Did not participate

The applicants sought adverse possession of a 16-acre parcel lying within adjoining owners' registered boundaries, relying on a fence line, historical cattle pasturing, and seasonal hunting use between 1955 and 1965.

Applying the adverse possession framework under s. 5(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act, the court found open, notorious, and continuous use during the relevant ten-year period, but held the claim failed because the applicants did not prove the use was adverse to the title holder or establish a shared mutual mistake about the boundary.

The court also rejected the submission that a payment under the respondents' title insurance policy affected the merits of the possessory title analysis.

The application was dismissed, the cross-application was granted, the respondents were declared to hold absolute title without restriction, and the applicants were ordered to remove their chattels from the disputed lands at their own cost.

The applicant sought to appeal a summary judgment order but failed to perfect the appeal by not filing an issued and entered order.

A prior motion to dispense with this requirement was denied by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The applicant then brought a motion before a panel of the Court of Appeal to set aside or vary that denial order.

The panel dismissed the applicant's request, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the motion judge's decision, and noted the applicant's failure to provide particulars for his allegations.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought an urgent motion to set aside a Summons to Witness served by Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services (Kina) on the child A.L.P. in a Secure Treatment Application proceeding.

Kina sought to question the child, arguing it was permissible under the Family Law Rules.

The OCL argued that Secure Treatment Applications fall under Part VII of the CYFSA, not Part V (Child Protection), and therefore Rule 20(3) regarding questioning as a right does not apply.

The court agreed with the OCL, finding that Rule 20(3) does not apply to Secure Treatment Applications and that Kina should have brought a motion under Rule 20(5) for an order to question the child, which it failed to do.

The OCL's motion was granted, and the Summons to Witness was set aside.

This appeal addresses the application of the open court principle to court-approved settlements involving minors or persons under disability, as required by Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought sealing orders for motion records related to these settlements, arguing that such motions, heard in writing, are not subject to the open court principle, or that the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, privacy interests, and solicitor-client privilege justify sealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming that the open court principle applies to written proceedings and that neither parens patriae nor solicitor-client privilege provides a freestanding basis for sealing orders.

The court found that the appellants did not meet the Sherman test for a sealing order, as the privacy interests were not at serious risk of undermining dignity, and the protection of minors/disabled persons and solicitor-client privilege were not seriously jeopardized by public access.

The applicant mother sought an urgent motion to change existing access arrangements due to the temporary closure of a supervised access centre (New Beginnings) during the COVID-19 pandemic, which had halted her face-to-face access with her children.

The children were in the custody of their paternal grandmother.

The court assessed the request against the Chief Justice of Ontario's Notice to the Profession regarding urgent family law events during the emergency period.

The court concluded that the frustration of face-to-face access met the definition of urgency, allowing the motion to proceed, limited to the issue of access exchange procedures.

Procedural orders for filing and service were issued.

The applicant estate trustee sought to pass the accounts of her late mother's estate.

Two of her sisters objected, alleging that the applicant had improperly managed estate funds and that various inter vivos transfers from the mother to the applicant were loans that needed to be repaid to the estate.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust and the Locke factors, finding that the transfers were gifts, not loans.

The court passed the accounts and ordered the four sisters to equally share the burden of the estate's unexpected tax liability by repaying a portion of their interim distributions.