from the Crown regarding specific conditions: a clarification on reporting IP addresses and a two-year maximum duration for inspection and monitoring requirements.

The appeal was largely dismissed, with the original order replaced by a new one incorporating these minor changes.

The appellant, Hussein Kelkas, appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual assault involving two complainants.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The trial judge found the complainants credible and the appellant's evidence incredible.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence, impermissible judicial notice, improper bolstering of credibility, and a finding of fact without evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or credibility, and no impermissible use of judicial notice.

This decision addresses an ex parte application for a publication ban under section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code, brought by police officers in Intake Court.

The Justice of the Peace dismissed the application, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The primary reasons were that the application was not made by a Crown attorney, and that publication bans, even if mandatory when requested by the Crown, cannot be granted ex parte in Intake Court, which is not an open court proceeding.

The court emphasized the strong public policy favoring open courts and judicial accountability, stating that such orders require public notice.