Dan Lemaire

The accused, Blake Stacey, pleaded guilty to touching a 15-year-old for a sexual purpose, contrary to s.151 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence as primary in child sexual offence cases, alongside significant mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, Indigenous background (Gladue factors), and substantial rehabilitative efforts.

The accused had suffered childhood sexual abuse linked to Indian day schools and was at a low point due to trauma and substance abuse at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought 3-4 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 months (2.5 years) imprisonment, finding it sufficient given the mitigating factors.

The court also imposed a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, a DNA order, and specific s.161 Criminal Code orders for 10 years, prohibiting communication with the victim and certain internet use with minors, but declined broader prohibitions on attending places where children congregate or positions of trust.

The accused was charged with impaired operation (care or control) after being found in the driver's seat of her vehicle with the engine running and elevated blood alcohol readings.

The defence rebutted the presumption of operation by establishing that the accused had a concrete plan not to drive, supported by the credible testimony of a sober passenger who had arranged for a ride.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove a realistic risk of danger beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant, William Leahy, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by a drug.

He was found passed out in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the engine running.

The court addressed whether the defendant rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code, and if so, whether the Crown proved de facto care or control by demonstrating a realistic risk of danger.

The court found that the defendant rebutted the presumption, distinguishing prior case law (Hatfield and Miller) by emphasizing that the impaired occupancy of the driver's seat did not begin with an intention to set the vehicle in motion.

The court also found no realistic risk that the defendant would change his mind and drive or unintentionally set the vehicle in motion.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty.