Publication ban

The appellant was convicted by jury of sexual assault and touching a person under the age of 16 for a sexual purpose against his stepdaughter.

The trial judge imposed a four-year sentence on the sexual touching count and stayed the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on four grounds: the prejudicial effect of evidence regarding the complainant's mother's conviction for invitation to sexual touching; errors in the trial judge's ruling on a third-party records application; errors in the jury charge; and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the grounds raised.

The appellants appealed their convictions for human trafficking and procurement into prostitution.

The trial judge found that while the complainant voluntarily entered the sex trade, the appellants subsequently exercised control over her, withheld her earnings, and forced her to work against her wishes.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as unreasonable, alleging the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to reconcile inconsistencies, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding ample evidence supported the verdicts and the trial judge properly addressed credibility issues and deficiencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for receiving a financial benefit from sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

Duty counsel argued that the trial judge erred in applying the presumption under subsection (3) when other findings suggested uncertainty about whether the complainant gave all earnings to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption and noting that the trial judge's findings regarding control for a second charge did not undermine the presumption's application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of assault, one count of sexual assault, and one count of unlawful confinement arising from a domestic relationship.

The appellant was acquitted of four other charges and one charge was withdrawn.

He was sentenced to 21 months in jail and three years probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of a Charter section 11(b) delay motion and raised three grounds of appeal relating to credibility evaluation and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the complaint due to pressure from his father.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instruction that "the timing of the disclosure signifies nothing," arguing it was improper in the context of the case.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction was ill-advised but not misleading when considered in context with the full charge and counsel's closing addresses.

The court clarified the instruction referred to delay between incidents and disclosure, not the circumstances of disclosure.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the victim fine surcharge was set aside with Crown consent.

This is a motion decision regarding a non-publication order imposed at a bail hearing.

A section 517 Criminal Code non-publication order was in effect, precluding publication of evidence, information, representations, and reasons.

The full decision in the underlying appeal contains information covered by the non-publication order and therefore was not immediately available on the Court of Appeal for Ontario's website pending the cessation of the order.

Appeal from a conviction entered by a Superior Court judge sitting with a jury on charges of sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on two grounds: first, that the jury should have been specifically cautioned that the appellant's failure to return to Canada immediately upon learning of the charges could not be used as evidence of guilt; and second, that the jury should have been instructed that if they found the complainant deliberately lied about a specific incident (the "2008 event"), they could use that lie to reject all of her evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the appellant's delay in returning could be relevant to credibility, the trial judge's instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that they must assess the complainant's entire testimony in context and that deliberate lies are relevant to credibility.

The appellant was convicted of three sexual offences committed against different complainants during a professional relationship and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment to be served in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions while the Crown appealed the sentence.

Following the appellant's death during the appeal process, the court considered whether to proceed with the appeals or dismiss them as moot.

The court dismissed both appeals as moot, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the general rule that an accused's death renders an appeal moot.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation by a Superior Court judge and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment concurrent on both counts, plus two years' probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed the convictions on four grounds: uneven scrutiny of witness credibility, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, failure to address the Crown's failure to call certain witnesses, and improper admission of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault against his step-granddaughter.

The trial judge found that the appellant sexually assaulted the complainant on multiple visits over a nine-year period, characterizing the assaults as part of an ongoing course of conduct.

The complainant acquiesced to the appellant's demands out of fear and therefore did not consent.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by drawing a negative inference from the absence of medical evidence regarding the appellant's physical capability, and that the trial judge failed to apply the third step of the W.(D) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

Media outlets applied for access to exhibits filed in 2003 proceedings where Bruce McArthur pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The exhibits included a psychological report and pre-sentence report.

McArthur, facing murder charges, opposed release arguing it would prejudice his fair trial rights.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and granted access to the reports with redactions of family members' names and residential information, finding the open court principle presumptively favoured disclosure and McArthur failed to establish a serious risk to fair trial rights.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house following a seven-day trial.

He received a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment and two years of probation.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding serious deficiencies in the appellant's bail compliance history, material omissions in his affidavits regarding outstanding breach charges, and insufficient grounds of appeal to overcome public interest considerations.

The trial judge's findings regarding the victim's incapacity to consent due to extreme intoxication were well-grounded in evidence and revealed no obvious error.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference and were properly reasoned.

The trial judge had provided ample justification for accepting the complainant's evidence and properly assessed conflicting testimony.

The court found no differential standard of scrutiny was applied to defence evidence and that the trial judge properly cautioned himself against treating the case as merely a credibility test.

Paternal grandparents sought to be added as parties to a child protection proceeding and requested interim access to three children (ages 13, 10, and 4) whose mother was murdered and whose father was charged with first-degree murder.

The children were placed in the care of maternal grandparents.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding that adding the paternal grandparents as parties was not in the children's best interests, would unduly delay proceedings, and was not necessary to determine the issues.

The court also dismissed claims for interim access and documentary disclosure, and refused to admit a transcript from the father's criminal preliminary hearing due to fairness concerns and publication ban restrictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

Originally charged on a sixteen-count indictment alleging sexual offences against three teenage girls under age 16, the Crown invited dismissal of thirteen counts.

The trial judge acquitted on sexual exploitation and sexual assault charges but convicted on sexual interference.

Seven months later, the trial judge set aside the sexual interference conviction and substituted a sexual assault conviction, imposing a suspended sentence and two years' probation.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper reliance on evidence of a witness regarding different counts, misapplication of the burden of proof, and inadequate reasons for differential credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and provided sufficient reasons.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of a thirteen-year-old cousin.

The primary ground of appeal was that the appellant received ineffective assistance from trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting that trial counsel had conducted an extensive and rigorous cross-examination of the complainant.

The trial judge had provided detailed reasons for disbelieving the appellant and accepting the complainant's evidence, finding consistency on core issues.

The Court found no basis to suggest that a different approach by trial counsel would have led to a different result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a half-sibling of the complainant, appealed a conviction for sexual abuse.

The trial judge found it dangerous to convict on most of the complainant's allegations but convicted on one incident (the basement incident) where the complainant provided detailed testimony corroborated by the parents' observations.

The appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that the parents' evidence contained inconsistencies with the complainant's account, and second, that the conviction was unreasonable given witness inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and was entitled to accept the complainant's detailed account despite minor inconsistencies attributable to the passage of eight years.

Appeal from conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum correcting an error in the prohibition order.

The trial judge had failed to specify the duration of the prohibition order.

The Court varied the order to impose a 15-year term to the prohibition order as a whole, in accordance with the appellant's request and the Crown's concession.

The court determined whether the offence of human trafficking, as committed by the accused against two young women, constitutes a serious personal injury offence (SPIO) under section 752 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted of exercising control over the victims, trafficking in persons, receiving material benefit from trafficking, withholding passports, and obstructing justice.

The court found that the trafficking offence met the SPIO definition through implied threats of violence and severe psychological harm, though the court declined to find that human trafficking inherently constitutes an SPIO in all cases.

The court considered an application for a publication ban following the guilty plea of David Cake to obstructing justice.

The applicant Anthony George, charged separately in connection with the same incident, sought a complete publication ban to protect his right to a fair trial.

The Crown supported a limited ban, while media intervenors opposed any restrictions.

The court granted a partial, temporary publication ban, permitting publication of certain facts regarding Cake's plea and conduct while restricting publication of evidence concerning the cause of death and any references to George or co-accused Mielke.

The court considered the Dagenais test, the importance of open court principles, and systemic discrimination affecting aboriginal accused persons.